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When people have limited resources on hand, the immediate social network presents an impor-
tant source of support. In particular for economically less developed countries this has been
well-documented. A large proportion of the population in these countries is self-employed and
thus faces highly fluctuating income (Banerjee and Duflo 2007; Charmes 2012). While with the
promotion of microfinance, access to credit is nowadays less constrained, financial institutions
seldom offer emergency loans and the available credit products are often not suited to deal with
day-to-day income fluctuations (Collins et al. 2009; Karlan and Mullainathan 2013). When in-
come is insufficient, people thus borrow informally from neighbors, relatives and friends in order
to cover the costs of their daily expenses (Udry 1994; Fafchamps 2008; Kinnan and Townsend
2012); likewise, in rural communities subsistence farmers borrow rice and other crops from neigh-
boring farmers to cope with yield fluctuations and staggered crop cycles (Platteau 2000). In case
of health emergencies, the social network assumes insurance functions. In countries where health
insurance is non-existent or inaccessible for the poor and state-provided assistance is insufficient,
monetary and in-kind support by relatives and friends are shown to be a major strategy to cover
health related expenditures and to cope with foregone income (Fafchamps and Lund 2003; De
Weerdt and Dercon 2006; De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2011). Support by the social network is
not confined to monetary and in-kind transfers. In particular in rural areas, labor markets are
often not well developed, and when people are in need of short-term labor assistance, e.g. for
the harvest season, they tend to turn to their social network for labor support (Krishnan and
Sciubba 2009; Mekonnen and Dorfman 2013).
Inspired by early anthropological studies (Malinowski 1922; Mauss 1954; Scott 1976), struc-
ture and functioning of informal support has become a focus in economic research. The observed
forms of support are found to share a number of distinct features. Support is provided between
people who know each other well (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007a).
Support is typically not confined to a one-time act of assistance but is part of a longer-term
arrangement (Kranton 1996; Ligon et al. 2002; Jackson et al. 2012). This arrangement is seldom
the outcome of explicit negotiations, rather it is built on an implicit agreement on “unwritten,
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
but well-understood, rules that specify the level and direction of transfers of goods and services”
(Kranton 1996, p.830). Furthermore, the majority of the observed support arrangements appear
to be mutual – i.e., each party of the arrangement is expected to provide support. Different mo-
tives can explain why people engage in support arrangements (Cox and Fafchamps 2007; Ligon
and Schechter 2012): they might derive pleasure by the pure act of providing support; they
might be concerned about the welfare of the person they support; they might follow a general
custom; yet primarily, people are assumed to be extrinsically motivated and to follow strate-
gic considerations when engaging in support arrangements (Coate and Ravallion 1993; Kranton
1996; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al. 2002) – i.e., they agree to provide support in
the expectation that, “in one form or another, there will be a tangible quid-pro-quo for their
present generosity” (Platteau 1997, p.768). As there is no underlying formal contract specifying
the terms and conditions which could be legally enforced, other mechanisms are needed to ensure
compliance. The mechanism studied most extensively in this context is the threat of ‘reversion
to autarchy.’ When the expected support is not provided, the arrangement is dissolved and the
reneging individual needs to deal with future hardships in isolation (Kimball 1988; Coate and
Ravallion 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al. 2002). The effectiveness of this threat
is thus directly dependent on the alternative resources individuals have on hand.
1.2 Research Approach
In this thesis, I investigate empirically the relationship between informal support arrangements
and access to alternative resources.1
Many developing countries have experienced rapid economic development that goes hand
in hand with increasing possibilities for the population to cope with hardships individually.
Insurance markets have expanded, financial institutions offer saving and loan products designed
to meet the demand of the low-income population and with the promotion of mobile banking,
people living in remote rural areas have gained access to financial services. How does this
development affect informal support arrangements in the villages? Few studies have analyzed
the impact of an improvement in individual-level resources on informal support empirically,
and these studies come to mixed results (Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000; Angelucci and De Giorgi
2009; Lin et al. 2014; Dupas et al. 2015).2 It is crucial to study the relationship between informal
support and access to alternative resources in more detail in order to make predictions on how
this development will affect the social structure and to specify welfare effects.
This is where my thesis comes in. From three different angles I investigate empirically
1The literature uses a number of different terms to describe these support arrangements: mutual insurance
(Ligon et al. 2002), informal insurance (Coate and Ravallion 1993), risk sharing (Fafchamps and Lund 2003), risk
pooling (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001), reciprocal exchange (Kranton 1996). The more general term “informal
support arrangements” yet captures the main features of the observed arrangements well while remaining neutral
on the direction of support, the underlying motives and the outcome of the arrangement.
2Some studies find an increase in informal support, which they explain by an improvement of the economic
situation of the beneficiaries (Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009; Flory 2011; Dupas et al. 2015); while others find a
reduction in informal support, which is assumed to be caused by an increase in the value of ‘living in autarchy’
(Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000; Lin et al. 2014).
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the relationship between informal support within rural communities and households’ access to
alternative resources. First, I study the structure of mutual support arrangements in a fishing
village on the Philippines (Chapter 2). Based on a model of strategic link formation I investigate
which factors explain that two households engage in a mutual support arrangement with a
focus on the role of households’ alternative resources. In a second study I investigate how
the willingness to provide support can be affected by the availability of alternative resources,
in particular individual insurance (Chapter 3). This is analyzed based on a lab-in-the-field
experiment conducted in Cambodia. Different to the first study, the second study analyzes
support that is motivated by social preferences, i.e. a concern for the welfare of another person;
furthermore, the focus is on the actual provision of support. The last study conceptually links
the first two studies. I relate the subjects’ support decisions observed in the experiment back to
the subjects’ engagement in mutual support arrangements in ‘real life’ (Chapter 4). I thus put
the behavior in context to the social structure.
The two countries, the Philippines and Cambodia, are very suitable for the research focus.
Both are characterized by a strong economic growth in the last two decades and yet a stark and
increasing divide between the rich and the poor (ADB 2009; World Bank 2013b; ADB 2014). In
both countries, access to financial services, including insurance, for people with low income is
very limited and the social safety net is insufficient (World Bank 2011; Llanto 2015; World Bank
2015).3 Therefore, the social support network plays an important role to deal with the everyday
hazards and risks in particular in rural communities. The two countries thus provide an adequate
setting to investigate the structure of informal support arrangements and the interplay with the
increasingly available alternative resources.
The first study in this thesis is based on a household survey that I designed and conducted in
30 fishing villages in Western Visayas on the Philippines in summer and fall 2012, covering 476
households. The second and third study are based on a research project conducted together with
Susan Steiner. In close cooperation we developed the design of the lab-in-the-field experiment and
the household survey. The field research was conducted in 21 villages in North-West Cambodia
in summer and fall 2015, covering 1270 households.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis consists of three separate studies. Chapter 2 analyzes the structure of informal
support arrangements between households and highlights the importance of households’ access
to alternative resources. In this chapter, I analyze the likelihood that two households engage in
a mutual support arrangement in dependence on the alternative resources they have available to
cope with an emergency in isolation. The theoretical framework that guides the analysis assumes
quid-pro-quo considerations as motive for the formation of mutual support arrangements. I
hypothesize, first, that households only engage in mutual support arrangements if they have
insufficient alternative resources on hand and thus face a positive probability of being in need of
3Recently, there have been considerable advances by the Philippines government to provide health coverage to
the poor, yet with mixed success, as I will discuss in Chapter 2.
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support; and second, that two households are less likely to form a mutual support arrangement
the more they differ in their respective probability to become needy. I test the hypotheses
using census network data from a fishing village on the Philippines. I find that households
engage in mutual support arrangements even if they have access to alternative resources, yet
that two households are less likely to form a mutual support arrangement the more they differ
in their available resources and thus their probability of neediness. Furthermore, I show that
the structure of one-sided support arrangements, where support is expected only from one side,
differs systematically from the structure of mutual support arrangements. Besides the empirical
analysis, this chapter highlights the methodological challenges of analyzing informal support
arrangements within a dyadic framework.
Chapter 3 focuses on support that is motivated by social preferences. This chapter is joint
work with Susan Steiner. We analyze whether less support is provided to a person who experi-
enced an income loss when this person could have avoided her loss by purchasing insurance; that
is whether solidarity is conditioned on the availability of alternative resources. We conducted a
lab-in-the-field experiment with 672 villagers from 21 villages in North-West Cambodia. In the
experiment, subjects are split in ‘providers’ and ‘recipients.’ All subjects receive the same endow-
ment. However, with a probability of 50%, the recipients can lose almost all of their endowment
while the providers can keep their endowment. Half of the recipients have the option to purchase
insurance, which would cover their loss; the other half do not have this option. The provider
is matched with a recipient, to whom the provider can transfer in case the recipient lost. Each
provider is asked how much she would transfer in case the recipient had no option of insurance,
and how much she would transfer if the recipient had the option of insurance but forewent this
option. The difference in the transfer decisions indicate the extent of conditional solidarity. We
find a significant reduction in transfers when the recipient had the choice of insurance. Providers
transfer on average 30% less when recipients could have purchased insurance. Thus, solidarity
is conditioned on the availability on alternative resources. Yet, while on average there is a sig-
nificant reduction in transfers, we observe considerable heterogeneity in the individual subjects’
transfer behavior. 44% reduce their transfers when the recipient had the choice of insurance; yet,
43% transfer the same amount independent of the insurance availability.
In Chapter 4, I analyze this heterogeneity in more detail by incorporating socio-economic
information on the subjects which was collected as part of a household survey conducted prior to
the experiment. In particular, I relate the providers’ transfer behavior in the experiment to their
engagement in mutual support arrangements in real life. The focus is on informal exchange of
credit, food and labor. I find that subjects, who have large informal exchange networks, tend to
condition their solidarity on choice. They punish a recipient’s decision not to take up insurance
by more than subjects with smaller exchange networks. The results indicate that the tendency
to hold others accountable is related to a person’s engagement in informal exchange. There
are two possible interpretations of the observed correlation. One interpretation is based on an
argument of selection: people who show a stronger inclination to hold others accountable are
also more likely to engage in informal exchange; potentially because the benefit that they derive
from these arrangements is greater than for other people due the higher threat of punishment
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they pose. The other interpretation follows a learning argument: people engaged in informal
exchange arrangements learn the importance of holding others accountable and punishing non-
compliance to sustain cooperation. People with more exposure to informal exchange internalized
this notion of accountability and act in accordance also outside these arrangements. With the
data on hand I cannot identify which interpretation most adequately explains the observed
correlation. Notwithstanding, the findings reflect the complexity of informal support institutions
and highlight the value of relating subjects’ decisions in experiments to their socio-economic
background, to gain insight into conditions and motives that affect decision-making and to derive
adequate policy implications.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
The Role of Expected Neediness for the
Formation of Mutual Support
Arrangements
2.1 Introduction
In many developing countries, the poor have little resources on hand to cope with emergencies.
Most are not covered by any type of insurance; and the types of loans offered by financial in-
stitutions are mostly not suitable for emergencies. Illnesses or injuries through accidents can
have severe long-term consequences, not only due to the foregone income but also due to the
health related expenses that are often covered privately. As access to formal risk coping strate-
gies is limited, support from the immediate social network plays a crucial role in dealing with
the consequences of shocks. There is substantial evidence for dense inter-household support
networks. Households support each other in terms of money, food, shelter or labor assistance
(Fafchamps and Lund 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon 2006; Krishnan and Sciubba 2009; De Weerdt
and Fafchamps 2011; Ambrus et al. 2014). These support arrangements are commonly assumed
to be guided by a principle of ‘balanced reciprocity’ (Platteau 1997). Provision of support is
conditioned on the implicit agreement that the support will be reciprocated should the support
providing household be in need of assistance in the future. In the literature, this is often de-
scribed as (reciprocal) risk-sharing (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; De Weerdt 2004; Fafchamps
and Gubert 2007b; Ambrus et al. 2014). In this study, I use the more neutral term mutual
support arrangement.
This chapter studies determinants for the formation of mutual support arrangements. Which
characteristics explain that household i forms a mutual support arrangement with household
j, but not with household k? More specifically, I investigate the role of predicted neediness,
whereby a household is defined as needy if it must call upon another household for support in
case of an emergency. Building on the theory of reciprocal risk-sharing (Coate and Ravallion
1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al. 2002), I develop a theoretical framework that
describes mutual support arrangements as bilaterally agreed upon arrangements between agents
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who differ in the resources available to cope with a shock in isolation, and thus in their respective
probability of becoming needy. I derive two hypotheses. First, an agent is more likely to engage
in a mutual support arrangement, if she faces a positive probability to become needy; that is,
if she has insufficient resources to cope with an emergency in isolation (Hypothesis 1). Second,
a mutual support arrangement between two agents is less likely the larger the difference in the
agents’ respective probability to become needy (Hypothesis 2).
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, I determine which variables predict a
household’s probability to become needy conditioned on a shock experience. I analyze data
that cover detailed information on shock-coping strategies and the role of the village support
network for a random sample of 306 households in 22 fishing villages in Western Visayas on the
Philippines. I show that household size, wealth and access to sources of support outside the
village affect the probability of neediness. Households of small size, low asset wealth and little
connections outside the village are significantly more likely to seek for support from their village
neighbors. Second, in order to test the two predictions of the theoretical framework I make use
of another data set. One of the 22 villages was surveyed completely. Detailed information on the
support arrangements between all households residing in the village were elicited, which allows
me to construct the complete inter-household support network within the village. Analyzing
the structure of the support network by dyadic regression, I show that predictors of neediness
indeed affect the formation of mutual support arrangements. Yet, the findings are not univocal.
Hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed. Households with less resources and thus a higher probability
of neediness are not necessarily more likely to engage in mutual support. On the other side,
I find confirmation for Hypothesis 2. The more households differ in variables that determine
their probability of neediness the less likely it is that they form a mutual support arrangement.
However, not all variables of interest have the predicted effect. In order to address endogeneity
concerns, in a next step, I develop a propensity score applying weights that are derived from the
larger data set. The score predicts each household’s probability of neediness based on exogenous
household characteristics. Using the score as predictor for the formation of mutual support
arrangements confirms the first results. Households with a similar score of predicted neediness
are more likely to form mutual support arrangements, yet a lower score does not necessarily
increase the likelihood that a household engages in mutual support. In a final step, I show
that results change considerably once the local network structure is taken into account. In the
course of the analysis, I demonstrate how results vary depending on the specification of a mutual
support arrangement, in particular, depending on whether support links that are reported by
one side only are distinguished from support links that are reported by both sides.
This study makes three major contributions. First, it contributes to the broad literature on
risk-sharing. While, theoretically, it can be shown that the probability of neediness plays a piv-
otal role for the formation and sustainability of mutual support arrangements, to the best of my
knowledge, this specific aspect has never been analyzed empirically. In this study, I show that
predicted neediness can indeed explain part of the structure of the observed support network
and might be able to reconcile some of the contradictory findings of previous studies. Second,
the study contributes methodologically to the empirical literature on the formation of informal
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support arrangements. In many studies, mutual support arrangements are not distinguished
from one-sided support arrangements; this is often due to missing data: there is no report by
the support arrangement partner, or the underlying survey question does not explicitly ask for
the direction of support. Using the structure of the reported support links to differentiate be-
tween one-sided and mutual support arrangements I show significant differences in the estimated
models depending on whether a distinction between the two types of arrangements is made or
not; neglecting this distinction can result in erroneous inference. Finally, this study informs fu-
ture research of the challenges faced when analyzing link formation in a social network context.
Throughout the chapter, I highlight the difficulties researchers are confronted with when ana-
lyzing endogenous link formation and the corresponding methodological constraints. Thereby,
the study aims to advice future research to apply appropriate techniques in the elicitation and
analysis of social networks in the context of risk-sharing.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide a brief
overview on the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on risk-sharing arrangements and
highlight how the present study can address some of the shortcomings of previous studies. In
Section 2.3, I first present the theoretical framework and the derivation of the two hypotheses,
and then discuss the empirical strategy to analyze the theoretical predictions with network data.
The research setting and the data are presented in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, the empirical
model is specified, the results are presented and discussed. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature
This study builds on the theoretical and empirical literature that investigates the formation of
mutual support arrangements in the context of risk-sharing, and within this field, more specif-
ically, on studies that analyze support link formation in a social network setting. While this
literature does not discuss the aspect of predicted neediness explicitly, previous findings with
respect to income shock probability and access to alternative resources can be set in direct
context.
One of the first theoretical analyses of mutual support arrangements as reciprocal risk-sharing
agreements is the paper by Coate and Ravallion (1993). Two risk-averse agents face uncorrelated
income streams that vary over time. When income cannot be stored and resources cannot
be accumulated over time, the agents have an incentive to agree on an informal risk-sharing
contract which specifies monetary transfers in dependence on the income realized. As there is no
external enforcement mechanism in place, the agreement must be self-enforcing. One possibility
is ‘reversion to autarchy:’ in case of defection, the agreement is canceled and no future transfers
will take place. The authors show that the incentive to defect increases when income streams
are correlated. Subsequent papers extend the basic model. It is shown that a risk-sharing
arrangement is less sustainable when the value of living in autarchy increases with the access to
alternative resources, e.g. due to the introduction of insurance or credit technologies that allow
the transfer of resources over time (Ligon et al. 2002; Lin et al. 2014), and when income shocks,
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and thus the probability to be in need of support, are persistent over time (Attanasio and Rios-
Rull 2000). More recently, mutual support has been analyzed within a network context, where
agents can form support arrangements with more than one other agent (Bramoullé and Kranton
2007; Bloch et al. 2008; Jackson et al. 2012; Ambrus et al. 2014). The local network structure can
thus affect the stability of the arrangements, which are shown to be more sustainable if reneging
on an agreement can result in the loss of multiple support links (Bloch et al. 2008; Jackson et al.
2012). In summary, mutual support arrangements are predicted to be more sustainable, when
income streams are uncorrelated, the value of living in autarchy is low as access to alternative
resources is limited, when shocks are non-persistent, and the arrangement is embedded in a dense
social network.
There is substantial empirical work on mutual support arrangements, yet most authors focus
on the outcome of these arrangements – that is the level of income pooling that is achieved (e.g.
see Townsend (1994), Udry (1994), Gertler and Gruber (2002), and Fafchamps and Lund (2003)).
Few studies analyze the formation process and the determinants for the sustainability of mutual
support arrangements. These studies can be broadly split into studies that draw on behavioral
experiments (e.g. in Barr et al. 2012; Attanasio et al. 2012; Lin et al. 2014) and studies that
analyze household survey data (e.g. in De Weerdt 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007b; Schechter
and Yuskavage 2012).
From the experimental literature, two studies are of particular relevance: Attanasio et al.
(2012) and Barr et al. (2012). Both studies use risk-pooling games to investigate the formation
of mutual support groups in Colombia and Zimbabwe respectively. The games are conducted in
rural communities where mutual support arrangements are common. In these games, participants
are asked to form groups with other people from their community; they then individually make
choices on lotteries, the proceeds of which are shared equally within the groups that have been
formed. Treatments vary in the extent sharing is enforced. Attanasio et al. (2012) find that
people tend to group with relatives and friends and that they then group assortatively on their
risk preferences. Furthermore, the authors find that villagers with similar levels of consumption
are more likely to group. Barr et al. (2012) find that groups are typically formed with people
that are similar to them in terms of gender and age, but find no effect of wealth or income;
that is, people seem not to take other people’s household wealth into account when deciding
with whom to form a sharing group. A drawback of the experiments is that the arrangements
analyzed are formed for a specific one-time purpose; they lack the repeated game characteristic
of real-life support arrangements, thus the implications for the formation process of continual
support arrangements are limited.
Few studies analyze the determinants for support arrangements by using network data elicited
through household surveys. Indeed, this requires very specific data which ideally cover socioeco-
nomic information for all potential support partners within a predefined network. Importantly,
this information should allow the researcher to disentangle outcomes and drivers of the formation
of support arrangements. Furthermore, as risk-sharing is per definition not a unilateral arrange-
ment, the data should contain independent statements of each household on its support links
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which in addition distinguish the direction of the support. Few data sets fulfill these require-
ments. To the best of my knowledge there are only three studies, which investigate support links
in the context of risk-sharing explicitly drawing on data sets which partly fulfill the above listed
requirements. In the following, these three papers are discussed in more detail, since they are
similar to the present study with respect to the underlying data structure and the estimation
approach, but also have a number of short-comings that the present study aims to overcome.
De Weerdt (2004) investigates support links in a village in Tanzania where all households
residing in the village were surveyed. Each adult was asked to list people in the village " (...)
[she] can personally rely on for help and/or that can rely on [them] (...)" (p. 201). For the main
specification, De Weerdt defines a support link connecting two households as existing if at least
one member of one of the two households lists at least one member of the other household; the
support link is analyzed as undirected; it is not specified which of the two households reports
the link, nor whether a reported link is reciprocated. De Weerdt analyzes the determinants
of link formation based on dyadic regression analysis, including pair specific characteristics (in
particular, differences in household characteristics), yet not level effects. He finds that the
likelihood of a support link between two households increases when they are related, live close
by and share the same religious affiliation. In contrast to the theoretical predictions, De Weerdt
finds that households with a larger occupational overlap as well as similar levels of wealth in
terms of livestock and landholding are more likely to be linked.
Fafchamps and Gubert (2007b) study support networks of a random sample of households
in four villages on the Philippines. Each household is asked to name up to four people "(...) on
which it could rely on in case of need or to whom [it] gives help when called upon to do so" (pp.
331). Different to De Weerdt (2004), the authors analyze the determinants for a directed link;
that is they differentiate a link from i to j, which exists if i names j, from a link from j to i, which
exists if j names i. As not all households in a community were surveyed, only links among the
sampled households are considered. The analysis is conducted using dyadic regression analysis
accounting both for differences in household characteristics as well as level effects. Furthermore,
the authors develop a novel method for correcting the standard errors to account for dyadic
correlation (more on this in Section 2.3.2.1). Similar to DeWeerdt, the authors find that kinship
and geographic proximity are important factors determining link formation and that households
with a higher correlation in income are more likely to link. Contrary to De Weerdt, they find
links to be more likely between poor and rich households than between households of similar
wealth.
One major drawback of both studies is that, while the authors’ focus is on risk-sharing, which
postulates mutuality, due to the phrasing of the survey question the elicited support link can
refer to both mutual and one-sided support arrangements; this renders it difficult to interpret
the results in the context of risk-sharing.1 Schechter and Yuskavage (2012) partly address this
issue. They analyze support links based on a sample of households from 15 villages in rural
Paraguay. Households are asked in two separate questions from which household they could
1While the analysis in Fafchamps and Gubert (2007b) is conducted for a ‘directed’ link, the direction is based
on the report (i.e., ‘who names whom’) not the flow (i.e., ‘who supports whom’).
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borrow a specified amount of money if needed, and which household would come to them to
borrow. A mutual support link is defined as existing, if a household lists another household
in both questions. An one-sided support link is defined as existing, if the other household is
listed only once. Using multinomial logit estimation, the authors simultaneously estimate the
likelihood of the existence of a mutual and of a one-sided link among the surveyed households.2
They find that one-sided support links are more likely from wealthier to poorer households, while
mutual support links are more likely between two wealthier households, where wealth is measured
by the value of land, animals and tools owned.
In summary, the empirical literature on the formation of mutual support arrangements can-
not clearly confirm the theoretical predictions of the basic risk-sharing framework. While the
theoretical framework suggests that arrangements are more sustainable if income streams are
uncorrelated, empirical studies find the opposite to be the case; households with a larger activity
overlap and correlated income streams are more likely to form a mutual support arrangement
(De Weerdt 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007b). With respect to wealth and access to alter-
native resources, evidence is mixed. Some studies find that households with similar wealth level
are more likely to link with each other (De Weerdt 2004; Schechter and Yuskavage 2012), other
find the opposite to be the case (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007b) or no effect at all (Attanasio
et al. 2012; Barr et al. 2012).
In this study I suggest two explanations for the seemingly contradictory findings. First, the
concept of predicted neediness might explain why households with correlating income streams
are more likely to link. Income correlation and activity overlap can indicate a similar probability
of neediness. As long as income shocks are not directly polychoric this similar probability of
neediness can reduce the incentive to defect and enhance the sustainability of a mutual support
arrangement. In the next section this mechanism is explained in more detail. Second, the
empirical specification of support arrangements in the studies mentioned above partly mixes one-
sided and mutual support arrangements. None of the studies distinguishes between reciprocated
(i.e., i names j and j names i) and unreciprocated links (i.e., i names j but j does not name i).
This can result in erroneous inference, as will be shown further below.
2.3 Theory and Method
In the following, I first discuss the theoretical framework based on which the two hypotheses are
derived that guide the empirical analysis (Section 2.3.1). The theoretical framework builds on
the model of favor exchange by Jackson et al. (2012) but is modified to reflect the probability
of neediness.3 I then present the estimation strategy to test the hypotheses within a dyadic
2Note that instead of ‘mutual and one-sided support links,’ the authors talk about ‘reciprocated and unrecip-
rocated links.’ In a network context, this term can be confusing as only the report from one side is used and not
from both.
3Jackson et al. (2012) focus on the properties of stable networks in the context of favor exchange. In their
main specification they do not allow for asymmetric probabilities; however, they later show the implications of
asymmetric payoff functions, expanded on in an online appendix to their paper.
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framework (Section 2.3.2 ). Both for the theoretical model and the estimation strategy, I discuss
the underlying assumptions and their implications for the econometric specification as well as
for the interpretation of the results.
2.3.1 Theoretical Framework
There are two selfish agents i and j that live over an infinite number of periods. In each period,
an agent faces the probability π of a negative income shock with 0 < π < 1. The two agents can
agree to form a mutual support arrangement. If a support arrangement is formed, then in case
i is in need of support, j provides support to i; and in case j is in need of support, i provides
support to j. For simplicity, it is assumed that providing support costs the provider a fixed
amount c while the value of receiving support is v, with v > c; thus engaging in mutual support
over time is ex-ante pareto-efficient. Let pi represent the probability that i is in need of support
in a given period, i’s probability to become needy. More specifically, we assume pi = π(1 − ri),
where ri is the probability that agent i can cope with the shock individually, with 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1. ri
depends on the alternative resources i has available to cope with the shock individually. While
π is fixed, agents differ in ri and thus their likelihood of neediness pi.
i and j agree to form a mutual support arrangement if for both agents the expected utility















where δ is a discount factor by which the agents discount their payoffs over time, with 0 < δ <
1. Agents only engage in a mutual support arrangement if they cannot cope with the shock
individually, that is if ri < 1 and rj < 1. As commitment is limited and there is no external
enforcement mechanism in place, the arrangement must be self-enforcing. Compliance can be
enforced through the threat of autarchy: once an agent deviates, the support arrangement will
be dissolved and the agents have to deal with future shocks in isolation. Thus, mutual support
is not sustainable if the cost of providing support when asked exceeds the discounted benefit of








Ceteris paribus, the incentive to deviate increases the larger |pi − pj |. That is, the larger
the difference in the agents’ likelihood of neediness, the less likely it is that an arrangement is
sustained.
Based on this framework, the following predictions are derived which can be tested empirically:
Hypothesis 1
An agent only engages in a mutual support arrangement if her alternative resources to cope with
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a shock are insufficient and she thus faces a positive probability of becoming needy.
Hypothesis 2
Two agents are less likely to maintain a mutual support arrangement the larger the difference in
their respective probability to become needy.
The model is built on a number of assumptions that have important implications for the empirical
analysis and the interpretation of the results.
First, the model assumes v and c to be fixed and ri to be stable over time. However, in
reality v and c are likely agent specific, e.g. dependent on an agent’s wealth. More importantly,
in reality, resources are depletable and, moreover, can be decision parameters of an agent, who, for
example, can decide to invest in her resources in dependence on the mutual support arrangement
she formed. For the empirical specification this potential endogeneity needs to be considered and
access to alternative resources should be proxied by variables that are exogenous to the mutual
support arrangement.
Second, resources are assumed to be observable. However, only in a small community context,
as it is the case for the present study, it does seem plausible to assume that resources are
observable or, at least, that an agent can form rational expectations of another agent’s resources
based on observable characteristics. In other contexts, resources are less observable and agents
might even have the incentive to send untruthful signals about their level of resources (Genicot
2015; De Weerdt et al. 2015). Moreover, the probability to become needy likely depends less
on resources available today and more on the resources expected to be available in the future.
While this information might be inferable by other agents in the community, it is difficult to be
observed by researchers. We need to assume that the resources which can be observed today
serve as adequate predictors for future resources.
Third, the model makes the implicit assumption that an agent prefers to employ her alter-
native resources first before turning to others to ask for support. This might not be the case in
reality, in particular as the use of personal resources is unlikely to be cost-free. In the present
study, I can provide some evidence that households are indeed inclined to employ alternative
resources first before turning to others (see Section 2.5.1.2); yet, this does not need to be the
case in other settings, and likely depends on the social and cultural context.
2.3.2 Empirical Method
In order to analyze the two hypotheses empirically, in the following the two agent framework of
mutual support arrangements is set in a network context and a dyadic regression model is derived
(Section 2.3.2.1). I then expand the basic model to account for one-sided support arrangements
(2.3.2.2 ).
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2.3.2.1 Estimating the formation of mutual support arrangements in a network
context
I assume a set of agents N = {1, ..., n} living in a community of size n. Agents are linked by
different types of relationships. I focus on mutual support arrangements which are assumed to
be bilateral agreements between a pair of agents as described above. The network of mutual
support arrangements is represented by the graph ς, where for each pair of agents (ij), ςij = 1 if
there exists a mutual support arrangement between i and j, and ςij = 0 else, with i, j ∈ N and
i < j. Thus ς is an undirected network with n·(n−1)2 possible links.
The expected utility of a mutual support arrangement between agents i and j within a
support network can be described as
Ui(ςij = 1) =
δ
(




Uj(ςij = 1) =
δ
(




where pij is the probability that i asks j for support and pji the probability that j asks i.
The mutual support arrangement is based on a bilateral agreement. A support arrangement
ςij between two agents i and j is only formed if the utility each of the two agents derives from
the support network is at least as large when the support arrangement is formed, compared to
the utility the agents derive from the network when the arrangement is not formed.4 That is:
ςij = 1 if [Ui(ς+ij) ≥ Ui(ς−ij) and Uj(ς+ij) ≥ Uj(ς−ij)],
where ς+ij describes the network of mutual support arrangements including the arrangement
between i and j, while ς−ij is the network of mutual support arrangements if there is no mutual
support arrangement between i and j.
I assume that the benefits from an additional arrangement depend on a vector of observable
characteristics, which include characteristics that describe each agent’s probability of neediness,
and a residual.5
Ui(ς+ij)− Ui(ς−ij) = α+X ′ijβ + εij
Uj(ς+ij)− Uj(ς−ij) = α+X ′jiβ + εji
We can thus write the likelihood that a pair of agents (ij) agrees on a mutual support
arrangement as
P (ςij = 1) = P (−εij ≤ α+X ′ijβ and − εji ≤ α+X ′jiβ) .
The true value of ςij is unobserved. But suppose we have from each agent i, with i = (1, ..., n), an
4This equilibrium concept of link formation is known as pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996).
5The following specification is based on the approach suggested by Comola and Fafchamps (2014) to estimate
bilateral link formation.
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independent report on her potential sources of support within her community, with sij indicating
the reported support link from i to j with i 6= j. More specifically, sij = 1 if i names j as a
source of support in times of need and sij = 0 otherwise; and sji = 1 if j names i as a source
of support in times of need and sji = 0 otherwise. Thus, different to ς, s is a directed network
with n · (n − 1) possible links. s can be used to proxy the unobserved structure of the support
arrangement network ς.
In a first step, it is assumed that each reported support link represents a mutual support
arrangement; that is a mutual support arrangement exists if sij = 1 or sji = 1. We can then
estimate








by maximum likelihood under the condition that there is degree variation in the characteristics
across dyads; that is, Xij 6= Xji for at least some dyads (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007b).
The estimation strategy is based on a number of assumptions which have, in addition to the
assumptions of the theoretical model discussed above, important implications for the empirical
specification. I briefly outline them in the following; I address them in more detail in the
remainder of the chapter.
First, Specification 2.2 does not allow for interdependencies in link decisions; the strong
assumption has to be made that the network structure cannot affect link specific utilities (Chan-
drasekhar 2016). In particular, the theoretical framework assumes link-specific probabilities,
and thus the probability that i asks j for support might depend on the number of support
arrangements i has in place; yet, interdependency between links cannot be estimated with a
pairwise regression model. I will discuss this and other types of link-interdependencies as well as
approaches to address these issues in Section 2.5.1.1 and Section 2.5.3.3.
Second, building dyadic regression analysis on individual choices requires two further as-
sumptions. a) Separability of the utility functions; that is, the utility of a network is assumed to
be the sum of the utility derived from each link. b) Symmetry for the case of undirected links;
that is, the additional value i derives from being linked with j is assumed to be the same as the
additional value j derives from being linked with i (Bramoullé and Fortin 2010). The estimated
model needs to be specified accordingly; more specifically (Xi + Xj) and |Xi − Xj | should be
included as regressors for the analysis of undirected links, and Xi, Xj and |Xi − Xj | for the
analysis of directed links. The specification of the regressors will be addressed in more detail in
Section 2.5.2
Third, undirected link formation assumes mutual consent. If an agent i lists another agent j as
a source of support, without j being aware of this role, the choice foundation of the estimation
approach would be put into question; this would challenge the interpretation of the results
(Comola and Fafchamps 2014). I will come back to this issue when specifying the variables in
Section 2.5.1.1.
Fourth, the error term structure in Specification 2.2 needs to allow for correlation across
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observations. Error terms across observations can be correlated in at least three distinct ways:
for i, j, k ∈ N = (1, ..., n), E[uij , uik] 6= 0, E[uik, ujk] 6= 0 and E[ujk, uij ] 6= 0 (Cameron
and Miller 2014). As shown by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007b) this can result in inconsistent





















where β is the vector of coefficients, n is the number of observations,m is the number of regressors,
X is the matrix of all regressors, Xij is the vector of regressors for the dyadic observation ij,
and Iijkl = 1 if i = k, j = l, i = l or j = k, and 0 otherwise. In the regression analysis, standard
errors need to be corrected accordingly.6
Finally, it is not straightforward how to use independent reports on undirected links, if these
reports mismatch. This issue will be discussed in the following Section 2.3.2.2 in more detail.
2.3.2.2 One-sided versus mutual support arrangements
How to proceed if reported support links do not correspond with each other – i.e., sij 6= sji?
This is unproblematic as long as all reported support links can be assumed to represent mutual
support arrangements; then sij 6= sji is due to underreporting, and hence we can assume ς = 1 if
sij = 1 or sji = 1. However, it is not obvious that the motive of risk-sharing explains all observed
support arrangements. Indeed, there is considerable evidence for one-sided support arrangements
that follow quite different mechanisms: an agent might provide monetary or in-kind support to
ensure the political endorsement by the recipient, to contain unwanted behavior such as theft, to
gain social approval by the community or due to fairness concerns (e.g. see Fafchamps (1992),
Platteau (1995), Schechter (2007), and Ligon and Schechter (2012)). The provided support is
expected to be reciprocated in a different domain, or not at all. In most one-sided support
arrangements, expected neediness plays a different role than in mutual support arrangements:
the recipient of the support is typically assumed to be resource constrained, while the provider
is assumed to have access to sufficient alternative resources; and thus, contrary to the case of
mutual support arrangements, a one-sided support arrangement should expected to be more
likely the larger the difference in expected neediness. This suggests that, when analyzing the
implications of expected neediness, it is important to distinguish mutual from one-sided support
arrangements.
Let us denote ς̇ as the undirected support arrangement network in a community with n
agents with n·(n−1)2 possible links. ς̇ includes both one-sided and mutual support arrangements.
ς̇ij describes the type of support arrangement a pair of agents (ij) have agreed upon, with
6There are alternative approaches: Udry and Conley (2004) include individual fixed effects, and Barr and
Genicot (2008) use a quadratic assignment procedure (QAP), where standard errors are estimated based on
permutations of the data set to account for interdependence of the observations. However, when the number of
nodes (i.e., in our case the number of households) is small the dyadic corrected standard errors is considered most
suitable (Cameron and Miller 2014).
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i, j ∈ N = (1...n) and i < j. A support arrangement can have three outcomes. It might be
mutual; that is, i and j agreed that j supports i if i experiences an income shock and i supports
j if j experiences an income shock (in this case let ς̇ij = 3); but it can also be one-sided: i and
j agreed that i supports j if j experiences an income shock but j is not expected to support i
in case of an income shock, though i might be compensated by other means, (ς̇ij = 2); or vice
versa, i and j agreed that j supports i but i is not expected to support j (ς̇ij = 1).
If we observe a support network s that is directional not only with regard to who names whom
but also with regard to the flow of support, we can use the structure of s to proxy one-sided and
mutual support arrangements.
To distinguish unobserved support arrangements from the reported support links, for the re-
mainder of this chapter the following terminology is used.
The unobserved network of support arrangements can contain
• One-sided Support Arrangements,
i and j agreed that j supports i in case of emergency but no explicit agreement has been
made that i supports j (i.e., ς̇ij = 2), or vice versa (i.e., ς̇ij = 1), and
• Mutual Support Arrangements,
i and j agreed that j supports i in case of emergency and that i supports j (i.e., ς̇ij = 1).
The network of reported support links consists of
• Unreciprocated Support Links,
i names j as a source of support, but j does not name i (i.e., sij = 1 and sji = 0) or vice
versa (i.e., sij = 0 and sji = 1), and
• Reciprocated Support Links,
i and j name each other as source of support (i.e., sij = 1 and sji = 1).
An unreciprocated support link can be used as a proxy for a one-sided support arrangement
and a reciprocated support link as a proxy for a mutual support arrangement.
Which type of support arrangement two agents form is still based on a bilateral agreement;
that is, a specific support arrangement ς̇ij between two agents i, j is only formed if the utility
each agent derives from the support arrangement is weakly positive and there is no other type
of support arrangement which both agents would prefer. In particular, it is assumed that two
agents form a mutual support arrangement ς̇ij = q, with q = (1, 2, 3), if the utility each agent i
and j derives from the support arrangement network including this specific arrangement ς̇ij = q
is at least as large as when a different type of arrangement or no arrangement would be formed.
Specifically, for q = (1, 2, 3)
ς̇ij = q if [Ui(ς̇+ς̇ij=q) ≥ Ui(ς̇+ς̇ij=l) and Uj(ς̇+ς̇ij=q) ≥ Uj(ς̇+ς̇ij=l)],
for all l = (0, 1, 2, 3) with l 6= q;
ς̇ij = 0, else.
Moreover, it is assumed that i and j can be linked by at most one type of support arrangement
ς̇ij .
CHAPTER 2. FORMATION OF MUTUAL SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS 19
The reported support network s is used to proxy ς̇, where P (ς̇ij = 3) = P (sij = 1 and sji =
1), P (ς̇ij = 2) = P (sij = 0 and sji = 1), P (ς̇ij = 1) = P (sij = 1 and sji = 0) and P (ς̇ij = 0) =
P (sij = 0 and sji = 0). Then the likelihood that a pair of agents (ij) agrees on the support
arrangement ς̇ij = q can be jointly estimated through multinomial logit via maximum likelihood
as








for q = (1, 2, 3). (2.4)
For identification the set of coefficients of ς̇ij = 0 is set to zero; this choice serves as the base
category. The above raised points of caution related to dyadic regression analysis of binary choice
models apply also for the estimation of multiple choice models. In particular, the coefficients need
to be constrained to fulfill symmetry requirements and the standard errors need to be corrected
to account for correlation across observations.
2.4 Data
The data used for the analysis stem from a unique data set from a household survey that
I conducted in 30 fishing villages in the region Western Visayas on the Philippines. In the
following, I first explain the research setting in more detail (Section 2.4.1), before turning to the
description of the data, in particular the socioeconomic characteristics of the survey respondents
(Section 2.4.2) and their support network (Section 2.4.3).
2.4.1 Research Setting
The household survey was conducted from August to October 2012.7 The focus of the survey
was the use of financial services and the structure of the social network. In 29 of the 30 villages a
small, randomly drawn sample of on average 14 households was surveyed, covering around 15%
of each village’s population. One village, the village Maramig, was surveyed completely. That is,
all 65 households which were residing within the village boundaries at the time of data collection
were surveyed, covering in total 228 people.8
The household survey was typically conducted with the head of each household. The survey
covered socioeconomic characteristics of all people who resided in the household at the time of
the survey, including access and use of formal financial services, housing characteristics, as well
as detailed questions on the informal support networks within and outside the community. For
7For the data collection, I accompanied a research team from the University of Mannheim that conducted
behavioral experiments in the 30 villages. For more detail on these experiments as well as on the sampling
strategy of the villages see Landmann and Vollan 2016.
8Officially, the village consists of 69 households. However, at the time of the survey, two households had
merged (a woman had moved back to her parents after her husband died) and two households (one single-person
household and one family) had moved for temporary work to Manila. One single-person household lives outside
the village in the forest and was not reachable during the entire time of the survey. For the following analysis,
the data are adjusted so that the latter three households are treated as residing outside the village.
20 CHAPTER 2. FORMATION OF MUTUAL SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS
some analyses, I revert to the larger data set, which covers 22 out of the 30 surveyed villages.9
Yet, for the main analysis, I exclusively focus on the data from Maramig.
Maramig is situated on the main island Panay, the sixth largest island on the Philippines.
The next town with a market is 10 km away, reachable by bus. In this region, a large proportion
of the population is very poor; in 2012, 31% of the population in Antique was estimated to
live below the poverty line (National Statistical Coordination Board 2013). Many people are
self-employed and most economic activities are not formalized. But the conditions are changing.
Financial institutions have started to expand their services to rural areas; and, with the building
of new roads, which facilitates transport to urban centers, formal sector work has grown in
importance. Furthermore, catching up with the general trend on the Philippines, work migration
has become very common, even in more remote areas. Many young men and women seek
temporary employment abroad (as so-called ‘Overseas Filipino Workers,’ OFW) or in the Marine.
The money that is sent home has become an important source of income for the remaining
families and improves their purchasing power.10 Despite these changes, informal risk-sharing
institutions and inter-household support arrangements still play a central role: the majority of the
surveyed households name assistance from relatives and neighbors as the main strategy to cope
with emergency situations. Also, traditional community support schemes assume an important
function, such as ‘abuloy,’ a practice where in case of a death in the village, all inhabitants
are asked to donate money and food for the family of the deceased, each contribution being
meticulously documented.
The prominent role that informal support arrangements play for the villagers’ day-to-day risk
management, and furthermore, the fact that information is available on all households residing
within the village’s boundaries make the data from Maramig ideal to analyze the mutual support
network.
2.4.2 Socioeconomic Characteristics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of the most important socioeconomic characteristics of the
households residing in Maramig (for the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents of all
22 villages refer to Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.1). As is common in the region, a household is
generally formed by the nuclear family, thus household size is comparably small; a household has
on average 3.5 household members, not including those members that temporarily migrated at
time of the survey. The majority of the households are headed by men. 40% of the household
heads have high school education, however one out of four household heads has no basic education.
That is, they either never went to school or dropped out before finishing elementary school.
Most households in the village are connected through family: on average, a household is
9Only for 22 villages is data available to me in unconstrained form. The data of the other 8 villages have not
yet been digitized.
10Over one million Filipinos leave the country every year to work abroad. The estimated number of Overseas
Filipino Workers in 2012 was 2.22 million, around 2.4% of the overall population; remittances accounted for about
9% of the GDP (Philippine Statistics Authority 2013). Nevertheless, work migration is generally not an option
for the very poor, as the so-called placement agencies, through which most of the work migration is organized,
demand high fees for their services.
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Table 2.1: Household Characteristics; Maramig
mean sd min max median count
Household size 3.46 1.71 1 8 3 65
Female head 0.35 0.48 0 1 0 65
Head has no basic education 0.28 0.45 0 1 0 65
Head completed high school 0.40 0.49 0 1 0 65
No. of family hh within village 9.46 6.51 0 25 10 65
No. of family hh outside village 3.17 2.83 0 15 3 65
% of adults working 0.57 0.35 0 1 .5 65
% of adults working outside village 0.10 0.24 0 1 0 65
Covered by social security 0.20 0.40 0 1 0 65
Fishing as main income source 0.22 0.42 0 1 0 54
Farming as main income source 0.41 0.50 0 1 0 54
Household income last month (PHP) 14,919 43,671 160 330,975 4,000 65
Asset Wealth 0.39 0.20 .0041 1 .36 65
OFW exists 0.12 0.33 0 1 0 65
Remittances recipient 0.57 0.50 0 1 1 65
Amount remittances last year (PHP) 34,388 60,007 2,000 312,000 18,000 37
Coop member 0.34 0.48 0 1 0 65
Bank account 0.05 0.21 0 1 0 65
MFI Member 0.03 0.17 0 1 0 65
Health insurance 0.62 0.49 0 1 1 65
Informal borrowing and lending 0.66 0.48 0 1 1 65
Observations 65
Surveyed 65 households, covering 225 household members; hh - households; PHP - Philippine Pesos.
*) Income from last month; includes salary, proceeds from self-employment, remittances, loans,
public assistance, pensions, payouts from savings and other income (such as gambling).
22 CHAPTER 2. FORMATION OF MUTUAL SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS
related to nine other households in the village; in contrast, the number of households outside the
village a household is related to and in touch with is much smaller. Half of the adult household
members (on average 57%) worked during the last month, most of the others reportedly stayed
at home doing domestic work. The vast majority of the employment is within the village, only
10% of the adult household members work outside the village. While Maramig is traditionally a
fishing village, only 22% of the 54 households, where at least one household member is working,
report fishing as a main income source; more people work as farmers. The average last month’s
household income is 14,919 PHP, or 3,183 PHP per capita, which is around 76 USD.11 The
income distribution is highly skewed, with almost 50% of the households having less than 4,000
PHP income per month which amounts to less than 32 USD p.c. An important source of income
are transfers from family or friends living outside the village (i.e., remittances).
57% of the households report receiving some form of regular transfers from outside the village,
mainly from former household members that work in larger cities in other districts. In one out
of ten households, at least one former household member is working on the sea or abroad.
The average amount that a remittances receiving household received over the last year is not
negligible, about 34.000 PhP which is more than twice the average monthly household income.
In fact, eight households report having no income besides the remittances they receive.
As most of the reported income is highly irregular and income reports are not always reliable,
as a measure for wealth an asset index is derived, using polychoric principal component analysis
(Moser and Felton 2007). The asset index is derived on the basis of the larger data set of
the 22 villages and includes variables that describe asset ownership and housing characteristics.
Variables are chosen based on the proportion of variance they explain. Weights are assigned
using the first component, and the index is standardized to be between 0 and 1. The index is
checked both for internal and external validity (for details on the derivation of the index and the
validity checks see Appendix A.1.2).
Access to financial products is still limited in Maramig. The majority of households have
access to very basic financial services through a local cooperative located in the next town, which
offers loans to its members for education and investment purposes. There are three state-run
social security systems on the Philippines (SSS, GSIS and Pag-IBIG) which provide pension
schemes but also credit lines for employees in the private and public sector. In Maramig, in
one out of five households, at least one household member is covered by such a scheme. After
the cooperative, these schemes form the second most important source for loans. Use of formal
banking services is much rarer. Only in three households does a household member have a
deposit account with a commercial bank while only two households are registered as members
of a microfinance institution. Most households do not fulfill the eligibility requirements of the
banks; and microfinance institutions are not yet as developed as in other regions. Therefore,
informal lending plays an important role: 66% of the respondents state that their household
borrowed or lent money to someone from the village during the last month. Health insurance
has gained importance only recently due to a government initiative that aims to reach universal
11At the time of the survey, 1 USD was worth around 42 Philippine Pesos, the PPP conversion factor was 17.88
in 2012 (World Bank 2013a).
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health coverage through the state run program PhilHealth. PhilHealth is a contribution based
insurance scheme, but subsidizes the contribution for the indigent people. In Maramig, 85% of
those households that are covered through PhilHealth do not pay for it. Still, health insurance is
barely used. When asked about the major strategies to cope with health shocks, of those insured
only 30% name the insurance, while 54% name monetary support from friends, neighbors or
relatives.
2.4.3 The Support Network
The core of the survey is a social network questionnaire. Each respondent was asked to provide
a list of households (‘the alter household’), she would consider as close to her household (‘the
ego household’). No limitations were made on the number of names the respondent could list,
but each alter household could be named only once. The respondent was then asked to further
specify the relationship to each alter household. In particular whether they were related, friends
or neighbors, the type of family relationship if applicable, how long they knew each other and
where the alter household resided. In case the alter household was reported to reside in the same
village, the respondent was asked to identify the household on a household roster of the village
that was presented to her, which allowed matching the households directly. The identification
was later verified with one of the village elderlies.12
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of the Support Links in Maramig
Total By Household
no. of links mean min max
All links 345 5.31 0 11
within Village 236 3.63 0 10
relative 196 3.02 0 10
friend 22 0.34 0 3
neighbor 18 0.28 0 3
outside Village 109 1.68 0 7
relative 101 1.55 0 7
friend 8 0.12 0 2
Reported support links within the village.
Based on the report of the 65 surveyed households.
Different types of transfer and support relationships with each alter household were elicited.
In this study, I focus on the elicited information on support arrangements.13 For each of the alter
12I am not aware of other studies that have proceeded in a similar manner. Typically, matching is done
afterwards by matching the reported names with the names on lists, which can lead to a substantial loss of
observations (e.g. see Fafchamps and Gubert (2007b), Comola and Prina (2014), and Banerjee et al. (2013)).
Admittedly, the procedure of presenting a household list is only feasible in villages with a small number of
households.
13The other type of elicited relationships are the following. First, for each alter household the respondent
was asked to specify frequency and size of larger monetary transfers provided and received during the last year.
Second, focusing on the last 4 weeks, the respondent was asked to indicate whether and how often different
specified types of transfers (small amounts of money, food, other in-kind goods) or support (labor services or
job hints) had taken place between her and the alter household. Third, the respondent was asked to specify if
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households listed, the respondent was asked ‘Would these people help you if you/the main income
provider would turn very ill and would not be able anymore to earn income and in addition you
would need to cover the medical expenses? ’ Furthermore, ‘Would you ask these people for help? ’
For these questions, respondent could respond ‘Immediately,’ ’After some hesitation,’ ‘Only in
extreme emergency situations’ or ‘Never.’ I define a support link as existing, if a respondent
answered ‘Immediately ’ for both questions. The support link data form the core of the latter
analyses. Advantages and potential shortcomings of this measure are discussed in more detail in
Section 2.5.1.1.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics on the reported support links in Maramig. On average,
each household reported five support links, of which over two thirds are within the village. The
majority of the reported support links are with relatives. Only around 17% of the reported
support links within the village are with unrelated friends or neighbors. This is not surprising
given that households are related on average to ten other households within the village.
Reported support links within the village. Based on the reports of the 65 surveyed households.
Figure 2.1: Network of Reported Support Links, directed (map drawn by Pajek)
The resulting network of the support links within Maramig is depicted in Figure 2.1. Each
node represents one household. The network is depicted as directed, that is the report of each
household constitutes a link, and the direction of the report is indicated by the arrow pointing
towards the household that is named as a source of support. In case of reciprocated links (i.e.,
both household name each other as a source of support) the arrow points in both directions.
Support between households is common. 55 of the 65 households name at least one other house-
hold from the village as a potential source of support. For 37 of these households at least one
and how the alter household had provided support during emergency situations the respondent’s household had
experienced during the last 3 years.
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of the reported support links is reciprocated. 62 households are named as a potential source of
support by at least one other household. One household neither names any other household as
source of support nor is named by any other household; this household forms an isolate in the
network.
Besides the directed network of reported support links, also an undirected network can be
constructed by defining a link between two households as existing if at least one of the two
households mentions the other household as a source of support.
Table 2.3: Network Characteristics for the Support Network in Maramig
Density Clustering Average Pathlength Prop. reciprocated
Directed Link 0.057 0.175 4.1 0.302
Undirected Link 0.101 0.296 2.6 -
Reported support links within the village.
Based on the report of the 65 surveyed households.
Table 2.3 describes general characteristics of the support network in Maramig, both for
the directed network and for the undirected network. For the directed network, of the 4160
(65 · 64) possible links 5.7% are identified as support links (network density), of these 30.2%
are reciprocated. In case of the undirected network, 10.1% of the 2080 (65·642 ) possible links are
named. Two additional pieces of information are useful descriptives of the network structure: the
average pathlength, which measures the average number of links between any two households
in the network, and average clustering, which is a measure for the cohesiveness of a network
(Jackson 2008).14 The average path length of the undirected network is 2.6 and the clustering
is 0.296. These measures indicate a tight knit support network. The measures are surprisingly
similar to the characteristics of rural social networks in villages in Malawi, Uganda and India,
where comparable network data have been collected (for an overview see Chandrasekhar (2016)).
2.5 Empirical Analysis
Two hypotheses guide the empirical analysis. First, it is predicted that an agent only engages in
a mutual support arrangement, if she faces a positive probability to be in need of support; that is
her alternative resources to cope with an emergency situation alone are insufficient (Hypothesis
1). Second, two agents are predicted to be less likely engaged in a mutual support arrangement
the larger the difference in their respective probability to become needy (Hypothesis 2). In
addition to these two hypotheses, I investigate whether reciprocated support links need to be
analyzed separately from unreciprocated support links, or whether they describe similar types
of arrangements.
In the following, I first discuss the empirical specification (Section 2.5.1), in particular the
specification of the two main variables included in the model, namely the support arrangement
(Section 2.5.1.1) and the probability of neediness (Section 2.5.1.2). I then turn to the dyadic
14A household i’s clustering coefficient is calculated as the proportion of i’s support links for which the alter
household is linked to at least one other alter household of i.
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analysis (Section 2.5.2), presenting the estimation results of three different models (Sections
2.5.2.1 - 2.5.2.3) that differ in their specification of the support arrangement. At the end, I
address potential shortcomings of the main empirical specification (Section 2.5.3).
2.5.1 Specification
In the empirical analysis, the likelihood of a support arrangement between two households i and
j is set in relation to the households’ respective probability of neediness. The empirical specifica-
tion thus relies on two main pieces of information: first, information on the support arrangement
between the households, and second, household characteristics that proxy a household’s proba-
bility to become needy. In the following I discuss the specification of each.
2.5.1.1 Support Arrangement
The specification of a support arrangement is based on the definition presented in Section 2.3.2.2.
A support arrangement of a household pair (ij) is defined as existing if i and j have agreed that
one household supports the other in the event of an emergency situation; in the case of a one-sided
support arrangement, support is expected from one side only; a mutual support arrangement, on
the other hand, relies on direct reciprocity: j is expected to support i in case of an emergency
and i is expected to support j. Furthermore, the empirical model relies on the assumption that
the arrangement is based on a bilateral agreement between i and j; that is, both households are
aware of the arrangement and have given their consent.
In the data, a suitable description of inter-household support arrangements is provided by
the reported hypothetical sources of support in case of a health emergency, described in Section
2.4.3. This information is used to proxy the unobserved network of support arrangements ς. A
reported support link directed from household i to household j is described by sij , where sij = 1
if household i names household j as a source of support in the event of a health shock, and zero
otherwise; and sji = 1 if household j names household i as a source of support in the event of a
health shock, and zero otherwise.
This variable has a number of advantages. First, as the variable is defined on a hypothetical
situation, the number of observations is not limited to an actual shock event. Second, the
arrangement is elicited for the case of a health shock, a type of shock which is, by and large,
assumed to be random (i.e., controlling for household size and age structure, in general each
household should face a similar probability of a health shock) and idiosyncratic (i.e., within a
village, there should be no correlation between households’ health shocks within a short period
of time); health shocks are thus suitable for inter-household support arrangements within a
village. Both assumptions will be verified below. Third, given how the variable was derived, the
arrangement can be interpreted as a bilateral agreement: the question was explicitly phrased
to consider the willingness of provider and recipient (‘Who would help you...? ’, ‘Who would you
ask...? ’); therefore it seems reasonable to assume that a reported arrangement is based on mutual
consent.
While the variable is in many aspects ideal for the empirical analysis, there are two potential
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limitations that need to be considered. One concern is that s might underestimate the true
network of support arrangements. In case support arrangements are underreported, true mutual
support arrangements might be misspecified as one-sided arrangements or non-existing, and true
one-sided support arrangements might be misspecified as non-existing. As long as underreporting
is random and neither correlated with the explanatory variables included in the estimation nor
dependent on the type of existing arrangement, the estimators should be consistent and unbi-
ased.15 In the main analysis, I include respondent characteristics as additional control variables
to address the potential response bias.
Another, related concern is that, while a support link is defined as a link between households,
it is reported by individuals.16 There are three potential issues: First, the individual reporting
the links might not be aware of all support links that her household maintains. This concern is
less severe for the case of Maramig, as the question on support arrangements had been explicitly
phrased for the whole household and typically the head of household was surveyed, who should
be aware of most of her household’s concerns (particularly so as household size is small). Re-
spondents might still differ in their ability to name the relevant support links; which underlines
the importance of including respondent characteristic in the empirical analysis. Second, while
the question asks for other households as potential source of support, the respondent likely has
a particular individual in mind and not another household in its entirety. Households with more
(adult) members might then be more likely to be named as sources of support simply because
there are more individuals in the household. Indeed, this is the case as we will see below (and
possibly explains similar findings in Schechter and Yuskavage (2012)). Finally, a support ar-
rangement as defined in Section 2.3.2.2 allows for only one type of support arrangement between
two households. However, if the formation of support arrangements is not the decision of a
household as a whole, but of the different household members, who have their own budget, then
indeed there might be several support arrangements that connect two households; and, even more
problematic for the interpretation of the results, two one-sided support arrangements might be
falsely interpreted as a mutual support arrangement. This potential case will be adressed when
the results are analyzed in more detail (Section 2.5.3.1).
2.5.1.2 Probability to become Needy
In a next step, I determine the explanatory variables to be included in the empirical estimation by
analyzing which household characteristics are associated with a higher probability of neediness.
For the derivation of these characteristics I revert to the larger data set.
The probability that a household i becomes needy is defined as the probability that i turns
to another household from within the village to ask for support in the event of an emergency
situation – i.e., the probability that one of i’s support arrangements is activated. As support
15Misreporting due to overreporting seems less likely. It is not clear why a household i should falsely name
household j as a potential source of support. Reporting names was time consuming and required some effort;
furthermore, the interviewers were strangers to the villagers and unfamiliar with the village context, making a
interviewer demand effect less likely.
16Note that eliciting the network on the household level is a common procedure (e.g. see Fafchamps and Gubert
(2007b) and Schechter and Yuskavage (2012)) but the implications are typically not discussed.
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links were elicited for the case of health emergencies, in our context neediness is conditioned
on the event of a health shock. If health shocks are random, then neediness should depend
primarily on the alternative resources i has available to cope with a health shock. (Note that
neediness also depends on the willingness to deploy alternative resources first before turning to
another household, which depends on the costs of deploying the resources as well as on personal
preferences; below, I provide some suggestive evidence that in our context households indeed
tend to use alternative resources first.)
In order to determine which household characteristics can be generally associated with a
higher probability of neediness, I analyze the determinants of asking for support in case of a
health shock using the full data set including the 21 other villages that have been surveyed and
for which the data are available in unconstrained form. Of the Maramig data, only a random
sample of 14 households is included (instead of all households) in order to balance the data with
the data of the other villages and to circumvent potential reverse causality effects on the latter
analysis.17 The data set then contains a total of 306 household observations from 22 villages.
In the survey, respondents were asked whether they had experienced a health shock in the
past three years and the exact date. Of the 306 households, 48% indicate having experienced
a health shock. When the event of a health shock is regressed on household characteristics
that could be associated with adverse health related events (namely household wealth, whether
the household head completed high school, household size, age distribution of the household
members, major sources of income, as well as village fixed effects), only the number of household
members that are under the age of 6 is significantly correlated with the event of a health shock
(results are reported in Table A.13 in Appendix A.2.1).18 Village fixed effects are insignificant
overall; only in one village are slightly more health shocks reported than in the other villages;
yet, they are spread over the three years and do not accumulate within one time period. These
results confirm the assumption that the experience of a health shock can be generally viewed
as a random event (once household size and demographics are controlled for), and, furthermore,
that the majority of health shocks are indeed of idiosyncratic nature.19
Respondents, who indicated having experienced a health shock, were asked to identify up to
three main strategies they had employed to deal with the shock. In addition, all respondents were
asked to identify up to three main strategies they would apply to deal with health emergencies
if they faced such a situation today. Both for the case of an actual health shock and for the case
of a hypothetical health shock, approximately two thirds of the reported strategies involve the
support of neighbors, friends or relatives, the majority of which coming from within the same
village (for an overview on all listed strategies, see Tables A.14 and A.15 in Appendix A.2.1).
This information allows me to investigate what determines the probability that a coping strategy
17More specifically, I include those 14 households that have been surveyed on the first day of the survey period in
Maramig. Like in the other villages, these 14 households had been randomly selected from the village’s household
list.
18This effect can be due to illnesses of small children, but is likely also driven by complications during child
births; deliveries still bear considerable health risks for the mothers as villages are remote and health centers often
difficult to reach.
19Various other variables were tested; e.g. income instead of asset wealth, other educational variables as well
as respondent characteristics to test for potential response bias. None were significant.
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involves the support of other households within the village. The analysis is conducted on the





kα+ ξv + uk,i,v (2.5)
where ck,i,v = 1 if the strategy k listed by household i living in village v involves support from
within the village (in the form of money or in-kind), and 0 otherwise. The analysis is conducted
both for the case that an actual health shock has taken place (restricting the data set to those
households that have experienced a health shock) as well as for the case of a hypothetical health
shock. In line with the framework outlined in Section 2.3.1, the probability of neediness is
expected to depend on the alternative resources available to a household, which could include
personal wealth, access to financial products such as credit, savings and insurance, as well as
access to support outside the village. Therefore, as potential determinants, Xi includes asset
wealth, whether the household is covered by health insurance and access to credit, which is
defined as given if at least one household member is a member of a bank (commercial bank
or microfinance institution), is covered by one of the social security schemes or is a member of
a cooperative. Furthermore, I include the number of close household links outside the village
elicited in the network section of the questionnaire, as well as a dummy variable for whether the
household receives remittances. In addition, I control for the gender and age of the household
head, whether the household head has completed high school, household size, and village fixed
effects. Summary statistics for all household characteristics included in the analysis are provided
in Table A.2 in Appendix A.1.1. Besides the household characteristics, two dummy variables are
included, indicating whether a strategy was named as the second or third strategy (Strategy order
k). This will provide an indication for whether indeed households turn to alternative resources
first before asking for support from within the village. The estimation of Specification 2.5 is
conducted by logit regression with standard errors clustered on the village level.
Before turning to the results, two comments need to be made. First, one needs to be cau-
tious not to interpret the results as causal. Indeed, there might be considerable endogeneity:
households that expect less support from their neighbors might be more inclined to invest in
alternative risk management tools, e.g. by acquiring insurance or fostering contacts outside the
village; results should thus be interpreted as correlations and not as causal effects. Second, for
the analysis of strategies applied in the past, ideally information from the past (i.e., at the time
of the health shock) would be included. The data allow for a derivation of values for bank and
cooperative membership, access to insurance and coverage through social security systems for
the time a health shock occurred, however for the other variables I cannot infer past values.
This is problematic for asset wealth, the number of links outside the village, and whether the
household receives remittances, as these variables might have changed over the past years and
might even be endogenous to the strategy applied at the time of the shock. In a second estima-
tion, I therefore replace these three variables with an index of durable assets, and the number of
related households outside the village, excluding former household members. (For details on the
derivation and validity analysis of the durable asset index see Appendix A.1.2.)
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Neediness (all villages)
(1) (2) (3)
Needy in past Needy in past Needy hypothetically
Age of head 1.007 0.996 1.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Female head 0.987 0.898 0.830
(0.259) (0.226) (0.151)
Head completed high school 1.467 1.539 0.811
(0.511) (0.512) (0.159)
Household size 0.794∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.059) (0.038)
Asset wealth 0.033∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗
(0.026) (0.173)
No. links outside village 0.714∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.044)
Remittances recipient 0.377∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.100)
Durable asset wealth 0.031∗∗∗
(0.025)
No. of family hh outside village 0.929∗∗∗
(0.024)
Access to credit(∗) 1.229 1.421 1.410∗∗
(0.383) (0.390) (0.238)
Health insurance(∗) 0.468∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.818
(0.125) (0.142) (0.133)
Strategy order 2 1.728∗ 1.591 2.561∗∗∗
(0.540) (0.463) (0.484)
Strategy order 3 1.654 1.562 2.504∗∗∗
(0.585) (0.514) (0.530)
Constant 3.757∗ 3.825∗ 1.335
(2.878) (3.091) (0.718)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 380 380 896
Mean of dependent variable 0.324 0.324 0.333
χ2 98.005 83.519 128.991
r2p 0.206 0.148 0.125
Logit estimation. Estimators reported as odds ratios. Standard errors in parantheses, clustered at village level.
Columns 1 and 2: determinants of past neediness for households who experienced a health shock.
Column 3: determinants of hypothetical neediness for all households.
(∗) In Columns 1 and 2 values for the year of the health shock, in Column 3 values at time of the survey.
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The results are reported in Table 2.4. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for strategies
applied in the past, Column 3 for hypothetical strategies. Estimators are presented as odds
ratios, thus they need to be interpreted as the effect of a one unit change in the independent
variable on the probability of neediness. The number of household members as well as asset
wealth are significantly negatively correlated with neediness; thus, wealthier households as well
as households with more people are less likely to ask for support within their village. Furthermore,
households that are well connected outside their village (or have more family outside the village)
and households that receive remittances are less likely to ask for support within the village,
in case of both past and hypothetical strategies. Also, health insurance coverage is negatively
correlated with neediness, yet only significantly so for shocks in the past. Surprisingly, access
to credit is positively correlated with neediness, significantly in the case of hypothetical shocks:
a strategy named by a household with access to credit is 1.4 times more likely to be ‘support
from within the village’ than another form of risk coping. Finally, seeking support from within
the village is more likely to be named as a second or third strategy than as a first strategy; the
coefficients are jointly significant. This last result provides some confirmation for the theoretical
assumption that people employ their personal resources first before asking for support within
their village.
The results indicate that indeed households with access to alternative resources are less likely
to be in need of support from within the village. In particular, more wealth, a larger number
of connections outside the village and more household members (who could potentially work
more to cope with the consequences of a shock) are negatively correlated with being in need of
support from within the village. The role of access to credit is surprising. When splitting the
variable in the different types of credit access, we can observe that bank membership and social
security coverage are driving the results. One potential explanation is that households with credit
access have more possibilities to draw on village level support, potentially because they are more
trusted. While households with access to credit report on average slightly less links within their
village than households without access to credit, it might still be the case that these households
are on average more confident that they can seek support from their network than households
without access to credit. The data on hand do not permit investigating the relationship in more
detail. Nevertheless, this observation points towards a limitation of the theoretical framework:
in the framework, personal household level resources are viewed as a substitute for intra-village
support, while indeed a higher level of resources could enhance support options from within the
village if used as signal of trustworthiness.
To summarize, asset wealth, number of connections outside the village and the size of the
household are shown to determine the probability of neediness in case of a health shock and
should thus be included as predictors of neediness in the main analysis.
2.5.2 Dyadic Analysis
I now turn to the main analysis of the study and analyze the support arrangement network in
Maramig. The likelihood that a mutual support arrangement ςij between a household i and a
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household j is formed is described as
P (ςij = 1) = P (α+X
′
ijβ + εij ≥ 0) (2.6)
where Xij includes characteristics of i and j that proxy their respective probability to become
needy, and εij is the link specific error term.
For the characteristics to be included in X, I draw on the findings from Section 2.5.1.2. The
following variables are included as proxies for a household’s probability to become needy: Asset
wealth, Household size, the proportion of household members between 16 and 59 (% hh members
(16-59)), as well as the number of related households outside the village (No. of family hh outside
village), which is used instead of the number of links outside the village due to reverse causality
concerns (e.g. a household might invest more in outside connections if there are little support
possibilities within the village). As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the size of a household’s support
network within the village likely affects the probability that one of the support links is activated
and should thus be accounted for in the analysis; as the number of support links is inherently
endogenous to the model, instead, the number of related households within the village (No. of
family hh within village) is included as a proxy.20 Finally, as additional household level controls,
age and gender of the household head and a dummy indicating whether the household head
completed high school are included (Age of head, Female head, Education of head). Note that as
in 90% of the time the household head was also the respondent to the survey, these characteristics
overlap considerably with the respondents’ characteristics. All of the following estimations have
also been conducted including the respondents’ characteristics, the coefficients of interest do not
change significantly. Potentially endogenous variables, such as access to remittances, coverage
by health insurance and access to credit, are excluded for now. I come back to the analysis of
these variables further below. Dyadic summary statistics including the sum and the absolute
difference of all variables are reported in Table A.3 in Appendix A.1.1.
The dependent variable, ςij , is based on the reported source of support in case of health
emergency, as outlined in Section 2.5.1.1. There are different possibilities to specify this variable,
which affect both the specification of the estimation model and the results. In previous studies,
different specifications have been used. For the sake of comparison, I conduct three different
types of estimations.
First, I analyze the likelihood that household i reports household j as a source of support
(Section 2.5.2.1). This specification follows the analysis by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007b). It
does not yet inform us about the characteristics of mutual support arrangements but serves as
an informative baseline.
Second, I investigate the likelihood of a mutual support arrangement assuming that each re-
ported support link indicates a mutual support arrangement (Section 2.5.2.2). This is a common
approach used in the literature (e.g. see De Weerdt (2004)), but it ignores potential one-sided
support arrangements.
20Note that the questions on the number of related households within and outside the village are part of the
socioeconomic questionnaire, they are not derived from the elicited network.
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Finally, I turn to the main specification analyzing the likelihood of a support arrangement,
distinguishing one-sided from mutual support arrangements by accounting for whether or not a
reported support link is reciprocated (Section 2.5.2.3). This approach builds on Schechter and
Yuskavage (2012).
2.5.2.1 Likelihood of Support Link
As a baseline, I analyze how i’s and j’s respective probability to become needy, proxied by their
alternative resources, affect the likelihood that i names j as a potential source of support (i.e.,
sij = 1), disregarding whether or not a support link is reciprocated.
sij = α+ β1Xi + β2Xj + δ|Xi −Xj |+ εij for i, j ∈ N = (1, ..., 65), i 6= j. (2.7)
The analysis is conducted on the directed network, that is for each pair (i, j), with i, j ∈
N = 1, ..., 65 and (i 6= j); i.e., 4160 observations. X contains the above described proxies for
a household’s probability of becoming needy. Note, that the variables are defined such that
a higher value in X is associated with a lower probability of neediness. Level and difference
effects of each variable are accounted for: β1 measures the effect of i’s predicted neediness on
the likelihood of naming other households within the village as a source of support. β2 measures
the effect of j’s predicted neediness on the likelihood of being named as a source of support. δ
measures the effect of the absolute difference in i’s and j’s predicted neediness on their likelihood
to have a support link.
Specification 2.7 is estimated by a logit model. There are two estimations. First, household
characteristics are included as lined out above, in this case standard errors are corrected to
account for the correlation across observations (dyadic robust standard errors).21 Second, instead
of the household characteristics Xi and Xj , fixed effects for i and j (i.e., for the ego and for the
alter household) are included as well as the absolute differences in the household characteristics.
Using fixed effects controls for unobserved household characteristics that affect link formation,
yet, in this case, only the impact of the differences in alternative resources, and not the level
effects can be analyzed. When fixed effects are included, households that do not report any
support links within the village as well as households that are not named as potential sources of
support drop out of the analysis (in total 13 households).
Results are reported in Table 2.5. Estimated coefficients for the household head character-
istics are excluded from this and the following tables (for the complete tables for the following
estimations see Tables A.16 - A.18 in Appendix A.2.2). The results suggest that wealthier house-
holds as well as households of larger size are more likely to be named as a potential source of
support; however, differences in wealth should not be too large: the larger the difference, the less
likely a support link between two households exists. Households with a larger family network
within but less family outside the village name on average more support links. Furthermore,
a support link is more likely between households with a similarly sized family network. When
21I thank Marcel Fafchamps for the provision of the programming code for the estimation of the corrected
standard errors.
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Table 2.5: Likelihood of Support Link
(1) (2)





% hh members (16-59) 0.104
(0.231)
No. of family hh within village 0.031∗∗
(0.013)
No. of family hh outside village -0.054∗
(0.030)
Alter: Asset wealth 1.790∗∗∗
(0.685)
Alter: Household size 0.129∗∗
(0.062)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) 0.046
(0.334)
Alter: No. of family hh within village 0.000
(0.014)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village -0.056∗
(0.032)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth -1.501∗∗∗ -2.508∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.563)
AbsDiff in Household size 0.060 0.153∗∗
(0.049) (0.068)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) 0.181 0.011
(0.272) (0.354)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village -0.027∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)




Ego fixed effects No Yes
Alter fixed effects No Yes
Observations 4160 3357
Control variables Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.057 0.070
log likelihood -859.128 -758.231
χ2 225.427 191.690
p 0.000 0.000
Logit Estimation on the directed network. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
Control for the level of and the absolute difference in Age of head, Head completed high school, Female head.
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household fixed effects are included (Column 2), the negative effect of differences in wealth re-
mains, and becomes stronger;22 the difference in household size becomes significantly positively
correlated with the existence of a support link, indicating that a support link is typically formed
between a smaller and a larger household.
However, while Specification 2.7 uses the complete information of all reported support links,
the results cannot be interpreted in the context of mutual support arrangements. The analysis
is conducted on the directed network where each link is counted separately and the symmetry
requirements of mutual support arrangements, lined out in Section 2.3.2.2, are only fulfilled
when fixed effects are included. This limitation is addressed by the following second estimation
approach.
2.5.2.2 Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement – Naïve Approach
In order to account for the symmetry requirements, the network of support arrangements is
analyzed under the assumption that all reported support links are representing mutual support
arrangements and that unreciprocated support links are due to underreporting. This approach
follows Specification 2.2 described in Section 2.3.2.1.
ςij = α̃+ β̃Xi + β̃Xj + δ̃|Xi −Xj |
where ςij = 1 if sij = 1 or sji = 1
ςij = 0 if sij = 0 and sji = 0 for i, j ∈ N = (1, ..., 65), i < j. (2.8)
The analysis is conducted on the undirected network graph (i, j ∈ N = 1, ..., 65 and (i < j),
i.e., 2080 observations). Regressors are included to maintain the symmetric structure – i.e., the
sum, (Xi +Xj), to measure level effects, and the absolute difference, |Xi −Xj |.23 Estimation is
done by logit regression; in a first estimation, standard errors are corrected to account for the
correlation across observations, in the second estimation household fixed effects are included. β̃
measures the effect of the combined level of i’s and j’s predicted neediness on their likelihood to
form a mutual support arrangement, while δ̃ measures the effect of the absolute difference of i’s
and j’s expected neediness. A higher X is associated with a lower likelihood of neediness.
In line with Hypothesis 1, β̃ is expected to be smaller than zero; the more resources i and j
have available, and thus the smaller i’s and j’s predicted neediness, the lower the likelihood that
they engage in a mutual support arrangement. In line with Hypothesis (2), δ̃ is expected to be
smaller than zero; the larger the differences in i’s and j’s predicted neediness, the less likely it is
that they form a mutual support arrangement.
Results are reported in Table 2.6; as in the previous table, Column 2 reports the results of
the fixed effects regression. The estimated coefficients differ considerably from the estimation of
22The change is to some extent driven by those ten households that do not name any support links within the
village and drop out of the analysis when fixed effects are included; these households are overall wealthier than
the other households.
23Note that β̃(Xi +Xj) is split in β̃Xi + β̃Xj , for presentation reasons only.
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Table 2.6: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement – Naïve Approach
(1) (2)





% hh members (16-59) 0.107
(0.191)
No. of family hh within village 0.012
(0.009)
No. of family hh outside village -0.037
(0.023)
Alter: Asset wealth 0.595∗
(0.330)
Alter: Household size 0.098∗∗∗
(0.038)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) 0.107
(0.191)
Alter: No. of family hh within village 0.012
(0.009)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village -0.037
(0.023)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth -0.523 -1.313∗∗
(0.511) (0.579)
AbsDiff in Household size 0.108∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.077)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) 0.090 -0.431
(0.309) (0.406)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village -0.018 -0.020
(0.017) (0.018)




Ego fixed effects No Yes
Alter fixed effects No Yes
Observations 2080 1854
Control variables Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.055 0.062
log likelihood -647.404 -568.690
χ2 69.712 151.925
p 0.000 0.030
Logit Estimation on the undirected network. ςij = 1 if sij = 1 or sji = 1.
Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
Control for the level of and the absolute difference in Age of head, Head completed high school, Female head.
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Specification 2.7. The combined level effects of households’ asset wealth as well as of household
size is significant and positive. Wealthier households and larger households seem more likely to
form mutual support arrangements than poorer households or households of smaller size. This is
contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 1, as asset wealth and household size have been shown to
be associated with a lower probability of neediness. When including household fixed effects the
effects are similar as the fixed effect estimation of Specification 2.7, households are more likely
to form support arrangements if they have a similar level of wealth and if household size differs.
This is not particularly surprising, Specification 2.7 with fixed effects is similar to Specification
2.8 with fixed effects, with the exception that the estimation of the latter is conducted on a
subset of the support links analyzed in the former.
In summary, if indeed every support link indicates a mutual support arrangement, then, based
on these results, Hypothesis 1 would be rejected. While small household size and low wealth
have been shown to be strong predictors of neediness, these variables do not affect the formation
of mutual support arrangements as expected; indeed households with more alternative resources
in terms of household members and wealth, are predicted to be more likely to engage in mutual
support arrangements. With regard to Hypothesis 2, the interpretation is not as straightforward.
Households with a larger difference in wealth indeed seem to have a lower likelihood to form a
mutual support arrangement, yet the effect is only significant when fixed effects are included.
The differences in the other variables of interest (i.e., resources within the household, within the
village or outside the village) have either no significant effect or the effect is opposite to our
expectation (as for the case of household size).
However, the definition of mutual support arrangements used in Specification 2.8 might be
inadequate. As discussed in Section 2.3.2.2, the definition potentially combines mutual with
purely one-side support arrangements, which do not follow the motive of risk-sharing. Hence, it
might be sensible to differentiate between support links that are reciprocated from those that
are unreciprocated. This is the next step.
2.5.2.3 Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement – Accounting for Reciprocation
The third estimation approach follows Model 2.4 described in Section 2.3.2.2 and accounts for
the direction of a support link and for whether or not a support link is reciprocated. The model
builds on the approach by Schechter and Yuskavage (2012).24 I estimate the joint likelihood
using a multinomial logit specified as follows:
24Note, however, that Schechter and Yuskavage (2012) do not address the issue of bilateral and unilateral
link formation. They only study the reports from one side, neglecting the report from the other party (which
furthermore might result in double counting some of the arrangements).
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where ς̇ij = 1 if sij = 1 and sji = 0
ς̇ij = 2 if sij = 0 and sji = 1
ς̇ij = 3 if sij = 1 and sji = 1
ς̇ij = 0 if sij = 0 and sji = 0 for i, j ∈ N = (1, ..., 65), i < j.
(2.9)
Again the analysis is conducted on the undirected graph, that is for each pair (i, j), with
i, j ∈ N = 1, ..., 65 and (i < j); i.e., 2080 observations. For the estimation I use the reference
category of ς̇ij = 0. The parameters are constrained to account for symmetry. In particular, the
estimation of P (ς̇ij = 2) mirrors the estimation of P (ς̇ij = 1): the coefficients of the receivers’
characteristics in one-sided support – i.e., the ego household in arrangement ς̇ij = 1 and the
alter household in ς̇ij = 2 – are constrained to be equal, and the same holds for the providers’
characteristics; the intercept as well as the coefficients of the absolute differences in characteristics
are constrained to be the same in ς̇ij = 1 and ς̇ij = 2. Furthermore, in the estimation of
P (ς̇ij = 3) – i.e., the mutual support arrangement – level effects are constrained to be the same
for the characteristics of i and the characteristics of j (similar to Specification 2.8).
ς̇ij = 3 is assumed to describe mutual support arrangements. I expect that these arrangements
are more likely if the predicted neediness of both parties is sufficiently high (β′′3 > 0), yet the
difference in their predicted neediness is small (δ′′3 < 0). Furthermore, I investigate the difference
in reciprocated versus unreciprocated support links. If size and direction of the coefficients of
interest differ considerably for reciprocated support links (ς̇ij = 3) compared to unreciprocated
support links (ς̇ij = 1 and ς̇ij = 2), then this is an indication that unreciprocated support links
follow different mechanisms than reciprocated support links. The multinomial logit model is
based on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). That is, the proportion
of probabilities between two alternatives should be independent on the existence of a third
alternative (Greene 2012). This assumption can be tested formally using the Hausman-McFadden
Test (Hausman and McFadden 1984). In particular, I test whether the coefficients for one-sided
suport arrangements change significantly when the option of mutual support arrangements is
excluded. This hypothesis can be rejected.25
25Comparing the two models leads to a test statistics of χ2(25) = −0.47. A negative χ2 is generally viewed as
support for the hypothesis that there is no difference (Vijverberg 2011). An alternative approach is to include
the covariance when estimating the variance of the estimates’ differences (Weesie 1999). This ensures that testing
results are always well defined; furthermore, it allows for clustering standard errors, which is not feasible with the
conventional Hausman-McFadden Test, and for testing the models separately. This test supports the results for
both types of one-sided support arrangements (χ2(25) = 18.80, p = 0.81).
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Results are reported in Table 2.7; in Column 1, results are reported for one-sided support
arrangements – where i (the ego household) names j (the alter household) as a source of support,
but j does not name i (ς̇ij = 1); in Column 2, results are reported for a one-sided support
arrangement – where j names i as a source of support but i does not name j (ς̇ij = 2); in Column
3, results are reported for mutual support arrangements – i.e., i names j and j names i (ς̇ij = 3).
With regard to one-sided arrangements, I find that wealthier households and households of larger
size are typically named as providers in one-sided support arrangements. As expected, with
more family in the village, the likelihood of being a recipient of support increases, presumably
because there are more opportunities to ask for support. The effect of absolute differences in
wealth is negative; that is, even though a one-sided support arrangement is more likely when
the provider household is wealthy, there should be no large difference in wealth between the
household providing support and the household receiving support.
All these characteristics play no role for the formation of mutual support arrangements (Col-
umn 3). Mutual support arrangements are more likely when both parties do not have many
family connections outside the village, when they have a similar level of wealth and a similarly
large family support network. Furthermore, households with more relatives in the village are
also more likely to engage in mutual support. Difference in wealth seems to play an especially
important role. The effect is much more pronounced than for the case of one-sided arrange-
ments. In particular, if the difference in wealth reduces by one standard deviation (0.17), two
households are twice more likely to engage in a mutual support arrangement than to engage in
no arrangement (e−4.33·−0.17 = 2.09); for the case of one-sided support arrangements the scaling
factor is only 1.18 (e−0.95·−0.17).
So far, I have ignored alternative resources which are potentially endogenous to support ar-
rangement formation but have, nevertheless, been shown to explain the probability of neediness
(Section 2.5.1.2). When I include these variables (namely, coverage by health insurance, access
to credit and receiving remittances) results change slightly (results are reported in Appendix
A.2.2 in Table A.20). One-sided support links are more likely if the recipient has access to credit
(which is reminiscent of the previous results discussed in Section 2.5.1.2) and if the provider is
covered by health insurance; remittances seem to play no role. Contrary to this, mutual support
arrangements are less likely between households that receive remittances. However, neither ac-
cess to credit nor coverage by health insurance are predicted to explain the formation of mutual
support arrangements.
Summarizing the results, first, I find that the determinants for reciprocated support links
differ considerably from the determinants for unreciprocated support links. The results indicate
that indeed unreciprocated support links rather describe one-sided support arrangements that
follow a different mechanism. Second, the hypotheses on mutual support arrangements can only
partly be confirmed. Hypothesis 1 predicts that households with less alternative resources on
hand and thus with a larger probability of neediness are generally more likely to form mutual
support arrangements. However, neither wealth, nor household size, nor member composition,
which all are found to play an important role in predicting neediness, seem to determine whether
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Table 2.7: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement – Accounting for Reciprocation
(1) (2) (3)
P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3)
Asset wealth -0.847 1.858∗∗∗ 0.256
(0.604) (0.647) (1.044)
Household size 0.069 0.143∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.062) (0.055) (0.091)
% hh members (16-59) 0.077 -0.010 0.184
(0.267) (0.434) (0.552)
No. of family hh within village 0.025∗ -0.011 0.033∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
No. of family hh outside village -0.020 -0.030 -0.182∗
(0.030) (0.040) (0.097)
Alter: Asset wealth 1.858∗∗∗ -0.847 0.256
(0.647) (0.604) (1.044)
Alter: Household size 0.143∗∗∗ 0.069 0.077
(0.055) (0.062) (0.091)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) -0.010 0.077 0.184
(0.434) (0.267) (0.552)
Alter: No. of family hh within village -0.011 0.025∗ 0.033∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village -0.030 -0.020 -0.182∗
(0.040) (0.030) (0.097)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth -0.949∗ -0.949∗ -4.330∗∗∗
(0.525) (0.525) (1.200)
AbsDiff in Household size 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ -0.136
(0.045) (0.045) (0.158)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) -0.038 -0.038 0.746
(0.310) (0.310) (0.676)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village -0.014 -0.014 -0.060∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.035)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh outside village -0.013 -0.013 0.069
(0.042) (0.042) (0.134)







Multinomial logit estimation. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
Control for the level of and the absolute differences in Age of head, Education of head, Female head.
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a household is part of a mutual support arrangement or not. Only the number of family outside
the village and access to remittances is negatively correlated with the formation of mutual sup-
port arrangements. Hypothesis 2 predicts that households which differ in their probability to
become needy are less likely to form mutual support arrangements. In some aspects this hypoth-
esis is confirmed. Mutual support arrangements seem to be mainly formed between households
of a similar wealth level and with a similarly large family network within the village. However,
differences in none of the other resources are found to have a significant effect. Assuming the
estimation model is correctly specified, these results suggest that the proposed framework de-
scribed in Section 2.3.1 can explain some of the structure of the support network in Maramig,
while other aspects remain unexplained. Part of this might be driven by shortcomings of the
empirical specification. This will be addressed in the following section.
2.5.3 Limitations and Extended Analysis
There are a number of potential shortcomings of the estimation approach. First, what I call a
mutual support arrangement, might indeed just be two one-sided support arrangements; that is,
the report by i and the report by j do not refer to the same arrangement but to two different one-
sided arrangements. Second, in the specification above, household characteristics are included
as if each had a separate effect on the formation of support arrangements, while indeed these
characteristics are supposed to function as a combined predictor of neediness. Third, asset wealth
is estimated to have a strong effect on support link formation; however, wealth can be endogenous
to the formation of support arrangements: similar levels of wealth might be an outcome rather
than a driver of the formation of a support arrangement (as shown theoretically in Bourlès et al.
(“Altruism in Networks”) and Bramoullé and Kranton (2007)). Fourth, results might not be
driven by the households’ probability of neediness but by other unobserved characteristics that
have been shown in previous studies to play a role in risk-sharing formation processes such as risk
and time preferences (Charness and Genicot 2009) or trustworthiness (Attanasio et al. 2012).
Fifth, while I analyze mutual support arrangements in a network context, the model does not
allow the network structure to affect link specific utilities. In particular, it has been shown that
network structure might affect compliance (e.g. in Jackson et al. (2012)). The model above,
however, does not account for such interdependencies.
In order to address these concerns, I conduct some additional analyses. I address the first
concern, by comparing two models that, respectively, do and do not account for reciprocity, in or-
der to ensure that presumed mutual support arrangements are not indeed two one-sided support
arrangements (Section 2.5.3.1). To address the three concerns with regard to the explanatory
variables, I develop a ‘neediness score’ based on characteristics that are exogenous to the forma-
tion of a support arrangement; with this composite predictor, which should be unaffected by any
unobserved household characteristics or by the support link formation process itself, I re-estimate
Specification 2.9 (Section 2.5.3.2). Finally, I analyze how results differ when a measure for the
local network structure is included in the estimation (Section 2.5.3.3).
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2.5.3.1 Analyzing reciprocity
Could potentially a reciprocated support link represent not a mutual support arrangement but
rather two one-sided support arrangements? If this is the case, a model which accounts for
reciprocity should not have better explanatory power than a model which does not account for
reciprocity. This is analyzed by comparing the estimation results of Specification 2.7, which
estimates all support links independently of whether they are reciprocated or not, with a specifi-
cation, that takes reciprocity into account. In this latter specification, links that are reciprocated
(sij = 1 and sji = 1) are distinguished from links that are not reciprocated (sij = 1 and sji = 0).
The estimation is conducted by multinomial logit on the directed network graph (i.e., for each
pair (i, j), with i, j ∈ N = 1, ..., 65 and (i 6= j) – i.e. 4160 observations), with the reference
category of (sij = 0 and sji = 0). Note that this specification is very similar to Specification 2.9.
Likewise, for reciprocated links coefficients are constrained to fulfill symmetry requirements.



























The estimation of Specification 2.7 is compared with the estimation of Specification 2.10. Good-
ness of fit measures for both analyses are reported in Table 2.8. Yet, the measures cannot be
directly compared as the models are not nested. Two aspects can be analyzed. First, I test
whether the estimators for the probability to initiate a support link significantly differ when we
account for reciprocity, that is we compare the estimators of Specification 2.7 with the estimators
for the unreciprocated support links in Specification 2.10. The Wald test indicates that indeed
these estimators differ significantly: with a χ2(25) = 110.46 we can reject the hypothesis that
both estimators are similar.
Table 2.8: Model Comparison








- of unreciprocated links 0.0394 0.0391
(0.0026) (0.0027)
- of reciprocated links 0.0148 0.0143
(0.0019) (0.0017)
Specification 2.7 does not distinguish reciprocated from unreciprocated links.
Specification 2.10 distinguishes reciprocated from unreciprocated links.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Second, we can analyze whether Specification 2.7 performs better in predicting reciprocated
and unreciprocated links than Specification 2.10, by calculating the mean squared prediction
error for each type of link. For unreciprocated links the mean squared error is 0.0394 for the
predictor based on Specification 2.7 and 0.0391 for the predictor for Specification 2.10. While
the difference is not large, it is significantly different from zero. For unreciprocated links the
mean squared error is 0.0148 for the predictor based on Specification 2.7 and 0.0143 for the
predictor for Specification 2.10. Again the difference is significantly different from zero. That
is, Specification 2.10 performs overall better in predicting both unreciprocated and reciprocated
links than Specification 2.7.
However, the predictive power of both models is very poor. This is mainly due to the ‘rare-
event’ nature of the data and is a well-known limitation to dyadic regression analysis of link
formation.
2.5.3.2 Neediness Score
I develop a predictor of neediness that is based on household characteristics that are exogenous to
the support arrangement formation process. In particular, exogenous household characteristics
are weighted by a factor that is derived by analyzing past neediness using the larger data set of
the 22 villages (including a sample of 14 households from Maramig), the same data set which
is used in Section 2.5.1.2. Using the larger data set and not limiting the analysis to the data
of Maramig circumvents the potential problem of reverse causality; if the predictor would be
developed based on the Maramig data set only, the derived weights might be affected by the
existing support links.
Based on the derived weights, for each household in Maramig, a score is developed that
describes this particular household’s probability to become needy. This score is similar to the
score derived in propensity score matching techniques used for treatment effect analyses (Greene
2012, pp.934) In particular I estimate
Ym,v = βXm + ξv + εm,v for m = 1, ..., n and v = 1, ..., 22 (2.11)
where Ym,v = 1 if household m living in village v has been needy in the past (i.e., if m has
experienced a health shock and has turned to another household within her village to ask for
support) and Ym,v = 0 otherwise. X includes household level characteristics that are exogenous
to the probability of neediness. In addition, village fixed effects ξ are included. Based on the
estimator β̂, I can derive for each household i in Maramig a neediness score n̂eedyi:
n̂eedyi = β̂Xi for i = 1, ..., 65 (2.12)
The following variables are included in X: the education of the household head, the gender
and age of the household head, the age distribution of household members and the number of
other households within the village the respondent household is related to. Specification 2.11 is
estimated via maximum likelihood. Results are reported in Table A.21 in Appendix A.2.3. The
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score is standardized to be between 0 and 1. Summary statistics for the derived neediness score
for the households of Maramig are described in Table A.22 and the distribution is depicted in
Figure A.1 in Appendix A.2.3.
I then reestimate Specification 2.8 using as explanatory variables only the level and the dif-
ferences in the neediness score of the ego and the alter household, controlling for household
head characteristics (see Table A.3 in Appendix A.1.1 for the summary statistics). Results are
reported in Table 2.9, Part 1 (for the full table see Table A.19 in Appendix A.2.2). The level of
predicted neediness does not affect the likelihood that a household is a recipient or a provider
in a support arrangement significantly, neither for one-sided nor for mutual support arrange-
ments. However, differences in neediness play a role. Households are more likely to be part of
one-sided support arrangements the larger the difference in their predicted neediness. The sign
of the estimated level effects indicate that in a one-sided support arrangement the provider has
on average a slightly lower predicted probability of neediness while the recipient has a slightly
higher predicted probability of neediness. This is not the case for mutual support arrangements.
The more households differ in their predicted neediness, the less likely it is that a mutual support
arrangement is formed. In particular, a one standard deviation reduction in the absolute dif-
ference in predicted neediness (0.24), increases the likelihood of a mutual support arrangement
compared to having no arrangement by around 40% (e−1.37·−0.24 = 1.39), while it reduces the
likelihood of a one-sided support arrangement by 16% (e0.73·−0.24 = 0.84). Interestingly, it does
not seem to be the case that households with a higher probability of neediness are more likely
to form a mutual support arrangement; while the coefficients are not significant, the direction of
the effect is opposite to what is predicted in Hypothesis 2.
In summary, the findings of the previous analysis are confirmed. Hypothesis 1 needs to be
rejected. It seems not to be the case that households with a particularly high probability of
neediness are more likely to form mutual support arrangements. There is some support for
Hypothesis 2. Indeed, households which form mutual support arrangements typically do not
differ strongly in their probability of becoming needy. However, the estimated effects are only
marginally significant and explain little of the overall variance. There seem to be other, possibly
more important, forces that affect the formation and sustainability of support arrangements.
One of these potential forces is discussed next.
2.5.3.3 Including Network Characteristics
An important piece of information, which was disregarded until now, is the structure of the local
support network. The local support network can affect compliance. Theoretically, Jackson et al.
(2012) show that the participation constraint discussed in Section 2.3 can be ameliorated in a
network setting, when in case i defects on j, i does not only jeopardize the arrangement with
j but also arrangements with all those partners that she has in common with j. In particular,
they show that in case c >
δ
(
pi v − pj c
)
1− δ
, a mutual support arrangement network ς can still be
sustained if all links in ς are ‘backed,’ where a link between i and j is defined as ‘backed’ if there
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Table 2.9: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement - Neediness Score
Part (1) Part (2)
Mutual Support Mutual Support
P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3) P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3)
n̂eedy -0.285 0.287 -0.404 -0.456 0.767 1.506∗∗
(0.229) (0.452) (0.660) (0.504) (0.562) (0.590)
Alter: n̂eedy 0.287 -0.285 -0.404 0.767 -0.456 1.506∗∗
(0.452) (0.229) (0.660) (0.562) (0.504) (0.590)
AbsDiff in n̂eedy 0.728∗ 0.728∗ -1.366∗ 0.153 0.153 -1.238
(0.428) (0.428) (0.780) (0.651) (0.651) (1.206)
commonfriend 1.052∗∗ 1.052∗∗ 3.990∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.419) (0.987)
n̂eedy∗commonfriend 0.273 -0.759 -3.006∗∗∗
(0.754) (0.617) (1.078)
(Alter: n̂eedy)∗commonfriend -0.759 0.273 -3.006∗∗∗
(0.617) (0.754) (1.078)
(Absdiff in n̂eedy)∗commonfriend 0.660 0.660 0.320
(0.882) (0.882) (1.877)
Constant -1.980∗∗∗ -1.980∗∗∗ -2.450∗ -2.429∗∗∗ -2.429∗∗∗ -5.069∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.655) (1.419) (0.719) (0.719) (1.530)
Observations 2080 2080
Control variables Yes Yes
log likelihood -839.892 -799.244
χ2 166.661 551.357
p 0.000 0.000
Multinomial logit estimation. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
Control for the level of and the absolute differences in Age of head, Education of head, Female head.
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is at least one other agent k who is linked both with i and with j.26 Along similar lines, we
could expect that even if the difference in the probability of becoming needy is large, a mutual
support arrangement between two households might still be formed, if there is a third household
that is linked to both.
This can be analyzed by including the information of whether two households have a friend in
common. This information is derived from the friendship network that has been elicited as part of
the network questionnaire. I define a link between two households as backed if they have at least
one friend in common. In particular, for each household pair (ij) with i < j, commonfriendij =
1 if at least one of the households, which household i lists as ‘close households,’ is also listed by
household j as a ‘close household.’ I reestimate Specification 2.8 using the neediness score of
the ego and the alter household as well as the absolute differences and include the indicator for
whether or not a common friend exists, as well as the interaction between this indicator and the
neediness score. Note that for reasons of symmetry, the coefficients are constrained in a similar
way as above. In particular, the estimation of P (ς̇ij = 2) mirrors the estimation of P (ςij = 1)
and the effect of commonfriendij is constrained to be the same for P (ς̇ij = 1) and P (ς̇ij = 2).
Results are reported in Table 2.9 Part 2. Generally, arrangements are more likely if a link
is backed by a common friend; the effect is particularly strong for the case of mutual support
arrangements. Households are fifty times more likely to engage in a mutual support arrangement
if they have a common friend (e3.99). The exceptionally high effect suggests that there is strong
clustering which, however, cannot be well captured with ordinary regression analysis. It might
partly also be driven by the small number of observed reciprocated support links in the data;
I will discuss this issue below. Once we account for the common friend, the coefficients for the
level and absolute differences in predicted neediness change. Mutual support links are now more
likely if both households have a high probability of neediness, as predicted with Hypothesis 1.
Interestingly, this effect is reduced once a link is backed. More specifically, a one standard devia-
tion increase in predicted neediness increases the likelihood that a household engages in a mutual
support arrangement with a household that has no friend in common by 44% (e1.51·0.24 = 1.44);
while it reduces the likelihood to engage in a mutual support arrangement with a household that
has a friend in common by 31% ((e)0.24·(1.51−3.01) = 0.69); the coefficients are jointly significant.
However, as the latter effect is very small compared to the large effect of common friendship,
a better way to describe the results is the following: while a lower predicted neediness reduces
the likelihood that a household engages in mutual support, once two households have a friend in
common they might engage in a mutual support arrangement even if their probability of needi-
ness is low. The coefficients of the absolute difference in neediness turn insignificant. Again the
interaction with the common friend counteracts the main effect as predicted. One way of inter-
preting these results is that having a friend in common could be an indicator for a different type
(potentially more friendship based) link. With a common friend, other mechanisms than purely
‘quid-pro-quo’ motives come into play. For example, support might be provided even if it is not
necessarily needed, rather as a sort of custom to strengthen the relationship. This analysis shows
that the local network structure can have important implications for the formation processes of
26Note that in the paper, Jackson et al. (2012) use the word ‘supported’ instead of ‘backed.’
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social links, an aspect, which can only insufficiently be captured by dyadic regression analysis.
2.6 Discussion
In this study I analyze the role of households’ probability of neediness for the formation of
mutual support arrangements within villages. A model that assumes balanced reciprocity as the
guiding principle predicts that households engage in mutual support arrangements if they have
insufficient alternative resources to cope with a shock in isolation; that is if they face a positive
probability of neediness (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, the model predicts that a mutual support
arrangement between two households is less likely to sustain the larger the households differ in
their respective probability of neediness (Hypothesis 2).
The predictions are tested using census data of a fishing village in Maramig. The findings are
ambiguous. While households that form mutual support arrangements seem to have generally
less resources from outside the village and are thus more dependent on support from within
the village, they are not necessarily more deprived in terms of wealth, number of working-age
household members or access to credit. The first hypothesis can thus not be confirmed. There
is some support for Hypothesis 2. Two households are found to be more likely to engage in
mutual support arrangements if they have a similar level of wealth and a similarly large family
network within the village. Likewise, households with a similar predicted neediness score, which
is derived using exogenous household characteristics, are more likely to form a mutual support
arrangement. Results change considerably, when an indicator for the local network structure is
included as an explanatory variable. Results suggest that a reduction in a household’s predicted
neediness reduces the likelihood that the household engages in a mutual support arrangement
with a household that shares no common friend, while it increases the likelihood to engage in
a mutual support arrangement with a household that shares a common friend. The findings
suggest that the motive of risk-sharing under the principle of balanced reciprocity, is not entirely
well-suited to explain the structure of mutual support arrangements. These findings are in line
with De Weerdt (2004) and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2011). Analyzing actual inter-household
transfer data, the authors show that some of the common prediction of risk-sharing models do
not hold. Other motives need to be accounted for, such as social preferences which are shown to
reduce the incentive to defect in a risk-sharing arrangement (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Lin
et al. 2014).
As pointed out throughout the chapter, there are a number of important limitations on the
analysis that need to be considered. First, assumptions of the underlying theoretical framework
might not hold. Second, the data on hand might miss valuable information. Third, the estimation
approach cannot sufficiently accommodate the local network structure. I will briefly discuss each.
The theoretical framework makes a number of assumptions. Most importantly, the personal
resources of a household are assumed to be fixed. But, indeed, the utilization of these resources is
unlikely to be costless; resources are depletable. If support from another household in the village
is less costly than the use of personal resources, then also households with sufficient personal
resources on hand might still engage in mutual support arrangements. Furthermore, in the model,
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higher personal resources are associated with a higher propensity to renege on an agreement, as
the costs of living in autarchy are reduced. Thus, if i considers forming an arrangement with
j, the level of j’s resources should not only signal to i the probability that j will be in need of
future support but also the risk j might renege on the agreement when i is in need of support.
However, if this risk is only insufficiently incorporated in people’s link formation decision (as
shown by Lin et al., 2014) or if there are other costs of living in autarchy, such as social costs,
which are neglected by the model but reduce the risk of defection, then a household with more
personal resources might overall be considered more trustworthy and therefore more attractive
as a support arrangement partner. This could explain some of the unexpected findings. In future
research, these aspects should be incorporated into the theoretical framework and the resulting
predictions tested empirically.
There are several data related limitations. In particular, the data analysis is limited to
support arrangements within a village; arrangements with households residing outside the vil-
lage are neglected, as those households had not been surveyed and thus information on their
socio-economic characteristics are missing. However, there is considerable evidence that support
networks span across villages (De Weerdt and Dercon 2006; Mazzocco and Saini 2012). Some of
the households that have been identified as not engaging in mutual support arrangements might
indeed have such arrangements with households in neighboring villages. Furthermore, as only
data from one village is used, the sample size is small; in particular, the number of observed
mutual support arrangements is small which limits the inferences one can make. Finally, the
data do not allow me to verify whether a reported source of support – i.e., the household that
would provide the support – is aware of this role. Despite the careful definition of the sup-
port link variable, there might still be the possibility that this variable describes a desire for
an arrangement rather than an actual arrangement which both parties are aware of. This could
undermine the estimation approach. Future network surveys should include questions both on
the provision as well as on the recipience of support, in order to disentangle actual from desired
support arrangements.
Lastly, and possibly of most importance, the network structure cannot be incorporated
in dyadic regression analysis. With pairwise regressions, link decisions are assumed to be
independent, yet in the case of support arrangements, this is hardly a realistic assumption.
For example, the number of support arrangements an agent i maintains with her neighbors,
Ni(ς) = {j | ij ∈ ς}, likely affects the probability that one of the links will be activated –
i.e., the probability that neighbor j is asked by i probably reduces with the number of support
arrangements i maintains. Thus, the net utility an agent j derives from having a support link
with i would depend on Ni, a feature that the estimation approach cannot incorporate. Including
the number of family households in the village as a proxy for the size of the support network
is unlikely to be a sufficient remedy. Furthermore, I only analyze direct links, yet it has been
shown both theoretically (“Altruism in Networks”) and empirically (Kinnan and Townsend 2012)
that indirect support links matter; e.g. h might support i so that i can support j, but we do
not observe a link between h and j. Such link interdependencies cannot be incorporated well in
dyadic regression analysis, yet might directly affect the results. As shown in Section 2.5.3.3, just
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incorporating information on whether two households have a common friend already changes
the estimation results considerably. This deficit of dyadic regression analysis might explain the
unsatisfactory predictive power of the estimation models. Other models, such as exponential
random graph models, are more able to capture observed network structures, but accommodate
individual attributes only to a limited extend, which makes these models less suitable for testing
specific predictions e.g. regarding household characteristics (Lusher et al. 2013).
In summary, this study highlights the potentials and limitations of analyzing the theoretical
predictions of a reciprocal risk-sharing model with dyadic regression. I demonstrate the pivotal
role of predicted neediness in a model of reciprocal risk-sharing and show that predicted need-
iness can explain part, yet not all, of the observed structure of mutual support arrangement.
I emphasize the importance to account for the reports of both sides of a reported link and to
consider the direction of the flow of support: I show that characteristics of reciprocated support
links differ significantly from characteristics of unreciprocated support links; not taking these dif-
ferences into account can lead to erroneous inference. Finally, throughout the chapter I discuss
the methodological limitations of dyadic regression analysis to investigate link formation. This
study can thus serve as a guidance for future research on support arrangements to apply ade-
quate techniques of link elicitation and network analysis while being aware of the methodological
constraints.





Given the dearth of insurance markets in developing countries, many governments, the private
sector and the donor community have made considerable efforts over the last years to design
appropriate insurance products and to expand people’s coverage with formal insurance (Churchill
and McCord 2012). A growing literature deals with the consequences for informal support – i.e.,
monetary transfers provided by relatives, neighbors and friends – when insurance is introduced
(Attanasio and Rios-Rull 2000; Landmann et al. 2012; Boucher and Delpierre 2014; Lin et al.
2014; Klohn and Strupat 2015). This literature investigates the extent of crowding out: if
insurance crowds out informal support and delivers only incomplete risk coverage (for example,
because not everybody gets insured, insurance does not fully compensate losses, or not all risks
are insurable), introducing insurance does not necessarily lead to welfare improvements. A clear
understanding of the conditions under which crowding out occurs is thus necessary to help design
insurance contracts that avoid such unintended consequences.
Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), Boucher and Delpierre (2014), and Lin et al. (2014) illus-
trate that insurance crowds out risk-sharing transfers, which aim at inter-temporal consumption
smoothing. They identify the following mechanisms of crowding out. First, insurance increases
the value of autarky and thus reduces people’s commitment to risk-sharing (Attanasio and Rios-
Rull 2000; Lin et al. 2014); second, insurance payouts substitute risk-sharing transfers (Lin et al.
2014); and third, insurance encourages people to take more risk, which is counteracted by a
reduction in risk-sharing in order to curtail excessive risk-taking (Boucher and Delpierre 2014).
The focus of these studies is the effect of insurance on risk-sharing transfers through changes in
economic incentives. Social preferences are assumed to be unaffected. In this study, we consider
the possibility that insurance affects social preferences. We hypothesize that social preferences
are context dependent – i.e., that they determine different levels of informal support with and
without insurance available. We focus on a different type of transfers: solidarity transfers, which
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are informal transfers solely motivated by social preferences.
We report results from a lab-in-the-field experiment that investigates the effect of insurance
on solidarity transfers. We designed a novel game, the transfer game, that borrows both from
the dictator game and the solidarity game. Players are randomly assigned the role of provider
or recipient. Each provider is anonymously matched with one recipient. Both receive the same
endowment. The recipient can lose a large proportion of her endowment due to a random
idiosyncratic shock. We vary whether the recipient has the option to purchase an insurance
which avoids the loss from the shock. The provider is asked how much of her endowment she
would transfer in case the recipient loses. Transfers are only enacted if the recipient experiences
the shock. The transfer game is a one-shot game, in which transfers cannot be driven by economic
incentives.
There is considerable evidence from behavioral economics suggesting that people condition
their solidarity transfers to another person on this person’s prior choices.1 In particular, people
are found to reduce their solidarity transfers when the other person could have avoided her
neediness - by participating in the labour market (Fong 2007), by choosing a safe amount over a
risky lottery (Trhal and Radermacher 2009; Cappelen et al. 2013a), by choosing a lottery that
is less risky than another (Bolle and Costard 2015), or by purchasing insurance (Mollerstrom
et al. 2015).2 Given that all these studies were conducted with students in university labs of
high-income countries, it is to be determined whether their insights on conditioning transfers to
choice can be repeated among populations of developing countries. Decisions and actions taken
by these populations may be inherently different from those of students in rich countries due
to different norms, frames, past experiences and lessons learned from these experiences (Levitt
and List 2007). We are aware of only one related study providing evidence from a developing
country: Morsink (2016) shows that subjects in Ethiopia condition their solidarity transfers on
the riskiness of recipients’ choices.
We conduct our experiment with villagers in Cambodia, a country with an under-developed
but growing insurance market (UNDP 2013; Microinsurance Network 2016). The Cambodian
government, international donors, private insurance companies and non-governmental organiza-
tions are engaged in establishing different forms of social and private insurance, which makes the
setting particularly relevant. The villagers who participated in our experiment are currently not
very familiar with insurance but will likely face an increasing amount of insurance options in the
near future. We play with high stakes to mimic substantial losses for which support from other
people becomes necessary. The average payout in our experiment amounts to more than twice
the daily average per capita income in rural Cambodia.
In addition to analyzing whether solidarity transfers are reduced when insurance becomes
available, we also investigate if the reduction is affected by whether the individual in need was
1There is also substantial survey-based evidence along these lines. By linking beliefs about the sources of
inequality to preferences for governmental redistribution, it was shown that individuals who perceive inequality
to be the result of luck rather than of effort or of deliberate choice are most supportive of redistribution (Fong
2001; Corneo and Grüner 2002; Alesina and Angeletos 2005).
2The study by Mollerstrom et al. (2015) differs greatly from the present study. The authors implement games
in which they ask third-party spectators to equalize incomes between two subjects. The income inequality is
either the result of brute bad luck or of bad luck that could have been avoided by purchasing insurance.
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aware of the possibility to receive transfers by someone else when making her insurance choice.
Recent studies show that, under certain circumstances, individuals deliberately do not take up
insurance and instead free-ride on the support of their peers (De Janvry et al. 2014; Janssens
and Kramer 2016). We here analyze how the peers react to such free-riding. We argue that if
individuals know that solidarity transfers may be forthcoming, the foregoing of insurance can be
interpreted by peers as free-riding on their solidarity. If, in contrast, individuals do not know
about potential solidarity transfers, such an interpretation is implausible. We thus expect that
people respond to an informed decision against insurance with a stronger withdrawal of solidarity
transfers. Previous studies on conditioning transfers to choice do not allow for disentangling such
an information effect. In these studies, all subjects were either informed (Trhal and Radermacher
2009; Cappelen et al. 2013a; Bolle and Costard 2015) or uninformed (Fong 2007; Mollerstrom
et al. 2015) about the later redistribution before they made their choices. In our experiment, we
thus vary whether the recipient is informed about the potential transfer from the provider.
In a first step, we investigate the prevalence of choice conditionality ; i.e., to what extent does
the provider reduce her transfers when the recipient could have avoided her loss by purchasing
insurance. In a second step, we analyze the information effect ; i.e., does the provider react
differently to the insurance option depending on whether the recipient is aware of the provider’s
potential transfer. The providers in our experiment transfer, on average, 13% of their endowment
to recipients who lost most of their endowed money and had no option to insure. We find a
significant reduction in transfers when the recipients can be held accountable for their neediness:
providers reduce their transfers by 28%, on average, when recipients forewent the option to
insure. This result confirms the conditionality found in previous studies; in fact, the proportion
of individuals who condition their solidarity transfers on peers’ choices is similar among our
Cambodian villagers and the student populations of these studies. To our surprise, providers
equally reduce their transfers towards recipients who were informed about the potential transfer
from providers and towards recipients who were not informed. Hence, the reduction of solidarity
transfers in response to insurance does not depend on the level of information available to the
individuals in need. In other words, free-riding is not sanctioned; in fact, foregoing insurance
may not be perceived as free-riding.
We provide evidence that solidarity transfers vary with the availability of insurance. We
argue that this is due to the fact that the underlying social preferences are context dependent:
people apply different norms of solidarity with and without insurance available. Different levels
of solidarity transfers are thus provided to people in need depending on whether these people had
the option to get insured. Our findings have important implications for the emerging literature on
the interplay between informal support and formal insurance. First, we illustrate that insurance
may not only crowd out risk-sharing transfers but also solidarity transfers. The mechanism of the
crowding out is different from those suggested in the existing literature. Second, we point out that
social preferences are context dependent. In future crowding out studies, we consider it necessary
to determine whether the informal support of interest is motivated by social preferences, economic
incentives, or both; and, if adequate, to allow for social preferences to determine different levels
of transfers when insurance gets introduced. In the case of risk-sharing transfers, we expect that
54 CHAPTER 3. INSURANCE AND SOLIDARITY
insurance affects both social preferences and economic incentives and that these motives interact
with each other in a complex way. How exactly they interact needs to be determined.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce the trans-
fer game and present the experimental design. We derive two hypotheses. First, people condition
their solidarity on the choices of their peers (Hypothesis 1). And second, people condition their
response to the choices of the peers on the level of information that the peers have about the
support they may receive (Hypothesis 2). In Section 3.3, we describe the implementation of the
experiment in the field. The results are presented in Section 3.4. We test Hypothesis 1 and
Hypothesis 2, separately. We first present average treatment effects and then turn to the hetero-
geneity in the treatment effects. Lastly, we address the external validity and the plausibility of
the assumed preferences. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework and Experimental Design
3.2.1 The Transfer Game
We designed a game, which we call the transfer game, to investigate the extent to which people
condition their solidarity transfers on the choices of others. The transfer game is a one-shot game.
There are two players, the provider and the recipient, with incomes x and y, respectively. The
players have the same initial income – i.e., xe = ye. However, the recipient faces the possibility of
an income shock that occurs with probability π; with 0 < π < 1. If a shock occurs the recipient’s
income is reduced to ys, with ys < ye. The provider does not face income shocks. In case the
recipient experiences a shock, the provider can decide to transfer part of her income, T , to the
recipient (with 0 6 T 6 xe).
In the transfer game, treatments vary in two dimensions:
1. Information of the recipient
The recipient is uninformed about the provider
The recipient is informed only about her own role in the game. She is not informed
about the existence of the provider who might transfer to her in case of an income
shock.
The recipient is informed about the provider
At the beginning of the game, the recipient is informed about the existence of the
provider. She is also informed that the provider has the possibility to transfer to her
in case she experiences an income shock.
2. Option of insurance
The recipient has no insurance option
The recipient has no option to avoid the potential loss. Her income is ys in case the
shock occurs and ye in case no shock occurs.
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The recipient has an insurance option
Before the shock is determined, the recipient has the option to purchase insurance
which covers the loss resulting from the income shock.
The price of insurance is p with p ≤ π · (ye − ys); i.e., insurance is not more expensive than
the actuarially fair price. If the recipient purchases insurance, her income is ye − p independent
of whether a shock occurs or not. If the recipient does not purchase insurance, her income is
ye in case no shock occurs and ys in case the shock occurs. Note that the provider always has
full information and that a transfer from the provider to the recipient can only take place if the
recipient’s income is reduced to ys. Combining the information and the insurance treatments,
there are four different states in which the recipient’s income can be reduced to ys and a transfer
can take place. These states and the corresponding transfers are depicted in Figure 3.1. Case 1
describes the two states in which the recipient has no information about the provider; Case 2 the
two states in which the recipient does have information. We refer to the provider in Case 1 as
A1 and to the provider in Case 2 as A2. The recipient is called B1 (without insurance option) or
B2 (with insurance option) in Case 1 and C1 (without insurance option) or C2 (with insurance
option) in Case 2.
In Case 1, the provider is asked to make two strategic transfer decisions:
1. The amount she would transfer to B1 in case this recipient experiences an income shock
and is left with ys [T 00].
2. The amount she would transfer to B2 in case this recipient experiences an income shock
and is left with ys [T 01].
The provider is then randomly matched with either B1 or B2. If the matched recipient indeed
experiences a shock, the respective transfer decision is implemented.
A1 A2
B1 B2 C1 C2
Uninformed Uninformed Informed Informed
No Option Option to insure No Option Option to insure
T 00 T 01 T 10 T 11
Case 1 Case 2
Figure 3.1: Transfer Decisions of Providers
In Case 2, the provider is asked to make the following strategic transfer decisions:
1. The amount she would transfer to C1 in case this recipient experiences an income shock
and is left with ys [T 10].
2. The amount she would transfer to C2 in case this recipient experiences an income shock
and is left with ys [T 11].
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The provider is then randomly matched with either C1 or C2. If the matched recipient experi-
ences a shock, the respective transfer decision is implemented.
We assume that when making her transfer decisions the provider is motivated by her own
income as well as the desire to behave in line with her solidarity norm. We specify her utility as
follows:3
U (·) = v (x− T )− f (φ− T ) (3.1)
v(·) is the provider’s utility from her material payoff after the transfer, with v′ (·) > 0 and
v′′(·) < 0. φ describes the provider’s solidarity norm, which specifies the amount that the
provider perceives to be the adequate transfer to the recipient. This solidarity norm can be
affected by both personal and social norms. It depends on the income allocation, (x, y), and the
context under which this income allocation was achieved – i.e., the information and insurance
status of the recipient. f(·) describes the cost that the provider incurs when her transfer T
deviates from the level of solidarity she perceives as adequate. Following the literature (Cappelen
et al. 2007; Konow 2010), we assume f ′ (φ− T ) · (φ− T ) > 0 for φ 6= T , and f ′′(·) > 0. The
provider maximizes her utility with respect to T . With the assumed utility specification in




|x=cons. < 1 (see Konow 2010). This implies that the underlying solidarity norm
determines the transfer provided.
We allow for the provider’s solidarity norm to differ across the four states in the transfer
game. We refer to the solidarity norms as φ00, φ01, φ10 and φ11 in line with the resulting trans-
fers. If solidarity norms differ across states, this must necessarily result from the variation in the
context, namely the four combinations of the information and insurance status, because the in-
come allocation that initiates a transfer from the provider to the recipient is always (xe, ys). This
implis that differences in solidarity norms describe the extent to which the provider conditions
her solidarity on the information and the insurance option of the recipient.
1. Choice Conditionality
Individuals may or may not differ in the extent to which they condition their solidarity on
other individuals’ choices (regardless of whether the choices were made informedly or not).
We differentiate between the following solidarity types:
1i) Unconditional solidarity. The provider’s level of solidarity is unconditional on whether
or not the recipient could have avoided her loss. Hence, the transfer that the provider
perceives as adequate in case the recipient’s income is reduced to ys is not affected by
the recipient’s option to purchase insurance.
φ00 = φ01 if recipient not informed
φ10 = φ11 if recipient informed
3We assume a specification of social preferences that is common in the literature, modeled as a trade off
between self-interest and fairness norms (e.g. see Cappelen et al. 2007; Konow 2010; Cappelen et al. 2013a).
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1ii) Choice conditional solidarity. The provider’s level of solidarity is conditioned on the
recipient being able to avoid her loss. The transfer that the provider perceives as
adequate in case the recipient’s income is reduced to ys depends on whether the
recipient had the option to purchase insurance or not.
φ00 6= φ01 if recipient not informed
φ10 6= φ11 if recipient informed
2. Choice Conditionality and Information
Furthermore, we allow individuals’ choice conditionality to depend on whether or not a
choice was made informedly. We differentiate between the following types:
2i) The level of choice conditionality is independent of the recipient’s information about
the transfer possibility. The provider does not respond differently to the choice of
the recipient when the recipient made her choice informedly compared with when the
recipient made her choice uninformedly.
φ01 − φ00 = φ11 − φ10
2ii) The level of choice conditionality depends on the recipient’s information about the
transfer possibility. The provider responds differently to the choice of the recipient
when the recipient made her choice informedly compared with when the recipient
made her choice uninformedly.
φ01 − φ00 6= φ11 − φ10
We do not observe the provider’s type directly. However, because solidarity norms affect
optimal transfers, the observed transfers from the provider to the recipient provide an indication
of the provider’s type. We can thus analyze the prevalence of the mentioned types by analyzing
the differences in actual transfers T when the context of information and insurance option is
varied.
The difference between T 00 and T 01 is the change in transfers when an uninformed recipient
could have avoided the loss by purchasing insurance. The difference between T 10 and T 11 is the
change in transfers when the recipient could have avoided the loss by purchasing insurance and
made the choice to forego insurance informedly. Assuming the utility of the provider follows
Equation 3.1, T 11 − T 10 reflects the extent to which the providers’ solidarity is conditioned on
the informed choice of the recipient, and T 01 − T 00 reflects the extent to which the providers’
solidarity is conditioned on the uninformed choice of the recipient, or the choice per se. Based
on previous findings on choice conditionality (e.g. Mollerstrom et al. 2015), we expect that the
provider disapproves foregoing insurance. We should thus observe the provider to transfer less
to B2 than to B1 in Case 1 and less to C2 than to C1 in Case 2 (see Table 3.1).
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Recipient had no T 00 T 10
option to insure yes T 01 T 11
Hypothesis 1 T 01 − T 00 < 0 T 11 − T 10 < 0
Hypothesis 2 T 01 − T 00 > T 11 − T 10
Hypothesis 1 - Choice Conditionality
Providers condition their solidarity on choice, in particular
φ01 < φ00 if recipient not informed
φ11 < φ10 if recipient informed.
The average provider sends a lower transfer to a recipient who forewent the option to insure
than to a recipient who had no option of insurance (regardless of the level of information of the
recipient); i.e.,
T 01 − T 00 < 0 , if recipient not informed
T 11 − T 10 < 0 , if recipient informed.
The difference in the transfer differences, (T 01 − T 00) − (T 11 − T 10), then reflects to which
extent the provider’s choice conditionality depends on the level of information available to the
recipient. Whereas an uninformed recipient is not aware that she might receive a transfer from the
provider when she foregoes insurance, an informed recipient has full information. The provider
may thus perceive the informed foregoing of insurance of the recipient as deliberate reliance on
her support, or as free-riding on her solidarity, and may not approve of this intention. In line
with Falk and Fischbacher (2006)’s theory of intention-based reciprocity, we hypothesize that the
provider’s solidarity norms are influenced by distributional outcomes as well as by intentions;
hence, the provider does not necessarily withdraw her support to an informed recipient who
foregoes insurance completely. We merely expect that the provider in Case 1 reduces her transfer
by more in response to foregoing insurance than the provider in Case 2.
Hypothesis 2 - Information Effect
Providers condition their response to choice on the recipients’ level of information; in particular
φ01 − φ00 > φ11 − φ10.
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The average provider reduces her transfer to a recipient who forewent the option to insure in-
formedly by more than to a recipient who forewent the option to insure uninformedly; i.e.,
T 01 − T 00 > T 11 − T 10.
3.2.2 Experimental Procedure
We conducted the experiment in 21 villages (one session per village) in Cambodia. In each
village, the experiment was run with 32 subjects: 16 providers and 16 recipients. There were two
groups of providers (with 8 subjects per group) and four groups of recipients (with 4 subjects
per group). All subjects played two rounds of the transfer game. Before the game was played,
subjects were randomly allocated to one of the six groups; the group determined the role each
subject would play in Round 1 and Round 2 (see Table 3.2). In Round 1, one of the provider
groups (A1) played the game of Case 1 – i.e., with uninformed recipients – and the other provider
group (A2) played the game of Case 2 – with informed recipients. In Round 2, providers switched
the roles. This means that all providers made all four transfer decisions depicted in Figure 3.1
over the course of the two rounds. The recipient groups played the role of player B1, B2, C1
and C2 in Round 1 and the role of player B2, B1, C2 and C1 in Round 2, respectively.
Table 3.2: Overview of Player Roles
Groups of Providers Groups of Recipients
1 2 3 4 5 6
Round 1
Role A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2
Transfer decisions T 00 and T 01 T 10 and T 11 - - - -
Information - - no no yes yes
Insurance option - - no yes no yes
Round 2
Role A2 A1 B2 B1 C2 C1
Transfer Decisions T 10 and T 11 T 00 and T 01 - - - -
Information - - no no yes yes
Insurance Option - - yes no yes no
No. of subjects per session 8 8 4 4 4 4
Total no. of subjects
(21 sessions)
168 168 84 84 84 84
Each group played in a separate room and subjects only observed the treatment of the group
they belonged to. Neither communication nor interaction between the subjects within a room and
between the rooms was allowed. Subjects were at no time told the purpose of the experiment and
no feedback was provided to the subjects between the rounds. The experiment was implemented
in an anonymous setting. Subjects did not know the identity of the subjects they were matched
with;4 and the research assistants supervising the games did not observe the subjects’ decisions.
4Subjects saw each other during introduction before the game, but they did not know who played which role
except for those who were in the same room. Thus, if providers wished to form expectations about the identity
of the recipient, they had to take into account the pool of all subjects who were not in their group.
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Those research assistants that could link the subjects’ decisions in the game to their identity
did not interact with the subjects until the final payout. This setting was explained during the
introduction.
The parameters of the game were specified as follows:
• Initial Income xe = ye = 16, 000
• Probability of shock π = 0.5
• Income after shock ys = 2, 000
• Price of insurance5 p = 6, 000
Figure B.1 in Appendix B.1 illustrates the resulting outcome tree for the transfer game.
The detailed procedure for recipients B1, B2, C1 and C2 was as follows:
1. Each recipient received an initial income of 16,000 Riel in sixteen 1,000 Riel bills in play
money.6
2. Recipients were explained that each of them would roll a dice. The outcome would deter-
mine how much they could keep of the initial income. If the dice showed 1, 2 or 3, they
would lose 14,000 Riel; if the dice showed 4, 5 or 6, they would keep the 16,000 Riel.
3. Recipients of type B2 and recipients of type C2 were explained the insurance option: they
had the option to purchase a private insurance for the price of 6,000 Riel.7 If a recipient
decided to purchase the insurance, she would keep 10,000 Riel independent of the outcome
of the dice.
4. Recipients of type C1 and recipients of type C2 were informed that each of them was
matched with a player in a different room, that these players had a safe endowment of
16,000 Riel, but could decide to transfer part of it to their partner (i.e., to the C1 and C2
recipients) in case this person lost.
5. Each recipient was asked questions to test her understanding of the game.
6. Each recipient of type C1 and type C2 was asked to note down how much transfer she
expected from her partner player in case of loss. The beliefs were noted down in private
behind a cardboard and then collected. Recipients were told that their partner would never
see these beliefs and that the beliefs had thus no impact on the actual transfer decisions.
5Note that this price is below the actuarially fair insurance price which would be 7,000 Riel. We intended
to put a value on the insurance such that in expectation 50% of the recipients would purchase insurance. Pilot
tests conducted with villagers as well as students in Cambodia suggested a price of 6,000 Riel for 50% uptake.
However, in the actual experiment insurance uptake was higher.
64,000 Riel are worth approximately 1 USD. As a benchmark: The average per capita income in rural Cambodia
was about 2 USD in 2014, according to the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (National Institute of Statistics
2015). For the participants in our experiment, the average daily income per household was slightly more than
5 USD (including the income of all household members, remittances, state assistance etc.), the median daily
household income was below 2 USD.
7For the insurance option, we intentionally did not use the Khmer word for ’insurance’ but the more general
word ’bankapie’ (’guarantee’) in order to not evoke any associations with existing insurance schemes.
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7. Recipients of type B2 and recipients of type C2 were asked to go outside the room one by
one to make their insurance purchase decision with a research assistant sitting outside.8
Recipients were not allowed to reveal their decision to the others when they came back into
the room.
8. Each recipient rolled the dice. The outcome was noted down. In case a recipient lost,
she handed 14,000 Riel of her play money to a research assistant. The remaining money
was inserted in an envelope and collected; recipients were told that this money would
be transferred to their personal ‘game account.’ This money together with any potential
transfer of the provider determined the payout of the recipients for this round.
Then groups switched rooms and roles for the second round.
Figure 3.2: Illustrations for A1 and A2 Providers
8Note that this was the only decision that was not made in private. However, the research assistants responsible
for the insurance sale were not part of the team of research assistants who supervised and explained the game,
and they had not interacted with the subjects before.
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The procedure for providers A1 and A2 was as follows:9
1. Each provider received an initial income of 16,000 Riel in sixteen 1,000 Riel bills in play
money.
2. Providers were explained the situation of the recipients. Specifically, providers of type
A1 were explained the situation of B1 and B2 recipients, and providers of type A2 were
explained the situation of C1 and C2 recipients. Providers were shown one of the overview
illustrations depicted in Figure 3.2 as well as a detailed illustration for each player type
(see Figures B.2-B.5 in Appendix B.2.4).
3. Providers simulated the situation of the recipients, first of type B1 [C1], then of type B2
[C2]. During this simulation, each provider was asked questions to test her understanding
of the game.
4. Providers were explained the random partner matching and the following transfer proce-
dure. It was emphasized that transfers would only take place in case the partner lost money
after rolling the dice and, for a recipient of type B2 and C2, had not bought insurance.
Again, each provider was asked questions to test her level of understanding of the transfer
procedure.
5. Each provider was asked to write down in private (behind cardboards) on two separate
sheets the following transfer decisions (see decision sheets in Figures B.6-B.9 in Appendix
B.2.5):
• In case your partner was of type B1 [C1] - how much of your 16,000 Riel would you
transfer if your partner loses?
• In case your partner was of type B2 [C2] - how much of your 16,000 Riel would you
transfer if your partner loses?
6. After decisions were noted down, providers had time to check both decisions and to make
final changes; then, pencils were collected.
7. Each provider was asked to draw an envelope from a box. On the envelope was a sign
indicating the player type of the partner and a unique ID for the partner (unidentifiable to
the providers). Each provider was asked to insert into the envelope the relevant decision
sheet and the amount of bills she had noted on the sheet.10
8. Providers were given a second envelope in which they placed the remaining amount of bills.
They were told that this money would be transferred to their personal ‘game account’ and
that in case their partner had not lost they would also receive back the amount they had
transferred. This money would determine their payout for this round.
9. All decision sheets and envelopes were collected by the research assistants.
9For the script of the instructions for providers A1 and A2, see Appendix B.2.2 and B.2.3, respectively.
10Providers were told that the amount they inserted would be double-checked with the amount indicated on
the decision sheet and that, in case there was a difference, the amount indicated on the decision sheet would
determine the transfer.
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Then the two provider groups switched rooms and roles for the second round. They did not
receive any feedback about the actual outcome of their partner. The procedure of Round 2 was
the same as in Round 1. Only the simulation of the recipients’ situation and the related test
questions for the providers were skipped.
3.3 Implementation of the Experiment in the Field
We ran the experiment between August and October 2015. The 21 experimental villages are
located in Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap provinces in Northwestern Cambodia (see Figure
3.3).11 Two weeks before the experiment took place in a village, a detailed household survey
was conducted with approximately 60 randomly selected households of the village as well as a
community survey with the village head. In total, 1,272 households were interviewed. The survey
focused on basic socio-economic information, employment, support networks within and outside
the village, labor migration, access to formal risk management tools, such as insurance, savings
and credit, as well as perceptions of solidarity and accountability.
At the end of each interview, the respondent was asked whether he or she was able and willing
to participate in an upcoming experiment. If the respondent answered affirmatively, he or she
was included in the pool of potential experimental participants for this particular village. Our
original target participant was literate and between 18 and 65 years old. However, as the literacy
rate in this region is very low and labor migration of the young in some villages particularly high,
illiterate and older respondents had to be included. We sorted the list of potential participants
according to their age and literacy level (youngest and most educated first) and sampled from this
list in the resulting order. Thus, our group of experimental participants is not representative of
the village population, the participants are younger and more educated than the average villager.
For detailed characteristics of the experimental participants, see Appendix B.3.1.
The experiment took place in a school building either in the village itself or in a neighboring
village. It was conducted with the assistance of 10 Khmer research assistants, who were different
from those who had conducted the household survey. The experiment had five parts: registration
and introduction; the first game (with two rounds) which is the focus of this study; a network
questionnaire and a short break; a second game (with four rounds); closing remarks and payout.
At the registration, each participant drew blindly a participant badge from a bag: a colored
card with a number from 1 to 32, the participant ID. The color determined the group the
participant was allocated to.
After the registration, all participants were gathered in one room for a brief introduction
where the general rules of the games and the payout modalities were laid out and the research
team was introduced (for instructions for the introduction, see Appendix B.2.1). In particular,
participants were explained that each of them would receive a show-up fee of 4,000 Riel; and
that they could earn additional money over the course of the experiment which consisted of
11The experiment was conducted in eleven villages in Siem Reap province and in ten villages in Banteay
Meanchey province. Villages were selected to be comparable within and across the two provinces. Selection
criteria included the size of the village, the level of migration, and remoteness.
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Figure 3.3: Map of Cambodia (Source: United Nations 2004)
several rounds. How much they would keep at the end of each round would be dependent on
their luck, their choices and the choices of others. Participants were told that they would not
receive any feedback between the rounds. At the end, only one round would be selected for
payout by the draw of a ball; hence, their decisions in one round should not be affected by
their decisions or their outcomes in other rounds. Participants were ensured that their decisions
would be kept anonymously and would not be observed by any of the other participants or the
research assistants they interacted with. Participants were told that they were not allowed to
communicate with each other during the course of the experiment, and that if they disobeyed
the rules they would need to leave. After making sure that the rules were understood, the
participants split into their groups according to the colors of their participant badges and were
accompanied by the research assistants to their rooms.
The first game was conducted as described in Section 3.2.2. The four rooms with the re-
cipients were each supervised by one research assistant (with two additional assistants sitting
outside the room for insurance sale), the two rooms with the providers by two research assistants,
respectively. The explanation of the game was done in front of all participants of each group.
However, participants wrote their decisions in private and unobserved by the research assistants
behind cardboard boxes. Although the literacy rate was low, most of the participants could read
and write numbers. 13% of the providers needed help from the research assistants in writing
their transfer decisions. We take this into account in the analysis. Low literacy constituted a
challenge for us to explain the game in such a way that it could be understood by the partici-
pants. We employed several measures, such as using graphical illustrations and simulating the
role of the other players, to increase the level of understanding. We also asked different sets of
test questions during the instructions, the results of which can be regarded as an indicator for the
level of understanding. Given that we are interested in the providers’ behavior, it is important to
us that they clearly understood the game and the implications of their transfer decisions. 44% of
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the providers gave correct answers to all test questions, and another 22% made only one mistake.
Part of the analysis below will be restricted to these providers.
At the end of the experiment, all participants were gathered in one room for the closing
remarks. One participant was asked to draw blindly one ball from a bag that contained six
different balls (one for each round). The drawn ball determined which round would be paid
out. The participants were then asked one by one to a separate room where they received their
payout which consisted of the outcome of the round that was drawn and their show-up fee. The
average payout amounted to 17,000 Riel, equivalent to 4.25 USD or slightly more than twice
the average per capita income in rural areas (National Institute of Statistics 2015). The full
experiment lasted, on average, 4.5 hours.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Treatment Effect Analysis
Over Round 1 and Round 2, each of the 336 subjects who played the role of the provider made four
transfer decisions, two as an A1 provider (to an uninformed recipient with and without insurance
option) and two as an A2 provider (to an informed recipient with and without insurance option).
Hence, there are 1,344 observations in total (4× 336). In the empirical analysis below, we pool
the transfer decisions of the A1 and A2 providers.12
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 depict the frequency distribution of the transfer decisions. We
separately show the transfer decisions to recipients who were uninformed about the transfer
possibility (Figure 3.4) and to those who were informed (Figure 3.5). For simplicity, the transfers
are divided by 1,000 in these figures and in all following tables. The amount of transfer varies
considerably; with the majority of providers transferring 1,000 or 2,000 Riel. Only a very small
number of providers are willing to transfer 7,000 Riel, which would result in an equal split of
the endowment such that both provider and recipient ended up with 9,000 Riel.13 There is a
considerable shift to zero transfers when the recipients had the option to insure: the number of
A1 providers who transfer zero when insurance is available increases more than threefold, the
number of A2 providers more than fivefold. The distribution of transfers to uninformed recipients
is not much different from the distribution of transfers to informed recipients, with a slightly
higher proportion of A1 providers transferring zero.
In order to test for the prevalence of choice conditional solidarity and the information effect
as outlined in Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 we exploit the within-subject and orthogonal
12We compare the socioeconomic characteristics of the A1 and A2 provider groups in Table B.2 in the Appendix
B.3.1. We find no overall significant differences, with the only exception of bank account. This is an indication
that randomization was successful and that we can pool the transfer decisions for the analysis.
13This fact makes our results different from Cappelen et al. (2013a) and Mollerstrom et al. (2015) who observe
a tendency of the providers to equalize income. It is important to note that our experimental design is quite
different from that of Cappelen et al. (2013a) and Mollerstrom et al. (2015). These studies rely on dictator games,
in which dictators or third-party spectators have to decide how to distribute the total amount of two incomes (i.e.,
of the dictator and of the recipient). It is likely that this procedure makes the norm of an equal split more salient.
In contrast, studies that use solidarity games, rather than dictator games, to analyze choice conditionality, also
do not observe an equalization of incomes (Bolle and Costard 2015; Trhal and Radermacher 2009).
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Figure 3.5: Transfer Distribution for
Providers A2
treatment design and specify the transfer decision of provider i in treatment t as follows:
transferi,t = θ + βInft + γOptt + ηInfOptt + εi,t (3.2)
Optt is equal to one if recipients had the option to insure and zero otherwise. Inft is equal
to one if recipients were informed about the transfer possibility and zero otherwise. InfOptt is
an interaction term, equal to one if recipients were informed about the transfer possibility and
had the option to take up insurance and zero otherwise. We include a dummy to control for
round effects – i.e., level changes in transfer decisions when providers played the transfer game
a second time.
We can break down the transfer decisions of providers as depicted in Table 3.3 (mirroring
Table 3.1). In line with Hypothesis 1, we expect γ < 0 and γ+η < 0; and in line with Hypothesis
2, we expect η < 0.




Recipient had no θ θ + β
option to insure yes θ + γ θ + β + γ + η
Hypothesis 1 γ < 0 γ + η < 0
Hypothesis 2 η < 0
We estimate Specification 3.2 using OLS with standard errors clustered at the village level
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(using the wild cluster bootstrap).14 To account for corner solution response and for unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual level, we also conduct a Tobit random effects estimation with the
outcome variable censored at zero (see Table B.3 in Appendix B.4.1). We here report the results
of the OLS estimation for the ease of interpretation.
The estimation results are reported in Table 3.4. In Column 1, we report the basic results
without controlling for round effects. In Columns 2 – 6, we control for round effects. In Column
3, the sample is restricted to those providers who did not need support in writing their transfer
decisions (292 out of 336 providers). In Column 4, the sample is restricted to providers who
made none or only one mistake in the test questions which were asked before transfer decisions
(227 providers). In Column 5, we further restrict to providers who answered all test questions
correctly (149 providers). In Column 6, we exclude the 24 providers who made extreme transfer
decisions; these are providers that indicated to transfer more than 7,000 Riel in at least one
treatment.
Table 3.4: Treatment Effect Analysis - Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer
Inf (β) 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.014 0.092∗ 0.097
(0.121) (0.121) (0.140) (0.122) (0.050) (0.059)
Opt (γ) -0.598∗∗∗ -0.598∗∗∗ -0.596∗∗∗ -0.670∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.102) (0.107) (0.102) (0.115) (0.081)
InfOpt (η) 0.018 0.018 -0.048 -0.013 -0.007 -0.024
(0.078) (0.078) (0.097) (0.078) (0.058) (0.053)
Constant (θ) 2.155∗∗∗ 2.275∗∗∗ 2.318∗∗∗ 2.360∗∗∗ 2.272∗∗∗ 2.117∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.132) (0.146) (0.177) (0.135) (0.089)
Round effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1344 1344 1168 908 596 1320
r2_a 0.034 0.039 0.039 0.052 0.074 0.046
F 15.146 20.016 19.414 20.438 26.259 19.701
Pooled OLS estimator; standard errors (wild cluster bootstrap) in parentheses.
(1)-(2) for all subjects; (3) excluding subjects who needed support in writing.
(4) excluding subjects who made at least two mistake at test questions.
(5) excluding subjects who made at least one mistake at test questions.
(6) excluding subjects who made at least one transfer above 7,000 Riel.
Transfers in terms of 1,000 Riel
The average baseline transfer (θ) – i.e. how much is sent to recipients who experienced a
shock but had no insurance option and were not informed – is 2,155 Riel in Column 1. Hence, the
providers transfer 13.5% of their endowment. Introducing the insurance option has a significantly
negative effect on the transfers. Providers reduce their transfers to recipients who forewent the
insurance option by 28% in case the recipient is uninformed (γ as a proportion of θ) and by 27%
in case the recipient is informed (γ + η as a proportion of θ + β). Both γ as well as the joint
14Due to the orthogonal treatment design, fixed effects and random effects models come to the same results as
standard OLS (Oaxaca and Dickinson 2005).
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effect of γ + η are significantly negative; a support of our first hypothesis. We find no evidence
that the extent to which solidarity is conditioned on the insurance choice depends on the level
of information available to the recipients. η is close to zero and statistically insignificant. On
average, information does not seem to matter. There is neither a significant change in transfers
in response to information per se (β) nor a change in the response to foregoing insurance (η).
Introducing round effects in Column 2 and restricting the sample in Columns 3 – 6 does not
change the results by much.15 The baseline transfer varies between 2,100 Riel and 2,400 Riel
(13%-15% of the endowment) across these columns. γ as well as γ + η are always significantly
negative; but η alone is statistically insignificant. The magnitude of γ and γ + η amounts to
between 25% and 32% and is thus comparable to that in Column 1.
A potential concern with these results arises from the fact that providers make their transfer
decisions strategically: They know the transfer will only be enacted if recipients actually lose. In
the transfer game, the probability of a transfer being implemented varies across the treatments
with and without the insurance option. When recipients have no insurance option, there is
a 50% probability of losing and thus of transfers. When recipients have an insurance option,
the probability decreases as soon as some recipients take up insurance and thus have a zero
probability of a loss, making transfers impossible. In our experiment, insurance uptake was
relatively high, namely 75%. Hence, the probability of a transfer was 0.75*0+0.25*0.5=12.5%
in the treatments with the insurance option. If providers expected high insurance uptake, they
may have indicated a relatively high transfer amount in the treatments with the insurance option
because they did not expect a transfer would take place. Such behavior would be particularly
likely if providers were not only motivated by solidarity norms but also by a desire to ‘look good’
in the eyes of the research assistants, the other experimental participants or themselves; i.e., by
their social or self image. As described in Section 3.2.2, we tried to limit concerns for social image
by using an anonymous setting in which neither the research assistants nor the other participants
could observe the transfer decisions. Nevertheless, providers might still be motivated by their
self image (Dana et al. 2007). If this was the case, then differences in transfers would be larger
in a non-strategic setting. The transfer differences that we observe should thus be interpreted as
a lower bound for the true extent of choice conditionality.
In sum, we find support for Hypothesis 1, but no support for Hypothesis 2. On average,
providers reduce their transfers significantly when recipients had the choice of insurance and
hence the option to avoid the loss. The reduction in transfers to recipients who forewent the
option to insure informedly is not larger than that to recipients who forewent the option to insure
uninformedly. These results are stable across all columns in Table 3.4 (OLS results) and Table
B.3 (Tobit random effects results). This finding is an indication that people tend to condition
their solidarity on the choices of their peers and hold others accountable for prior decisions; yet
it seems irrelevant whether or not the peers knew about the potential support before making
their choice.
15There are round effects. Subjects reduce their baseline transfers from Round 1 to Round 2; yet, the treatment
effect of the insurance option as well as the information remain unchanged. We analyze the rounds separately in
Table B.4 in Appendix B.4.2.
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3.4.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Are the observed average transfer changes driven by just a few providers in our sample or do
they represent a pattern common to the whole provider sample? To answer this question, we
investigate the distribution of treatment effects across providers. We first take a look at choice
conditionality (γ and γ + η) and then look at the information effect (η). Five providers (i.e.,
1.5%) transferred zero in each treatment. We exclude them from the following analysis because
they behave purely payoff maximizing and do not show any sign of solidarity.
Table 3.5 depicts the distribution of the change in transfers to an uninformed recipient in
response to foregoing insurance (γ). Table 3.6 shows the respective distribution for an informed
recipient (γ + η). Column 1 reports the distribution for all providers; Column 2 restricts the
sample to providers that made at most one mistake at the test questions; and Column 3 is for
providers that responded correctly to all test questions.












γ = 0 42.30 43.05 45.21
γ < 0 44.71 47.53 47.95
γ > 0 12.99 9.41 6.85
Observations 331 223 146
Excluding subjects who always transferred zero
(2) excluding subjects who made at least two mistakes at test questions
(3) excluding subjects who made at least one mistake at test questions












γ + η = 0 42.90 43.50 41.31
γ + η < 0 44.71 47.09 51.37
γ + η > 0 12.39 9.42 7.53
Observations 331 223 146
Excluding subjects who always transferred zero
(2) excluding subjects who made at least two mistakes at test questions
(3) excluding subjects who made at least one mistake at test questions
Indeed, not all providers exhibit choice conditional solidarity. 45% of providers reduce their
transfers when recipients had the option to insure (γ < 0 or γ + η < 0); in fact, these providers
reduce their transfers by 65%. In contrast, 42% (Table 3.5) or 43% (Table 3.6) of providers do
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not condition their transfers on the choice of recipients (γ = 0 or γ + η = 0). This means these
subjects transfer the same amount independent of whether recipients had the option to insure.
Interestingly, 13% (Table 3.5) or 12% (Table 3.6) of the providers transfer more when recipients
forewent the insurance (γ > 0 or γ + η > 0). This proportion reduces to 9% when we restrict
the sample to subjects who responded mostly correctly to the test questions and further to 7%
when we restrict to only correct answers. This reduction suggests that some of the observations
are caused by erratic decisions by providers that did not clearly understand the experiment.16
The proportion of providers who condition their transfers on the choices of others in our
experiment is comparable to the proportions in Trhal and Radermacher (2009), Cappelen et al.
(2013a), Mollerstrom et al. (2015) and Bolle and Costard (2015). In these studies, between one
third and two thirds of experimental participants conditioned their transfers on the past decisions
of the co-players. Hence, choice conditionality does not seem to be a phenomenon specific to
high-income countries where the other studies were implemented but appears to be prevalent in
developing countries to a similar extent.
The distribution of responses to the information of recipients (η) is illustrated in Table 3.7.
Again, there is considerable heterogeneity. The majority of providers (61%) do not condition
their response to foregoing insurance on the information available to recipients (η = 0); i.e.,
providers adjust their transfers by the same amount for informed and uninformed recipients. It
seems that either they do not regard the informed recipients’ behavior as free-riding on their
solidarity or they do not consider that free-riding on solidarity should be punished.17












η = 0 60.73 64.12 67.12
η < 0 20.24 17.45 17.12
η > 0 19.03 18.39 15.75
Observations 331 223 146
Excluding subjects who always transferred zero
(2) excluding subjects who made at least two mistakes at test questions
(3) excluding subjects who made at least one mistake at test questions
16In order to better understand the reasoning behind the transfer behavior, we conducted qualitative interviews
with participants after the experiment in one third of the villages. Of the interviewed providers, 19 increased their
transfers when the recipients had had the option to take up insurance. The majority of these providers seemed
to not have understood the situation of the recipients or confused the order of the two decisions. Four providers
stated they felt more pity with recipients who decided against the insurance and lost, than with recipients who
just lost due to pure misfortune. One provider responded she expected the recipient would take up the insurance
anyway and thus did not care about the transfer. And one provider stated he ‘just did not care about the money.’
17In fact, the insurance uptake of the uninformed recipients is only slightly higher than that of the informed
recipients: 79% vs. 71%. This indicates that there is some free-riding among recipients but not very much.
If providers expect little free-riding, it seems reasonable that they do not make a difference between foregoing
insurance informedly and foregoing insurance uninformedly.
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20% of the providers behave in line with our Hypothesis 2 (η < 0). They reduce their
transfers by more to recipients who forewent insurance informedly. Surprisingly, the proportion
of providers that respond positively (η > 0), is approximately as high as the proportion of
providers that respond negatively. 19% reduce their transfers by less when the recipients made
their choice informedly. This share reduces only slightly to 18% (16%) when we restrict the
sample to those providers that responded mostly correctly (only correctly) to all test questions.
Thus, problems with understanding the experiment do not seem to be the root cause of this
behavior. These providers may instead be driven by different motives than the others. Possibly,
they wish to reward the foregoing of insurance of the informed recipients as they advocate the
institution of informal support.18 Such behavior is still in line with intention-based reciprocity
but providers apply a positive, rather than a negative, reciprocal response. An indication for this
interpretation may be that providers with η > 0 have considerably higher baseline transfers (θ) of
2,651 Riel compared with 2,150 Riel among providers with η < 0 and 1,701 Riel among providers
with η = 0. Given that they are willing to make larger transfers than others, they seem to value
informal support highly. An alternative motive is guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg
2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007): providers may wish to comply with the expectations of
recipients, who made the choice against the insurance in reliance on their support. With the
data currently at hand, we cannot say anything about the plausibility of these interpretations.
We did not elicit the perception of intentions or the second-order beliefs of the providers in our
experiment. Hence, we do not know whether the providers regarded the recipients’ insurance
decision as intentionally good or bad and whether they took the recipients’ expectations into
account when making transfer decisions.
3.4.3 Supporting Evidence
Our experiment shows that, on average, providers condition their solidarity transfers on the
insurance choice of their peers and do not vary their behavior according to the peers’ awareness of
potential monetary support. A number of features of our experimental design may raise concerns
over the generalizability and interpretation of our findings. In the following, we address such
concerns, in particular the external validity of the experiment and the validity of the presumed
underlying preferences.
3.4.3.1 External Validity
In order to investigate our research question, we chose to conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment
because it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to cleanly analyze choice conditionality
in combination with the information effect through survey questions. A major limitation of lab
experiments is, however, that they are artificial. As laid out by Levitt and List (2007), several
characteristics of lab experiments make extrapolation of behavior in the lab to behavior outside
the lab questionable. We designed our experiment in such a way that it eases extrapolation to
the extent possible. For example, the decisions of the providers and recipients were not observed
18We thank Jean-Philippe Platteau for making us aware of this potential explanation.
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by the research assistants who interacted with them. The level of scrutiny was thus minimized,
which should have reduced the pressure to act pro-socially. Moreover, we played with high stakes,
which may have further reduced the extent of unnatural pro-social behavior. Still, our subjects
played anonymously and were not allowed to communicate with each other, which is far from
real-life interactions.
We address the external validity of our experiment in two ways. First, we contrast the
providers’ transfer decisions in the experiment with their survey response to a vignette situation
on accountability.19 Second, we study the beliefs of the recipients in the experiment. In a
first step, we analyze whether the recipients’ beliefs about providers’ transfers match the actual
transfer decisions of the providers. In a second step, we correlate average recipients’ beliefs and
providers’ transfer decisions per village.
Providers’ behavior outside the lab
In the survey, we confronted the respondents with a vignette situation in order to analyze their
perceptions of accountability in a situation which was familiar to them. Respondents were asked
to consider two different situations:
- Situation 1 (S1): "The household head of a poor household in this village dies of sudden
illness. All other households are asked once to support the household. How much money
would you contribute?"
- Situation 2 (S2): "The household head of a poor household in this village dies after a
motorbike accident. He had behaved very risky on the road. All other households are asked
once to support the household. How much money would you contribute?"
80% of the providers report in the survey that they would contribute the same amount in
both situations (S1 = S2). 19% report to provide less in Situation 2, where the outcome is the
result of choice – i.e., careless driving (S1 > S2). Only 1% (4 providers) indicate to provide
more in Situation 2.
Of course, the situation that individuals face in the experiment is very different from the
situation they face in the survey. Death is a much more severe circumstance than the loss of
money due to the roll of a dice. Furthermore, death plays a special role in Buddhist culture,
and money collection after the passing of a village member has a long standing tradition in
Cambodia. Finally, in the vignette situation the help goes to the family of the deceased and not
to the person liable for the loss. These differences may explain the high proportion of providers
who report to contribute the same amount in both situations. Nevertheless, we expect that those
providers who reported lower contributions in case of irresponsible behavior in the survey to also
reduce their transfers by more when recipients could have avoided their loss in the experiment.
We split the sample according to whether providers report in the survey to contribute less in
Situation 2 than in Situation 1 (Column 2) or the same (Column 1) and analyze Specification
19Note that the survey was conducted two weeks before the experiment. It is therefore highly unlikely that the
participants’ behavior in the experiment was diluted by their response to the survey questions.
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Table 3.8: Treatment Effect Analysis, by Survey Response
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
Transfer if S1 = S2 Transfer if S1 > S2 Effect Comparison
Inf (β) -0.007 0.046 -0.053
(0.129) (0.144) (0.271)
Opt (γ) -0.528∗∗∗ -0.908∗∗∗ 0.380∗
(0.099) (0.244) (0.234)
InfOpt (η) -0.004 0.108 -0.112
(0.088) (0.170) (0.197)





Pooled OLS estimator; standard errors (wild cluster bootstrap) in parentheses.
(1) Participants who report in survey to contribute the same.
(2) Participants who report in survey to contribute less.
Transfers in 1,000 Riel.
3.2.20 Table 3.8 reveals that providers that report in the survey to transfer less in case the
outcome was affected by deliberate choice reduce their transfers significantly more (by 34%-
40%) in response to foregoing insurance in the experiment than subjects who report to transfer
the same amount (by 25%). We see this as an indication that the transfer behavior observed in
the experiment is motivated by solidarity norms that are applied in real-life decision making.
Recipients’ expectations
Those recipients that were informed about the transfer possibility (recipients of type C1 and
C2) were asked to write down how much transfer they expected from the providers. We are
interested in whether or not these beliefs change with the insurance option. If the recipients with
the insurance option expected lower transfers from the providers than the recipients without the
insurance option, the providers’ behavior as illustrated above would be directly reflected in the
recipients’ beliefs.
Among all recipients who were informed, the average expected transfer amounts to 3,840 Riel
without the option to insure and to 3,390 Riel with the option to insure (Column 1 of Table 3.9).
The difference in the expected transfer of about 450 Riel is significantly larger than zero at the 5%
level. Notably, this difference is close to the actual reduction in transfers by the providers when
insurance becomes available – i.e., the roughly 600 Riel reduction in Table 3.4. This finding indi-
cates that the recipients anticipated that providers condition their solidarity on insurance choice.
We now relate the average changes in providers’ transfers in response to the insurance option
to the average changes in recipients’ beliefs at the village level. Figure 3.6 illustrates a strong
20The four participants, who reported in the survey to contribute more in Situation 2 than in Situation 1, are
not considered.
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Table 3.9: Expected Transfer by Recipients
Expected Transfer




Difference in Expected Transfers 0.446∗∗
(between rounds) (0.194)
Observations 166
Response to Belief Questions in Round 1 and Round 2; standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 3.6: Differences in Beliefs and Transfers in Response to Insurance (Across Villages)
correlation between these two measures. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.41 with a p-
value of 0.06. A simple regression without controls for village characteristics (results unreported)
finds that the average change in transfers explains more than one sixth of the average change
in beliefs. We argue that this correlation of providers’ transfers and recipients’ expectations at
the village level is likely driven by the existence of village-level social norms on solidarity. Social
norms, according to Bicchieri (2005), guide individuals’ behavior through the expectation that
others behave in line with the norm and also expect oneself to do so. If social solidarity norms,
which generally guide villagers’ behavior in real life, are here applied to the less familiar situation
of the experiment, the correlation between providers’ and recipients’ behavior provides support
for the external validity of our findings.
3.4.3.2 Underlying Preferences
Up to this point, we assumed the utility function in Equation 3.1 to represent the preferences
of our experimental participants. However, a different specification of preferences can lead to
similar findings. Let us assume that providers are motivated by social preferences that involve
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both their own utility as well as the perceived utility of the recipient. Let us further assume
that individuals differ in their risk preferences and that risk preferences tend to be personal
information. Providers generally do not know the risk preferences and hence the utility of the
recipients in the transfer game. If there was a selection of recipients into insurance based on risk
preferences, recipients who choose not to take up insurance would signal their risk lovingness.21
Providers may then act upon this signal and adjust their transfers accordingly. They would
provide less transfers to recipients for whom they have reason to believe to be risk loving and
thus not to suffer much from a loss. Given that this information becomes available only with
the option of insurance, providers give less with the insurance option than without the insurance
option. The reduction in transfers would then not be driven by the recipients’ choice of foregoing
insurance but by the signal that this choice provides about the recipients’ utility curvature. We
can provide some insight into the selection to insurance and the possibility of providers’ acting
on risk preferences in the following way.
We model the insurance uptake decision of the recipients in our experiment as a function of
risk preferences as well as other characteristics that should determine insurance uptake according
to the literature (Giné et al. 2008; Giesbert et al. 2011). For recipients that were uninformed
about the transfer possibility, insurance uptake appears to be completely random (see Table
B.5 in Appendix B.4.3). For informed recipients, risk preferences matter at a marginal level of
significance. This indicates that risk preferences are unlikely to explain the insurance uptake per
se. They rather seem to influence the recipients’ willingness to rely on the providers’ solidarity.
Even so, the providers may nevertheless use the insurance uptake decision as a signal of risk
preferences and respond accordingly.
Under the assumption that the knowledge of another person’s risk preferences increases with
the level of familiarity, we should expect that the signal in the experiment is of little value
when providers transfer to people they know well. To gain insight into this idea, we can use
information from the second game in our experiment in which the transfer game was played
non-anonymously. If providers reacted solely to the risk preference rather than conditioning
their transfers on choice, providers should be less likely to reduce their transfers in response to
foregoing insurance, the better they know the recipient.
The second game in our experiment was similar to the first game with three main differences:
1) all subjects played both the role of the provider and the role of the recipient; 2) providers
knew the name of the recipient they were matched with; recipients, in turn, were always informed
that there was a provider but they did not know her identity; 3) the matched recipient for any
provider remained the same for the treatment with insurance and for the treatment without
insurance. Between the first and the second game, participants had to report for each of the
other 31 participants per village whether they knew each other and, if so, whether they were
relatives or close friends. In 9% of the matched pairs in the second game, the provider did not
know the recipient; in 49% the provider knew the recipient but they were neither relatives nor
friends; in 33% provider and recipient were related; and in 9% the provider reported to be a close
21Note that the price of the insurance was set relatively low, such that only risk loving people should forego
the insurance.
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friend with the recipient.
Table 3.10: Response to Foregoing Insurance in Game 2, by Relationship to Respondent
Unknown Known Relative Friend Total
Reduction in Transfers 27.12 32.83 27.85 29.23 30.36
No Change 59.32 54.71 55.25 58.46 55.65
Increase in Transfers 13.56 12.46 16.89 12.31 13.99
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
We analyze whether providers responded differently to the insurance uptake decision de-
pending on how well they knew the recipient. We report the share of providers who transferred
less, the same or more when insurance became available, separately for the different categories
of acquaintance with the recipient. Table 3.10 illustrates that a comparable share of providers
transferred less (the same, more) to the recipients in response to the insurance option across
the categories. Most importantly, providers in the knowledge, blood relation and friendship
categories are not less likely to reduce their transfers in response to the foregoing of insurance
compared with providers in the first category (no knowledge). This implies that providers do not
regard the insurance uptake decision solely as a signal of risk preferences. We do not mean to
say that none of our experimental participants reacted on the perceived risk preference, but we
can rule out that this is the only explanation for their behavior. They also or even dominantly
respond to the choice of foregoing insurance per se.
3.5 Conclusion
In this study, we focus on informal transfers between peers which are motivated by social pref-
erences. We investigate whether or not transfers to individuals who lost most of their income
are reduced when these individuals could have avoided the loss by purchasing insurance. We
formulate two hypotheses. First, individuals condition their solidarity on the choices of others
(Hypothesis 1). And second, individuals condition their response to the choices of others on
whether or not the others know that they might receive support (Hypothesis 2). Using a lab-
in-the-field experiment in rural Cambodia, we obtain unequivocal support for Hypothesis 1 but
not for Hypothesis 2. To our surprise, the providers’ response to foregoing insurance do not
depend on the level of information available to the recipients.22 Possibly, individuals behave
in line with Hypothesis 2 only if formal insurance is common. Familiarity with insurance may
be a necessary condition to make people regard the reliance on others as free-riding. There is
suggestive evidence for this idea in our experiment: providers who had purchased insurance in
real life reduced their transfers by significantly more when insurance was foregone informedly
22This finding is in line with Koch and Normann (2008) and Dreber et al. (2013). These authors play dictator
games, in which the recipients either know about the existence of a dictator who may transfer money to them or
do not know about it. In both studies, the authors find that information on the side of the recipients is irrelevant
for the dictators’ transfer decisions. Dana et al. (2006) come to different results.
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than providers who had no insurance in real life. As a follow-up, it would be desirable to think
about an experimental design that varies the familiarity with insurance.
Most providers whom we interviewed after the experiment explained that they had made a
positive transfer because they had felt pity for the recipient. The solidarity norms of our providers
thus seem to be shaped by empathy.23 Then, why do providers feel less empathy with a recipient
who forewent insurance? As pointed out by Bowles (2008), economic incentives have a framing
effect: they affect how a decision situation is represented and may imply appropriate behavior.
The introduction of insurance may thus be interpreted as a signal that economic security becomes
an individual responsibility, which reduces the moral obligation to support others (Landmann
et al. 2012). This idea relates to findings by Hintz (2010) who analyzes the implementation of
a life-insurance product in rural Indonesia. Hintz finds that in villages where the insurance was
introduced, the willingness to provide help declined substantially after the insurance scheme was
established. Hintz describes a paradigm shift: the insurance led to an “individualization of risk
management . . . (furthering) the erosion of social cohesion” (Hintz 2010, p. 232).
Our findings have potential implications for social preference driven support in developing
countries. A non-negligible number of people support their ill or disabled relatives or friends
without anticipating any transfers in return (De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2011). If people expect
others to get insured when insurance becomes available, such support might be reduced. This
would be particularly concerning if transfers were lowered to people who are too poor to pay for
insurance premiums. Based on our experiment, in which people voluntarily forego insurance, it
is impossible to evaluate the plausibility of this concern. Follow-up research would ideally vary
the endowment of the recipients such that some people are able to pay for insurance premiums
and others are not. If informal support turned out to be crowded out similarly to both groups of
people, this would be a strong call for complementing insurance with social safety nets targeted
at the poor.
23A number of studies suggest that empathy is one of the driving motives explaining pro-social behavior (e.g.
see Andreoni and Rao (2011)).
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Chapter 4
Conditional Solidarity and Informal
Exchange
4.1 Introduction
In a lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in North-West Cambodia we elicited the extent to
which people conditioned their support to another person on this person’s prior choices (see
Chapter 3). More specifically, we investigated whether villagers reduced their monetary transfers
to a person in need if this person had the option to avoid her neediness by purchasing insurance.
While on average we find a strong reduction in transfers, there is considerable heterogeneity in
subjects’ behavior. 44% of the subjects conditioned their support on the prior choice of the
person in need – i.e., they reduced their transfers if the person in need could have avoided her
neediness – yet 43% of the subjects transferred the same amount independent of the prior choice.
How can this heterogeneity be explained?
There is considerable evidence both from surveys and experiments that many people consider
whether a person is responsible for her outcome before they decide about the allocation of
income, rewards or sanctions or when they make fairness judgments about redistribution policies
(Schokkaert and Capeau 1991; Konow 2000; Cappelen et al. 2013a; Fong 2007; Jakiela 2015);
that is, people evaluate the extent to which an outcome is the result of an individual’s choice
or of factors that lie outside of an individual’s sphere of influence (Konow 2003). They allocate
less to a person who put little effort in her work (Cappelen et al. 2007; Cappelen et al. 2013b;
Jakiela 2015), who made risky investment decisions (Trhal and Radermacher 2009; Bolle and
Costard 2015; Cappelen et al. 2013a), or who had the option to purchase insurance but forewent
this option (Mollerstrom et al. 2015).
Notions of accountability differ systematically across countries and so does the extent to
which individuals apply merit based fairness views when judging income re-distribution policies
(Corneo and Grüner 2002; Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Reeskens and Oorschot 2013). But
also within countries, individuals seem to differ in their understandings of fairness. While a
large proportion of people allocate less to a person who put little effort in her work or made
risky investment decisions, a non-negligible proportion allocate the same amount independent
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of the recipient’s effort. This has been shown to be the case for people living in high-income
countries such as Germany, Norway and the U.S. (Konow 2000; Cappelen et al. 2007; Cappelen
et al. 2013b; Almås et al. 2016), but also for lower-income countries such as Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania (Cappelen et al. 2013b; Jakiela 2015). There is limited evidence for the determinants
of this heterogeneity. It is shown that part of the variation can be explained by differences
in social upbringing: individuals coming from higher socioeconomic background, in terms of
parental education and income, are more inclined to reward effort (Almås et al. 2016). Within
a low-income country, individuals from economically more developed villages are shown to be
more likely to reward effort (Jakiela 2015). Furthermore, there is some suggestive evidence that
experience with joint production and resource allocation processes is positively correlated with
the tendency to reward effort (Schäfer et al. 2015).
Holding others accountable for prior choices, by allocating income in proportion to a recipi-
ent’s exerted effort or by transferring less when a recipient’s neediness is self-inflicted, is, in the
broader sense, a form of reciprocity. There is substantial experimental evidence that reciprocity
can function as a social norm enforcement mechanism. Negative reciprocity (or the threat of it)
can explain the high offers in ultimatum games (for an overview see Güth and Kocher (2014)),
reduce free-riding and enhance cooperation in public-good games (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Os-
trom 2006; Reuben and Riedl 2013) and increase the offered wage level in a gift-exchange game
(Fehr et al. 1997; Fehr and Gächter 1998; Fehr and Gächter 2000). Reciprocity is thus a mech-
anism that can sustain arrangements between parties of competing interests when contracts are
incomplete, and that can countervail the absence of a third party which could enforce contracts
exogenously.1 The question arises: do people who are more engaged in arrangements that rely
on reciprocity as enforcement device also generally show a stronger tendency to hold others
accountable?
In a context like rural Cambodia – where markets are less developed, most people work in
the informal sector, access to financial services and insurance is limited and legal enforcement
institutions are weak – people rely to a great extent on informal arrangements that are charac-
terized by incomplete contracts and limited external enforcement possibilities. Neighbors and
relatives transfer money in response to health shocks (Fafchamps and Gubert 2007b), yield is
shared when crop-cycles are staggered (Platteau 2000) and people form labor sharing groups for
the labor intensive harvest season (Krishnan and Sciubba 2009). Most of these arrangements are
based on mutuality and are characterized by exchange; money, goods and services are exchanged
against future compensation in kind (Kranton 1996). These mutual support arrangements need
to be self-enforcing; to ensure compliance, the threat of punishment in case of defection must
be sufficiently strong. When commitment is limited and the threat of punishment is weak, ei-
ther because punishment is not severe enough or because the threat is not credible, the level of
1Similar to the studies on accountability, studies on negative reciprocity in public good, ultimatum and third
party punishing games find substantial heterogeneity across and within countries in individuals’ willingness to
reciprocate (Henrich et al. 2005; Dohmen et al. 2008; Egas and Riedl 2008; Herrmann et al. 2008; Gächter and
Herrmann 2009; Henrich et al. 2010; Falk et al. 2015). The observed differences can be related to differences in
economic development and inequality at the country level, and to differences in age, gender and religion at the
individual level.
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support is sub-optimal or arrangements can break apart completely (Coate and Ravallion 1993;
Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al. 2002). Thus, negative reciprocity, in the sense of hold-
ing exchange partners accountable when they are not behaving in the (implicitly) agreed-upon
manner, is fundamental for the functioning of these informal arrangements.
In the present study, I investigate whether differences in engagement in informal exchange
can explain part of the heterogeneity in the subjects’ transfer decisions that we observe in our
experiment; more specifically, whether subjects with more exposure to mutual support arrange-
ments that are characterized by an exchange of money, goods and services show a stronger
tendency to condition their support on prior choices and provide less support when neediness
was self-inflicted.
I analyze this relationship, matching the experimental transfer data with data from a house-
hold survey conducted two weeks before the experiment. This survey elicited in detail different
types of informal support arrangements between villagers, including exchange arrangements. I
find that subjects with a larger ‘exchange outdegree’ – i.e., a larger number of informal exchange
arrangements with other villagers – reduce their transfers by significantly more when neediness
was self-inflicted. The correlation remains strong and significant when controlling for various
subject characteristics that could affect the results, when excluding subjects with particularly
large exchange networks and when using an exchange measure that is based on other villagers’
reports, a subject’s ‘exchange indegree.’ Furthermore, I show that the correlation is particularly
strong the larger the number of exchange arrangements that take place outside the family. The
results indicate that the tendency to hold others accountable and to condition transfers on prior
choices is stronger among villagers that are more engaged in informal exchange arrangements.
The findings can be interpreted from two different angles. One way to interpret this is
that engagement in informal exchange arrangements increases individuals’ inclination to hold
others accountable. They learn the importance of enforcing accountability for the stability
of these arrangements, they internalize this behavior and act in accordance with it even in
settings where the arrangement partner is unknown and no future interaction can be assumed
(learning argument). On the other hand, one could argue that people’s willingness to hold others
accountable is not affected by their exposure to informal exchange; rather individuals with a
stronger sense of accountability (due to innate characteristics or social upbringing) are more
likely to select into informal exchange arrangements: as they pose a higher threat of punishment
they face lower risk of a partner’s non-compliance, the arrangements are more sustainable, and
a higher level of exchange can be achieved (selection argument).
The finding is of particular relevance in the context of the recent expansion of formal insur-
ance in developing countries. It is generally assumed that existing informal support networks
can reduce the uptake of formal insurance in particular when they cover similar types of risks
(Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013; Dercon et al. 2014; Berg et al. 2017). In this study, however, I
show that the willingness to sanction no-insurance uptake is particularly strong in villages with
dense mutual support networks. If these higher sanctions are effective, then, ceteris paribus, in-
surance uptake in these villages might indeed be higher than in villages with less dense exchange
networks. While certainly other factors also play a role and the net effect is not clear a priori,
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the findings show that the relationship between formal and informal insurance is much more
complex than often assumed.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, I introduce the research
setting in Cambodia. I discuss the importance of mutual support arrangements in rural Cambo-
dia and describe the research project and the data that form the basis for the empirical analysis.
In Section 4.3, I present the empirical method and the results of the analysis, and discuss their
interpretation. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Research Setting and Data
This study is based on data that were collected for a research project conducted in 21 villages in
North-West Cambodia. The villages selected for the research are located along both sides of the
river Stong-Sreng which separates the two provinces Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap.2 The
focus of the research project was to analyze the interplay between formal insurance and informal
support arrangements. The research consisted of two phases. First, in each village a household
survey was conducted with 60 randomly selected households; and then, two weeks afterwards, in
each village 32 of the respondents were invited to take part in an experiment.
4.2.1 Informal Exchange in Cambodia
In Cambodia, as in many other developing countries, most people have very limited access to
formal financial products, that is credit, insurance or saving accounts, which could help them to
better manage the risks they face such as health related emergencies or crop failure. While there
is a high penetration of (mostly commercial) microfinance institutions (MFI), most offer loans
for business investments; emergency loans are more seldom and typically associated with high
costs.3 Only around 4% of the adult population have savings at a financial institution and an even
smaller proportion are covered by insurance (World Bank 2014; Microinsurance Network 2016).
Informal support therefore plays a major role for coping with the consequences of shocks, but also
for dealing with the daily changing circumstances, and villages are characterized by a complex
system of mutual support arrangements (Murshid 1998; Kim 2001; Crochet 2011; Parsons 2016).
These arrangements have a long-standing tradition in Cambodia and have survived the decades
of turmoil that the country experienced.4 The dominant forms of exchange are money, food and
labor. In the rural areas most people are self-employed, e.g. as farmers, craftsmen or small scale
vendors, thus the inflow of cash is highly variable. As a consequence, households borrow and
2Villages were selected to be comparable across the two provinces. Selection criteria included the size of the
village, the level of migration and remoteness.
3According to the financial inclusion data provided by the World Bank, in 2013 nearly every third person
above 15 had borrowed from a financial institution. But most loans are for investment purposes. The average
loan size of MFIs that focus on poor clients has increased to 70% of median annual income in 2015 (MIMOSA
2016).
4Some scholars argue that the devastating era of the Khmer rouge regime and the following years of civil
war, which did not come to an end before the mid 1990s, destroyed social cohesion and trust within villages and
reduced inter-household exchange (Frings 1994; Ovesen et al. 1996). However, there is considerable evidence,
including the data on hand, that informal exchange on village level have remained intact or at least regained its
pivotal role (Murshid 1998; Kim 2001; Crochet 2011).
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lend each other small amounts of money on a very frequent basis, typically without interest or
a fixed repayment schedule. These credit exchange arrangements help the villagers to deal with
income fluctuation (Parsons 2016). Food exchange arrangements serve a similar purpose. Many
households grow rice, fruits and vegetables for their own consumption. Yet, harvest periods are
staggered and yields vary, thus part of the harvest is often shared with other households, who have
temporarily lower yields or harvest later; these households are generally expected to reciprocate
this in the future (Murshid 1998; Kim 2001). Provas dai, a form of labor exchange arrangement,
is another form of informal exchange that is very common in rural Cambodia. In this more
institutionalized type of arrangement farmers self-organize in groups and help each other on a
rotating basis in farming activities, in particular the harvest of rice (Kim 2001; Amakawa 2008).
In summary, the limited access to formal risk management options in rural Cambodia is met
by a variety of exchange arrangements among the villagers. These informal arrangements are
based on the, mostly implicit, agreement that provided support will be returned in the future.
4.2.2 Household Survey
The household survey elicited socioeconomic characteristics of all household members; access to
formal risk management tools, such as insurance, savings and credit; and, most important for this
research, information on the households’ support networks within the villages, including credit,
food as well as labor exchange arrangements. Each interview was conducted with the person
responsible for the main decisions in the household, typically the household head, if available,
or the spouse, and took on average two hours. In total 1,270 households were interviewed. At
the end of each interview, the respondent was asked whether she would be willing and available
to participate in a workshop (the experiment) that would take place two weeks after the survey
had been conducted. From those respondents who answered affirmatively, in each village 32
individuals were invited to the experiment.5 Care was taken to ensure that indeed the survey
respondent participated in the experiment. In very few cases the respondent had to be replaced
by another household member; in the analysis these cases are excluded.
4.2.2.1 Socioeconomic Characteristics of Provider Subjects
The analysis in this study focuses on those respondents who participated in the experiment, in
particular those 336 subjects who played the role of the provider (in the following ‘the provider
subjects’). The experiment will be described in more detail below. Due to the selection procedure,
the group of experiment participants are not representative for the overall population in the
villages.
The socioeconomic characteristics of the provider subjects are presented in Table 4.1.6 68%
of the subjects are female. More than two thirds are born in the village they reside. Subjects
5For the experiment, very old respondents were excluded and the focus was on the literate (for details on the
selection method of the participants see Chapter 3). Furthermore, as the experiment took place during daytime,
respondents who worked outside the village or had less flexible working schedules were less likely to take part.
6The provider subjects’ socioeconomic characteristics differ only slightly from the characteristics of the pool
of all survey respondents (see Table C.1 in Appendix C.1.1).
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Table 4.1: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Provider Subjects
mean sd min max median count
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.68 0.47 0 1 1 336
Age 38.90 12.05 18 77 36 336
Native 0.71 0.46 0 1 1 336
Household head 0.46 0.50 0 1 0 336
School years 2.95 3.07 0 14 2 336
Working 0.82 0.38 0 1 1 336
Working outside village 0.13 0.34 0 1 0 276
Selfemployed 0.86 0.35 0 1 1 276
Household Characteristics
Household size 5.75 2.44 2 17 5 336
Female headed household 0.24 0.43 0 1 0 336
Total household income (USD) 160.91 399.83 0 5,000 50 299
Asset wealth 0.38 0.15 0 .92 .37 336
No electricity 0.72 0.45 0 1 1 336
Household grows rice 0.93 0.25 0 1 1 336
Farming as income source 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 336
Cultivated land (ha) 2.93 2.53 0 30 2.5 336
Loan at MFI 0.34 0.47 0 1 0 336
Bank account 0.04 0.20 0 1 0 336
Savings at fin. institution 0.03 0.17 0 1 0 336
Insurance 0.09 0.29 0 1 0 336
Observations 336
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went to school for on average of 3 years. 30% never went to school. Only 13% of the subjects,
who are working, work outside the village.7 86% are self-employed – i.e., without stable cash
inflow. Most of the subjects come from poor households. The average household income is 161
USD, however 50% have not earned more than 50 USD in the last month.8 However, the income
measure needs to be interpreted with care. 10% of the respondents refused to provide information
for some or all income sources. Furthermore, income is typically fluctuating considerably over
the year. As an alternative wealth measure, an asset index is derived.9 72% of the households
have no electricity. Nearly all subjects’ households grow rice for their own consumption, a large
proportion also for sale. For four out of five households, revenues from farming is one source of
income. On average, households cultivate three hectare of land; only one subject reported not
to cultivate any land. Access to finance is very limited. While one third of the subjects reported
to have borrowed from a financial institution (typically an MFI) in the last two years, only 4%
have a bank account and even less hold savings at a financial institution. 9% of the households
have insurance, in nearly all of the cases this is health insurance.
4.2.2.2 Informal Exchange
The villagers are engaged in a variety of support arrangements. In the household survey, most
of these arrangements were elicited with the help of a social network questionnaire, where re-
spondents were asked to identify other households within their village for different types of
relationships. For each specific question, another household could only be named once; however,
across the questions, households could be named several times. After respondents listed the
names for each question, the interviewer asked them to identify the particular households, by
showing a list of all households living within the village. This procedure allowed to match the
households directly.
For the analysis in this study, I focus on informal exchange, which was reported for credit,
food and labor. The arrangements are derived from the villagers’ responses to the following
questions:
1. If you suddenly needed to borrow 50,000 Riel for your household, who from this village do
you typically ask?10
2. Who from this village would typically ask you for money (e.g. 50,000 Riel) for a sudden
need and you would lend the money?
3. With whom within this village do you exchange in-kind goods on a regular basis?
4. If you grow rice, do you share labor with other people from this village (i.e., Provas Dai)?
718% of the subjects do not work regularly; most of them reported domestic work as their main activity.
8Income includes wage income, income from self-employment, state assistance, pension payments, rental income
and remittances.
9The asset index is calculated by polychoric principal component analysis (Moser and Felton 2007). Variables
are included based on their explanatory power. The following assets are included: ownership of tv, dvd player,
smart phone, water pump, refrigerator, motorbike and handtractor; lifestock; roof material; source of lighting;
general housing condition. The weights are derived based on the complete sample of surveyed households. The
index is standardized to be between 0 and 1.
1050,000 Riel are approximately 12 USD or three days of average wage for a factory worker (ILO 2015).
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The first and second question are used as a proxy for the credit exchange network. In par-
ticular if a respondent names another household both as a borrowing as well as a lending link
then this household is defined as being part of the credit exchange network of the respondent.
The third question proxies the food exchange network and the fourth question the labor exchange
network of the respondent. The traditional form of labor exchange in Cambodia is only among
rice farmers and thus conditioned on growing rice. Households that do not grow rice (7% of the
subjects’ households) thus have no labor exchange arrangements.
The focus is explicitly on mutual support arrangements where support in terms of money, food
or labor is expected from both sides. One-sided support arrangements are intentionally excluded,
as the formation process differs (as shown in Chapter 2). While questions on food exchange and
labor exchange ask explicitly for existing arrangements, the credit exchange arrangement is based
on a hypothetical question. I assume that it measures an actual (and not a desired) link which
will be activated when financial support is needed and is thus comparable to the other two
exchange links.
In the latter analysis, information on social networks is included that are not specifically
exchange related. This information is derived from the following questions:
5. In your free time whose house do you visit or who visits your house?
6. If you needed to make an important decision, who within this village would you turn to
for advice?
The former question is used as a proxy for the friendship network and the latter for the advice
network within the village.
For the analysis, the following notation is used. I define g`
i,j;V
= 1 if respondent i reports a link
to j for network ` ∈ L = { Friendship, Advice, CreditExchange, FoodExchange, LaborExchange}
and g`
i,j;V
= 0 otherwise, with i ∈ NSV = {1, ...., nSV } and j ∈ NV = {1, ...., nV }, i 6= j, where NSV
is the set of respondents – i.e., the set of surveyed households living in village V , and NV is the
set of all households living in village V , thus NSV ⊂ NV . This information is used to calculate


















Table 4.2 describes the characteristics of the different network types for the provider subjects.
The first column lists the average number of outgoing links, or the network density; the second
column shows the proportion of subjects that named at least one other household for this specific
network; the third column lists the average number of outgoing links for those subjects that
reported at least one outgoing link; and the last two columns list the number of named households
divided in related and unrelated households.
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Table 4.2: Network Characteristics of Provider Subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network ` Outdegree At least 1 link Outdegree Links within Links outside
(δouti;V (`)) (δ
out
i;V (`) > 0) if δ
out
i;V (`) > 0 family
(**) family(**)
Friendship 3.61 0.99 3.65 2.23 1.38
(1.89) (0.09) (1.87) (1.85) (1.58)
Advice 1.16 0.77 1.50 0.82 0.35
(0.93) (0.42) (0.78) (0.95) (0.62)
CreditExchange 1.24 0.58 2.15 0.90 0.34
(1.48) (0.49) (1.35) (1.26) (0.72)
FoodExchange 3.06 0.98 3.11 2.00 1.05
(1.59) (0.13) (1.54) 1.58 1.22
LaborExchange(*) 2.29 0.55 4.19 1.36 0.93
(2.84) (0.50) (2.61) (2.00) (1.71)
AnyExchange 6.43 0.99 6.47 2.57 1.59
(4.44) (0.08) (4.43) (2.04) (1.91)
Observations 336
Standard deviation in parentheses. (*) For households growing rice. (**) Links to distinct exchange partners.
Nearly all of the subjects identify at least one befriended household in their village. On
average subjects listed four households as part of their friendship network. 77% of the subjects
name at least one household they would turn to to ask for advice. 60% of the subjects are part
of a credit exchange arrangement; on average they name two other households they would lend
to or borrow money from. Nearly all subjects engage in food exchange arrangements, on average
with three other households. 55% of the subjects that grow rice indicate to be part of a labor
exchange arrangement with on average four other households. Overall, subjects have on average
six exchange arrangements with four distinct exchange partners, of which around two thirds are
family members.
Analyzing the main determinants for the size of the different networks of the survey respon-
dents (see Table C.3 in Appendix C.1.2 ), we find that people who are born in the village as well
as more educated people tend to have overall larger networks. Households with female house-
hold heads report on average less network partners; households that cultivate more land have
greater credit, food and exchange networks, while smaller households tend to have larger advice
networks.
It is important to note that the engagement in labor exchange arrangements varies substan-
tially across villages. The proportion of respondents engaged in labor exchange ranges from below
20% to up to over 90%, while the proportion engaged in credit exchange and food exchange is
more similar across villages (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C.1.2). This variation can partly be
explained by the variation in average land size per household, which varies considerably across
the villages.
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4.2.3 Experiment
In the experiment, participants played two variations of a modified dictator game, which is called
the transfer game. In this study, I focus only on one variation. For a more detailed description
of the experiment, in particular the game design and the implementation in the field see Chapter
3.
4.2.3.1 Experimental Design
In each village the 32 participants were randomly assigned the role of provider or recipient. There
were 16 providers and 16 recipients. Each provider (P ) was anonymously matched with one
recipient. Both received the same endowment, 16,000 Riel. Each recipient faced the probability
of an income shock; with a 50% probability she could lose a large proportion of her endowment
(14,000 Riel). Half of the recipients had no option to prevent this shock (R1) while the other
half had the option to purchase an insurance for 6,000 Riel, which would cover the full loss from




No Option Option to insure
TNI T I
Recipients
Figure 4.1: Transfer Game
The provider was explained the situation of the recipients and was asked to make two transfer
decisions: how much of her endowment she would transfer if she was matched with a recipient of
type R1 and the recipient had lost (TNI), and how much she would transfer if she was matched
with a recipient of type R2 and the recipient had lost (T I). The basic design is depicted in
Figure 4.1. The provider was aware that a recipient of group R2 would only lose if she had
declined to purchase the insurance. The difference in the transfer decisions of each provider
(T I − TNI) indicates the extent to which this subject conditions her support on the choice the
recipient had to avoid her loss. It was hypothesized that the majority of subjects would condition
their solidarity and transfer less if the recipient could be held accountable for her loss by not
purchasing insurance.
4.2.3.2 Transfer Behavior in the Experiment
In the experiment, 336 subjects played the role of the provider. They made two transfer decisions,
one for the case the recipient had the option to take up insurance (T I) and one for the case where
11This is Case 2 of the transfer game described in Section 3.2.1.
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the recipient did not have this option (TNI). Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of transfers among
the 336 subjects that played the provider role in the experiment. The figure shows a clear shift
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Figure 4.2: Transfer distribution
Indeed there is a significant reduction in the average transfers sent (see Table 4.3). If the
recipient had no insurance option, providers transfer on average 2,200 Riel. However, in case the
recipient had the option to insure but forewent this option, providers reduce their transfers by on
average 600 Riel; a reduction of 28%. The results indicate that on average subjects condition their
solidarity on choice and hold the recipient accountable for not taking up insurance. Yet, there







Transfer in case of loss 2.155 1.577 -0.598***
(1.753) (1.505) (1.534)
Observations 336
Transfers in terms of 1,000 Riel.
is considerable heterogeneity in transfer behavior (see Table 4.4). While on average transfers are
significantly reduced when the insurance option is available, only 44% of the subjects actually
do reduce their transfers in response to the recipient’s choice; nearly the same proportion do not
change their transfers at all. This does not seem to be primarily driven by a lack of understanding:
when the sample is restricted to only those subjects that responded correctly to questions that
were asked during the experiment to test the subjects’ level of understanding, a similar pattern
emerges.12
12Interestingly, 13% of the providers transfer more when recipients forewent the insurance. The underlying
reasoning for this behavior is not directly apparent. A third of this is driven by erratic decisions of providers
who did not clearly understand the experiment. However, for some subjects this decision was intentional. In
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Table 4.4: Change in transfers
Proportion of subjects
All Test questionscorrect
No change (TNI = TI) 43.15% 44.57%
Reduction (TNI > TI) 44.05% 47.28 %
Increase (TNI < TI) 12.80% 8.15%
Observations 336 184
Change in transfers in response to recipient’s insurance option.
In summary, the findings from the experiment suggest that a large proportion of the villagers
take accountability principles into account in their transfer decisions even in an anonymous one-
shot setting. However, many subjects do not react to the ex-ante choice of the recipient. The
question is whether the transfer behavior can be related to the subjects’ exposure to informal
exchange outside the experiment. This will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
4.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.1 Estimation Strategy
I investigate the relationship between the subjects’ transfer behavior in the experiment and their
engagement in informal exchange by estimating the following model
CSi,V = α+ βExi,V + γXi,V + ξV + ui,V . (4.1)
CSi,V describes the extent to which subject i living in village V conditions her support on
whether the recipient did have the choice to avoid her loss. It is set in dependence to the subject’s
engagement in informal exchange Exi,V , controlling for individual characteristics Xi,V and village
fixed effects ξV .
I use two different specifications for CSi,V . Both are based on the subject’s transfer de-




, where T I
i,V
is the transfer of subject i if the re-
cipient had the option to insure, and TNI
i,V
is the transfer if the recipient did not have the
option to insure, which I call the baseline transfer. In a first specification, CSi,V describes
whether subject i reduced her transfer when the recipient had the option to insure. That is





and CSi,V = 0 else. I estimate the relationship between exposure
to informal exchange and the likelihood of transfer reduction by logit regression with standard
interviews conducted with randomly selected subjects after the experiment, some stated they felt more pity with
recipients who decided against the insurance and lost, than with recipients who just lost due to pure misfortune.
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errors clustered on village level.13 In a second specification, CSi,V describes the proportional







. The proportional rather than the absolute change is used,
as the scope for changes in transfers directly depends on the size of the baseline transfer; us-
ing the absolute change as dependent variable can thus lead to spurious regression results.14 I
estimate the relationship between exposure to informal exchange and the proportional transfer
change by OLS with standard errors clustered on village level. Using the proportional change
as dependent variable, mechanically excludes all subjects for which TNI = 0 (22 subjects). I
assume CSi,V reflects a subject’s preference to hold a person accountable for her choice. As it is
arguable whether engagement in exchange predates the formation of such preference, β should
be interpreted as a correlation not as a causal effect. I will discuss the interpretation in more
detail in Section 4.3.3.
Exi describes the extent to which subject i engages in informal exchange. In the main
analysis, Exi is measured by the number of exchange arrangements subject i reports; that is
δout
i,V
(ExchangeAny), in the following called the Exchange network.
A number of control variables, Xi,V , are included to account for factors that might affect
both, engagement in informal exchange as well as the inclination to hold others accountable. To
limit concerns of spurious regression I include three different sets of variables. First, I account
for socio-demographic characteristics that can be assumed to be exogenous to the model. I
include demographic characteristics such as gender and age (Female, Age, Age2); whether the
subject is born in the village (Native); the education (School years); and whether the subject is
the household head (Household head). Second, social network characteristics are included that
proxy a subject’s sociability; subjects that are in general more social might be better in forming
exchange arrangements, at the same time sociability can reflect a concern for the welfare of other
people and thus possibly affects transfer decisions in the experiment. To control for sociability,
I include the size of a subject’s friendship network δout
i,V
(Friendship) and the size of the advice
network δout
i,V
(Advice). A related concern is that subjects who are more engaged in informal
exchange might have a larger social network within the village and thus on average closer links
with other workshop participants. In the experiment, subjects do not know the identity of their
transfer recipient, but they can form expectations based on the overall pool of participants;
hence, the number of participants a subject is in close contact with might affect her transfer
decisions. Since the pool of workshop participants was not randomly selected, this aspect is not
necessarily captured by the friendship network. Therefore, I include the number of participants
a subject identified as people she trusted (Workshop network).15 Third, I control for economic
characteristics that are not necessarily exogenous but could be correlated with the outcome and
the explanatory variable of interest. To control for the general economic situation of a subject I
13When village fixed effects are included, bootstrap standard errors are used as recommended by Colin Cameron
and Miller (2015).
14For comparison, the results for the main specification using the absolute transfer decisions TNI and T I as
dependent variables are reported in Appendix C.2.2.
15This information is based on a network survey that was conducted with all workshop participants after the
transfer game: each participant was asked to indicate for each other workshop participant whether she knew the
person, whether they were relatives, whether they were friends and whether she trusted her.
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include household’s wealth measured by the asset index (Asset wealth); and whether a subject
is self-employed (Self-employed) as the self-employed are presumably exposed to greater income
fluctuations and are typically more dependent on their social support network; I include the
size of land in hectare a subject’s household cultivates (Cultivated land), which has been shown
to affect the size of both food and credit exchange networks; and whether a subject grows rice
(Growing rice), which is a precondition for labor exchange. Village fixed effects ξV are included
to account for village specific variation.
Summary statistics for all variables included in the regression analysis are provided in Table
C.2 in Appendix C.1.1. In three cases, the provider subject was not the original survey respondent
but was replaced by another household member, as the original survey respondent was not
available; in all of the following estimations these subjects are excluded.
4.3.2 Results
4.3.2.1 Conditional Solidarity and Informal Exchange
The control variables are subsequently added. In Tables 4.5 and 4.6, only the coefficients for the
network variables are depicted; for the full tables see Tables C.4 and C.5 in Appendix C.2.1.
Table 4.5: Likelihood of Transfer Reduction and Engagement in Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P (T I < TNI) P (T I < TNI) P (T I < TNI) P (T I < TNI)
Exchange network 0.048∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Friendship network -0.087 -0.090 -0.082
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Advice network 0.100 0.103 0.071
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Workshop network -0.009 -0.011 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 333 333 333 333
Socio-demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.441 0.441 0.441 0.441
r2p 0.008 0.020 0.022 0.022
χ2 3.405 12.932 20.359 11.855
p 0.065 0.228 0.119 0.618
Estimated by logit. Standard errors in parentheses.
In Columns 1-3: standard errors clustered on village level; in Column 4: bootstrap standard errors.
Sociodemographic Controls: Female, Native, Age, Age2, School years, Household head.
Economic Controls: Asset wealth, Selfemployed, Cultivated land (ha), Household grows rice.
Constant included but not reported.
We find a significant correlation between the size of a subject’s exchange arrangement network
and the likelihood that she reduces her transfer to a recipient who had the choice to insure against
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Table 4.6: Change in Transfers and Engagement in Exchange









Exchange network -0.023∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Friendship network 0.054∗ 0.056∗ 0.053∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Advice network -0.036 -0.046 -0.010
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Workshop network 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 311 311 311 311
Socio-demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable -0.232 -0.232 -0.232 -0.232
r2a 0.025 0.064 0.066 0.040
F 7.662 2.698 2.420 2.613
p 0.012 0.028 0.035 0.025
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on village level.
Sociodemographic Controls: Female, Native, Age, Age2, School years, Household head.
Economic Controls: Asset wealth, Selfemployed, Cultivated land (ha), Household grows rice.
Constant included but not reported.
the loss (Table 4.5). An increase in the exchange network by one standard deviation (4.44)
increases the odds that a subject reduces her transfers by 24% (e4.44·0.048 = 1.24). Similarly, the
proportional change in transfers is significantly correlated with the size of the exchange network
as depicted in Table 4.6. All else equal, an increase in the exchange network by one standard
deviation is associated with a 10% point reduction in transfers (4.44 · −0.023 = −0.10); this is
nearly half of the average reduction of 23%. For both specifications, the correlation becomes more
pronounced once socio-demographic and economic characteristics (Columns 2 – 4) and village
fixed effects (Column 4) are included. While including village fixed effects improves the overall
model’s fit, individual level characteristics explain little of the observed variation (see Table C.5
in Appendix C.2.1). Subjects with a larger friendship network and subjects who trust a greater
number of participants appear more lenient in their transfer reduction; while older subjects and
subjects who are not born in the village tend to reduce their transfers by more.
We can also analyze the different types of exchange arrangements separately. Results are re-
ported in Table C.6 in Appendix C.2.2. While each of the three types of exchange arrangements
is significantly negatively correlated with the proportional change in transfers, the correlation is
strongest for the case of credit and food exchange arrangements. One reason for the small pre-
dicted coefficient of labor exchange is the high variation of labor exchange arrangements across
villages. Indeed when two villages where labor exchange is nearly non-existent are excluded
from the analysis, the coefficient of labor exchange becomes larger and significant throughout
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the specifications.
Overall, the results show a strong correlation between the size of a subject’s exchange network
and the extent she reduces her transfers when the recipient foregoes the insurance option.16
Subjects who are more engaged in informal exchange show a stronger tendency to condition
their support in the experiment. The results remain robust when controlling for various subject
characteristics and village fixed effects.17
As a robustness check, I exclude subjects whose exchange network is more than two standard
deviations above the average; this excludes subjects who reported more than 15 different exchange
arrangements. Results are reported in Table C.8 in Appendix C.2.2. Columns 1 – 3 report
the results for the likelihood of transfer reduction, Columns 4 – 6 report the results for the
proportional change in transfers. For the estimation of the likelihood of transfer reduction,
the estimated coefficient of δout
i,V




, on the other hand, remains robust and the estimated effect size
is very similar to the previous estimation. This suggests that engagement in informal exchange
can explain the degree of transfer reduction but less whether transfers are reduced at all. Part
of this is likely due to the loss in information when aggregating the transfer behavior as a binary
response variable. Henceforth, the focus will be on the proportional change.
4.3.2.2 A different network measure
One concern is that the reported size of the exchange network might not reflect the true network
size; a subject’s report is potentially biased by unobserved characteristics that also affect her
transfer decisions (e.g. a wish to respond in line with the interviewer’s or experimenter’s expec-
tations). This concern is more difficult to address; yet, the unique data structure allows deriving
an additional indicator for the true size of a subject’s exchange network by using the reports of
the other survey respondents. In particular I derive a subject’s indegree measured by the num-
ber of surveyed households that identified a subject’s household as part of their social network.
More specifically, for network ` ∈ L = {Friendship, Advice, CreditExchange, FoodExchange,







16For comparison, Table C.7 in Appendix C.2.2 reports the estimation results for a subject’s absolute transfer
decisions.
17In addition to the reported control variables, various other variables have been tested: access to finance (e.g.
having a bank account or insurance), household income and other occupational characteristics. Independent of
these additional controls, the relationship between the exchange network and the reduction in transfers remains
strong and significant.
18This is not driven by the restricted subject pool. If we use the same subject pool when estimating the
likelihood of transfer reduction as we used for the estimation of the proportional change (i.e., excluding subjects
for which TNI = 0) results remain similar.
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where g`j,i;V = 1 if respondent j mentions subject i’s household as part of her network ` and 0
otherwise; with i and j both belonging to the pool of surveyed households – i.e., i, j ∈ NSV =
(1, .., nSV ) where n
S
V is the number of surveyed households in village V . Subject i’s overall

















Table 4.7: Change in Transfers and Engagement in Exchange (measured by the exchange inde-
gree)









Exchange network (indegree) -0.019∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.039∗ -0.030∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Friendship network (indegree) 0.036 0.031 0.026
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Advice network (indegree) 0.041 0.039 0.043
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 311 311 311 311
Sociodemographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable -0.232 -0.232 -0.232 -0.232
r2a 0.010 0.025 0.022 0.007
F 3.093 3.016 3.495 5.582
p 0.094 0.019 0.006 0.000
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on village level.
Sociodemographic Controls: Female, Native, Age, Age2, School years, Household head.
Economic Controls: Asset wealth, Selfemployed, Cultivated land (ha), Household grows rice.
Constant included but not reported.
of the respective outdegree measures. Results are reported in Table 4.7. The previous set of
control variables as well as village fixed effects are subsequently included. The coefficients of
interest are less significant but they point into a similar direction as the outdegree measure. The
larger a subject’s exchange network in terms of incoming links the greater the average reduction
in transfers in the experiment. The estimated effect size is similar to the outdegree measure. A
one-standard deviation increase in the number of incoming exchange related links is associated
with an additional 8% points reduction in transfers (4.44 · −0.019 = 0.084) or, ceteris paribus, a
13% point reduction when controlling for socio-economic characteristics and village fixed effects.
This provides some support that it is indeed the size of the exchange network that is driving the
results and not (or, at least, to a lesser extent) unobserved respondent characteristics that affect
the reported network size.
The indegree measure is not the perfect remedy. There are two short-comings. First, it likely
underestimates a subject’s true network size as not all households in the village were surveyed.
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This would be less problematic, if the pool of surveyed households was truly random and thus
representative for the village population. However, households could not be surveyed if no adult
member was present during the survey period. Thus, the derived indegree likely underestimates
the social network size to a larger extent for those subjects, who have proportionally more links to
households whose adult members work outside the village or have temporarily migrated. When I
regress the proportion of a subject’s exchange network that was surveyed on the subject’s socio-
demographic and occupational characteristics as well as village fixed effects, none of the subject’s
characteristics except for age turn out to be significant.19 This provides some indication that the
proportion of a subject’s exchange network that was surveyed is overall random or, at least, not
systematically affected by characteristics that could also explain transfer decisions. Second, the
indegree is strictly speaking the indegree of a subject’s household and not of the subject herself;
for each network question respondents were asked to identify the household they were linked to,
not a specific household member. Yet, this potential upward bias of a subject’s indegree is only
problematic if it varies systematically across subjects and is correlated with characteristics which
are not included in the regression that also affect transfer decisions. While this seems unlikely,
the possibility cannot be ruled out.
4.3.2.3 Exchange within and outside the family
The exchange network measure used, δout
i,V
(ExchangeAny), measures the sum of all exchange
arrangements a subject i reports. However, a subject might have different types of exchange
arrangements with the same partner. Furthermore, results might differ depending on whether
exchange takes place within or outside the family. There are at least two reasons. First, with
altruistic preferences a person is not only concerned about her personal welfare, but also about
the welfare of her exchange partner, and thus her incentive to renege on an informally agreed upon
arrangement is reduced (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Lin et al. 2014). Assuming altruism to be
stronger among family members than among non-family members, a lower likelihood of defection
implies a lower necessity for punishment in arrangements formed among family members. Second,
even in the absence of altruistic preferences, defection is likely lower if an arrangement is formed
within the family as the threat of social sanctions (i.e., sanctions by people who are not directly
part of the arrangement) can be assumed to be stronger: the network among family members is
likely more dense than the network outside the family and information sharing on defection more
complete (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001); therefore more links are jeopardized in case of defection
(Bloch et al. 2008). Hence, the social control through the family can reduce defection and thus
the need for bilateral sanctions, which are, on the other side, of greater importance when an
arrangement is formed outside the family. We could therefore expect that the inclination to
hold others accountable is more pronounced for subjects that are more accustomed to exchange
arrangements outside their family.
I repeat the estimation of Model 4.1 distinguishing between exchange within family and
exchange outside the family, both for the number of exchange arrangements and for the number of
19On average, 50% of a subject’s exchange partners were surveyed. The proportion reduces (on a declining
rate) the older subjects are; yet, the effect is only marginally significant.
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Table 4.8: Change in Transfers and Engagement in Exchange - within and outside the family














- within family -0.019∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
- outside family -0.035∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.038∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Exchange partners
- within family -0.017 -0.042∗∗∗ -0.024
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
- outside family -0.043∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.038∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311
Control Variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
r2a 0.026 0.063 0.039 0.013 0.045 0.020
F 4.008 2.516 2.255 2.178 2.337 3.273
p 0.034 0.028 0.045 0.082 0.039 0.007
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors clustered on village level.
Control Variables: Friendship network, Advice network, Workshop network, Female, Native, Age, Age2,
Household head, School years, Asset wealth, Selfemployed, Cultivated land (ha), Household grows rice.
Constant included but not reported.
exchange partners. Results are reported in Table 4.8. In Columns 1 – 3, as before, the number of
exchange arrangements is used as main explanatory variable, yet now split in arrangements within
and arrangements outside the family. In Columns 4 – 6, the number of distinct exchange partners
is included instead; again distinguishing between family members and non-family members.
First, we find that the estimation model that includes the number of exchange arrangements
explains overall a larger proportion of the variation in transfer reduction than the model including
the number of distinct exchange partners. Furthermore, we find that indeed the number of
arrangements outside the family as well as the number of exchange partners outside the family
are associated with a larger reduction in transfers than the number of exchange arrangements
and exchange partners within the family. These findings are in line with the above theoretical
reasoning. Subjects who engage more in exchange arrangements within their family reduce their
transfers on average by less than subjects who are engaged in arrangements outside the family.
4.3.3 Discussion
A link between engagement in mutual support arrangements and the inclination to hold others
accountable if neediness is self-inflicted does not seem unreasonable. In mutual support arrange-
ments, people are expected to provide support when the arrangement partner is in need and to
avoid excessive risk-taking that would increase her relative probability to be in need of support.
Under limited commitment and with non-existing or imperfect external enforcement mechanisms,
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the functioning of these arrangements crucially depends on the threat of punishment in case of
non-compliance (Coate and Ravallion 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 2001; Ligon et al. 2002); that
is, it depends on an individual’s readiness to hold the exchange partner accountable. While the
observed correlation thus seems sensible, there are different ways to interpret the findings. An
individual’s capacity to hold others accountable might explain her ability to sustain a number of
different informal exchange arrangements; on the other hand, it might be precisely the exposure
to informal exchange that forms and enhances an individual’s sense of accountability. The former
interpretation argues with selection, the latter assumes a learning process. Each will be briefly
discussed.
Holding others accountable for past choices and allocating less to someone who is responsible
for her bad luck suggests an underlying fairness norm. According to the developmental psychology
literature, notions of fairness are formed in childhood and adolescence. Children under the age of
6 already show a tendency to allocate more of a jointly produced good to those that contributed
more to the good’s production (Baumard et al. 2012; Liénard et al. 2013). This merit-based
fairness notion becomes more pronounced during adolescence (Sigelman and Waitzman 1991;
Kienbaum and Wilkening 2009; Meidenbauer et al. 2016). There is evidence for this also in the
economic literature. Almås et al. (2010) show that the willingness to accept income inequalities
as a result of differences in people’s exerted effort significantly increases with age.20 It is assumed
that the perception of what is fair or unfair is affected by the social environment, the education at
home and at school, and social interactions (Moore et al. 1993; Almås et al. 2010; Reeskens and
Oorschot 2013; Almås et al. 2016; Schäfer et al. 2015). If notions of accountability are formed
during childhood but are, by and large, stable thereafter, the findings from our experiment could
be explained by a selection process. An individual with a more pronounced sense of accountability
might be more inclined than others to select into informal exchange arrangements: she faces a
lower risk of a partner’s non-compliance due to the higher threat of punishment she poses, and
thus higher levels of exchange can be achieved. Furthermore, as the sustainability of exchange
arrangements depends on the level of punishment of non-compliance, individuals who hold others
accountable are more likely to be part of an exchange arrangement that is sustained. Finally,
these individuals might be more highly esteemed as exchange partners as they are assumed to
show a greater willingness to account for their own actions and thus to be less likely to free-ride
on other people’s goodwill.
A different interpretation of the observed relationship is based on the literature on the evo-
lution of fairness norms and cooperation (Chudek and Henrich 2011; Chudek et al. 2013; Boyd
et al. 2003). These authors argue that norms of cooperation and the inclination to punish their
non-adherence evolve as a strategy learned, adapted and imparted in order to sustain cooper-
ation; it becomes internally motivated and part of an individual’s preferences. There is some
suggestive evidence that, in particular, experience with market exchange can affect how fairness
rules are applied and how unfair behavior is punished. Analyzing fairness norms across small-
20The authors conducted a dictator game with a production stage with 5th – 13th graders in Norway. In their
distribution decisions almost none of the 5th graders took the production achievements into account, while among
the 13th graders meritocratism (i.e., allocating income in proportion to the exerted effort) was the dominant
fairness rule applied.
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scale societies, Henrich et al. (2010) find that in communities with stronger market integration
(measured by the average proportion of calories purchased at a market) people are more likely
to apply egalitarian fairness rules when asked to allocate a fixed amount of money between
themselves and an anonymous partner and, furthermore, to punish unfair behavior. The au-
thors argue that rules of cooperation were designed to sustain forms of market exchange, which
frequently involve interactions with strangers and differ from the traditional mode of exchange;
these rules resulted in local norms which were then also applied to other contexts. Findings by
Jakiela (2015) can be related. Conducting a dictator game with production stage at a university
in the U.S. and in different villages in Kenya, Jakiela finds that in the Kenyan sample villagers
living in economically more developed villages (measured by the distance to the next paved road
and to the electricity grid) tend to be more likely to reward effort.21 An interpretation of our
findings in line with this learning argument would suggest that individuals who are more exposed
to informal exchange arrangements learn the importance of holding others accountable for the
stability of these arrangements. They internalize this behavior and act in accordance also outside
these arrangements, even in a setting where the partner is unknown no future interaction can be
assumed.
To summarize, there are two potential interpretations for the observed correlation: one as-
sumes selection, the other a learning process. With the data on hand, I cannot determine which
interpretation captures the underlying mechanisms more accurately. Indeed, it could be a com-
bination of both. People growing up in an environment that is more favorable to mutual support
arrangements, learn the importance of accountability principles early on; when they engage in
informal exchange arrangements themselves this notion is strengthened; in particular, when they
deal with people outside their own family. Some individuals might be better than others in
following and enforcing the rules on which these arrangements are built upon due to innate
disposition or upbringing, and are thus able to maintain a higher number of different exchange
arrangements than others. But this is only a speculation; more in-depth research is needed to
understand the underlying mechanisms.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I show that an individual’s inclination to hold someone accountable for prior
choices is correlated with the extent to which she engages in mutual support arrangements, in
particular the informal exchange of money, food and labor. Individuals with larger exchange
networks reduce their support to a person, who could have avoided her neediness, by more.
The correlation is particularly strong for exchange arrangements formed outside the family.
Furthermore, the findings suggest that primarily the number of arrangements an individual
maintains matter and, to a lesser extent, the number of distinct exchange partners.
There are a number of limitations to the study that need to be considered before discussing
the policy implications of the findings.
21Jakiela provides a slightly different interpretation of her findings. She argues that economic development
increases people’s respect for others’ earned property rights.
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First, I can only show a correlation. I cannot identify a causal link, and there are several
plausible interpretations of the findings.
Second, the sample is very specific: the area, where the research is conducted is very poor
and has been heavily affected by the civil war following the Pol Pot regime (Chandler 2007;
ADB 2014); the surveyed villages were not randomly chosen but selected to be rather small and
not too close to the next urban center; finally, as discussed above there has been a selection
of subjects into the experiment, and people who worked outside the village were less likely
to partake. All these factors likely increase the size of the observed inter-household exchange
networks. Furthermore, the focus was explicitly on exchange arrangements within the village;
arrangements with people outside the village are neglected.
Third, the true number of an individual’s exchange arrangements is unobserved; I construct
the measure based on the individual’s reports. If misreporting is correlated with notions of
accountability this might affect the results. Showing that the results hold when using the indegree
measure reduces these concerns; however, I cannot rule them out completely.
Finally, I interpret the subjects’ transfer decisions as indication for their individual fairness
perceptions. But other motives might have affected the transfer decisions. For example, provider
subjects might have made their transfer decisions contingent on the expected preferences and
character traits of the recipient; they then might have taken the choice of the recipient as a signal
of her preferences (e.g. her risk preferences) and adjusted their transfers accordingly.22 A related
aspect is the role of presumed intentions. It has been shown that perceptions of intentions vary
across individuals and societies (Barrett et al. 2016). It might be the case that the observed
differences in punishment behavior in the experiment are not solely driven by differences in
the willingness to hold the recipient accountable for her prior choice but also by the presumed
intentions that affected the recipient’s choice. Indeed, it is shown how an individual interprets
certain behavior and the underlying intentions is affected by her social upbringing and experience
with social interaction (Dunn et al. 2000; Arsenio and Gold 2006; Vera-Estay et al. 2016); it thus
might also be correlated with exposure to informal exchange. As we have not elicited perceived
intention this potential link cannot be analyzed in more detail. Further research is needed.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings of this study are of particular policy relevance.
In recent years there have been considerable efforts to expand formal insurance in developing
countries. This aroused a debate on the interplay of formal insurance and the informal mutual
support arrangements. While some scholars are worried that formal insurance will crowd out
the traditional informal insurance arrangememts (Hintz 2010; Landmann et al. 2012, others ar-
gue that a strong network of informal insurance will rather result in a lower uptake of formal
insurance (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013; Dercon et al. 2014; Berg et al. 2017). Part of the
overall effect depends on how no-insurance uptake is received by other villagers. If there is a
general tendency to sanction villagers who do not take up insurance – i.e., to reduce the support
to those who could have avoided their neediness – then the pressure to take up insurance is high.
In this chapter, I show that this pressure is high even in villages with dense networks of informal
22In Chapter 3, we argue that this is unlikely to be the dominant motive, but we cannot rule out that some
subjects act in this manner.
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exchange arrangements; in fact, I show that in these villages the tendency to sanction irrespon-
sible behavior is even higher; particularly so, if these exchange arrangements take place outside
the family network. Ceteris paribus, the stronger threat of sanctions in villages with dense ex-
change arrangements could result in a relatively higher insurance uptake. These findings suggest
that the link between informal support arrangements and formal insurance is very complex. In
order to make predictions on the impact of formal insurance on informal institutions, both the
structure of existing support arrangements as well as the mechanisms that govern the behavior
within these arrangements need to be considered.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Descriptives
A.1.1 Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Household Characteristics (all villages)
mean sd min max median count
Household size 4.14 2.01 1 11 4 359
Female head 0.34 0.47 0 1 0 359
Head has no basic education 0.24 0.43 0 1 0 358
Head completed high school 0.35 0.48 0 1 0 358
No. of family hh within village 10.77 7.15 0 40 10 359
No. of family hh outside village 3.30 3.99 0 50 3 359
% of adults working 0.53 0.35 0 1.5 .5 357
% of adults working outside village 0.08 0.19 0 1 0 357
Covered by social security 0.27 0.44 0 1 0 359
Fishing as main income source 0.20 0.40 0 1 0 294
Farming as main income source 0.19 0.39 0 1 0 294
HH income last month (PHP) 13,225.56 31,225.09 0 330,975 5,800 359
Asset wealth 0.36 0.21 0 1 .33 358
OFW exists 0.13 0.33 0 1 0 357
Remittances recipient 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 359
Amount remittances last year (PHP) 34,228.40 47,443.59 100 312,000 12,300 187
Coop member 0.13 0.34 0 1 0 359
Bank account 0.06 0.24 0 1 0 359
MFI member 0.16 0.37 0 1 0 359
Health insurance 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 359
Informal borrowing and lending 0.63 0.43 0 1 1 359
Observations 359
Surveyed 359 households from 22 villages, covering 1485 household members; hh - households; PHP - Philippine Pesos.
*) Income from last month; includes salary, proceeds from self-employment, remittances, loans, public assistance,
pensions, payouts from savings and other income (such as gambling).
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics of Variables used in Neediness Analysis
mean sd min max median count
Age of head 53.84 15.72 4 98 53 306
Female head 0.33 0.47 0 1 0 306
Head completed high school 0.33 0.47 0 1 0 306
Household size 4.25 1.98 1 11 4 306
Asset wealth 0.36 0.21 0 .99 .33 306
No. links outside village 1.99 1.73 0 9 2 306
Remittances recipient 0.63 0.48 0 1 1 306
Durable asset wealth 0.42 0.20 0 .99 .41 306
No. of family hh outside village 3.42 4.21 0 50 3 306
Access to credit 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 306
Health insurance 0.52 0.50 0 1 1 306
Observations 306
Based on the sample of 306 surveyed households in the 22 villages, including a random sample
of 14 households from Maramig.
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics of Variables used in Dyadic Regressions
mean sd min max median count
Sum in Asset wealth 0.77 0.28 .049 1.8 .77 2080
Sum in Household size 6.92 2.39 2 16 7 2080
Sum in % hh members (16-59) 1.00 0.43 0 2 1 2080
Sum in No. of family hh within village 18.92 9.07 0 49 18 2080
Sum in No. of family hh outside village 6.34 3.94 0 25 6 2080
Sum in Age of head 110.89 22.84 51 176 111 2080
Sum in Head completed high school 0.80 0.69 0 2 1 2080
Sum in Female head 0.71 0.67 0 2 1 2080
Sum in Health insurance 1.23 0.68 0 2 1 2080
Sum in Access to credit 0.89 0.70 0 2 1 2080
Sum in Receives remittances 1.32 0.66 0 2 1 2080
Sum in n̂eedy 0.68 0.36 .0049 2 .6 2080
AbsDiff in Asset wealth 0.23 0.17 0 1 .2 2080
AbsDiff in Household size 1.91 1.49 0 7 2 2080
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) 0.35 0.26 0 1 .33 2080
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village 7.35 5.56 0 25 6 2080
AbsDiff in No. of family hh outside village 3.01 2.65 0 15 2 2080
AbsDiff in Age of head 18.98 13.33 0 66 17 2080
AbsDiff in Head completed high school 0.49 0.50 0 1 0 2080
AbsDiff in Female head 0.46 0.50 0 1 0 2080
AbsDiff in Health insurance 0.48 0.50 0 1 0 2080
AbsDiff in Access to credit 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 2080
AbsDiff in Receives remittances 0.45 0.50 0 1 0 2080
AbsDiff in n̂eedy 0.28 0.24 .00021 1 .22 2080
commonfriend 0.35 0.48 0 1 0 2080
Observations 2080
Based on the 2080 undirected links. hh - household.
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A.1.2 Asset Wealth
Derivation of Asset Index
I derive two asset indices: an index on general asset wealth (the variable Asset wealth) and
an index on durable asset wealth (the variable Durable asset wealth). These indices are derived,
using polychoric principal component analysis (Moser and Felton 2007), on the basis of the larger
data set of the 22 villages. Variables are chosen based on the proportion of variance they explain.
For the summary statistics of all included variables for both indices see Table A.4. The weights
are assigned using the first component. Each index is standardized to be between 0 and 1.
Table A.4: Assets included in Asset Indices
mean sd min max p50 count
land 0.36 0.89 0 4 0 358
cooking 1.23 0.61 1 5 1 358
lighting 4.74 0.60 1 5 5 358
water 3.57 1.26 2 6 4 358
walls 2.70 0.84 1 4 3 358
roof 3.21 1.85 1 5 5 358
floor 3.37 1.11 1 5 4 358
toilet 2.91 0.63 1 4 3 358
fridge 0.25 0.43 0 1 0 358
tv 0.55 0.50 0 1 1 358
ricecook 0.15 0.35 0 1 0 358
dvd 0.33 0.47 0 1 0 358
radio 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 358
pc 0.05 0.22 0 1 0 358
Observations 358
Based on 358 households from 22 villages.
The general asset wealth index includes variables that describe assets and housing charac-
teristics. The following variables are included: land size; wall-, roof- and floor material of the
house; source of energy for cooking and lighting; source of water; type of toilet; furthermore, an
indicator for whether the household owns one of the following assets: ricecooker, fridge, tv, wash-
ing machine, dvd recorder, radio and PC. The outcome of the component analysis is reported in
Table A.5.
The durable asset wealth index includes the following variables: land size; wall-, roof- and
floor material of the house; source of energy for cooking and lighting; source of water; and the
type of toilet (see Table A.6). The outcome of the component analysis is reported in Table A.6.
Internal Validity
For an index to be internally valid, the correlation among the variables included should be
sufficiently high. This is the case both for the general asset wealth (Table A.7) as well as for the
durable asset wealth (Table A.8).
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Table A.5: General Asset Wealth - Principal Components
k Eigenvalues Proportion Cumulative proportion
explained explained
1 7.02 0.50 0.50
2 1.31 0.09 0.59
3 1.04 0.07 0.67
4 0.92 0.07 0.74
5 0.71 0.05 0.79
6 0.68 0.05 0.83
7 0.54 0.04 0.87
8 0.53 0.04 0.91
9 0.36 0.03 0.94
10 0.31 0.02 0.96
11 0.23 0.02 0.98
12 0.17 0.01 0.99
13 0.15 0.01 1.00
14 0.03 0.00 1.00
Polychoric principal component analysis;
Based on asset ownership of 358 households from 22 villages.
Table A.6: Durable Asset Wealth - Principal Components
k Eigenvalues Proportion Cumulative proportion
explained explained
1 3.62 0.45 0.45
2 1.20 0.15 0.60
3 0.84 0.10 0.71
4 0.74 0.09 0.80
5 0.58 0.07 0.87
6 0.47 0.06 0.93
7 0.38 0.05 0.98
8 0.17 0.02 1.00
Polychoric principal component analysis.
Based on asset ownership of 358 households from 22 villages.
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Table A.7: Correlation among Assets for General Asset Wealth Index




lighting 0.11 0.03 1.00
0.04 0.58
water 0.05 0.17 -0.05 1.00
0.30 0.00 0.35
walls 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.15 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
roof 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.61 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
floor 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.53 0.40 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
toilet 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.21 0.26 1.00
0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
fridge 0.25 0.32 0.14 0.12 0.46 0.40 0.39 0.27 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
tv 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.12 0.39 0.44 0.36 0.25 0.44 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ricecook 0.18 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.47 0.35 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dvd 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.12 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.23 0.43 0.58 0.42 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
radio 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.22 1.00
0.00 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
pc 0.14 0.26 0.02 0.15 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.36 0.26 0.16
0.01 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Based on 358 households from 22 villages; p-values in second line of each row
Table A.8: Correlation among Assets for Durable Asset Wealth Index




lighting 0.11 0.03 1.00
0.04 0.58
water 0.05 0.17 -0.05 1.00
0.30 0.00 0.35
walls 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.15 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
roof 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.61 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
floor 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.10 0.53 0.40 1.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00
toilet 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.21 0.26
0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Based on 358 households from 22 villages; p-values in second line of each row.
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External Validity
To test the external validity of the derived indices, we compare the distribution of each asset
index with the income distribution (Table A.9 for the general asset wealth index and Table A.11
for the durable asset wealth index) as well as with the distribution of a measure of subjective
wealth (Table A.10 for the general asset wealth index and Table A.12 for the durable asset
wealth index). The subjective wealth measure is based on the question ‘On a scale from 1 to
10 how would you describe your household’s wealth status compared to the other households in
the barangay? (1 - much less wealthy; 10 - much more wealthy).’ The distributions are, by and
large, similar which supports the external validity of the indices.
Table A.9: Quartile Comparison: General Asset Wealth Index vs. Household Income
Quartiles of Household Income Distribution
1 2 3 4 Total
1 35.56 30.00 22.22 12.22 100.00
2 34.83 26.97 23.60 14.61 100.00
3 20.00 28.89 26.67 24.44 100.00
4 12.36 11.24 28.09 48.31 100.00
Total 25.70 24.30 25.14 24.86 100.00
Observations 358
Based on 358 households from 22 villages.
Table A.10: Quartile Comparison: General Asset Wealth Index vs. Selfreported Wellbeing
Quartiles of Selfreported Wellbeing Distribution
1 2 3 4 Total
1 64.44 30.00 5.56 0.00 100.00
2 46.07 32.58 19.10 2.25 100.00
3 30.00 24.44 38.89 6.67 100.00
4 5.62 7.87 48.31 38.20 100.00
Total 36.59 23.74 27.93 11.73 100.00
Observations 358
Based on 358 households from 22 villages.
Table A.11: Quartile Comparison: Durable Asset Wealth Index vs. Household Income
Quartiles of Household Income Distribution
1 2 3 4 Total
1 36.96 30.43 20.65 11.96 100.00
2 31.03 31.03 24.14 13.79 100.00
3 17.78 22.22 32.22 27.78 100.00
4 16.85 13.48 23.60 46.07 100.00
Total 25.70 24.30 25.14 24.86 100.00
Observations 358
Based on 358 households from 22 villages.
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Table A.12: Quartile Comparison: Durable Asset Wealth Index vs. Selfreported Wellbeing
Quartiles of Selfreported Wellbeing Distribution
1 2 3 4 Total
1 60.87 30.43 6.52 2.17 100.00
2 44.83 34.48 18.39 2.30 100.00
3 25.56 21.11 42.22 11.11 100.00
4 14.61 8.99 44.94 31.46 100.00
Total 36.59 23.74 27.93 11.73 100.00
Observations 358
Based on 358 households from 22 villages.
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A.2 Data Analysis
A.2.1 Healthshocks and Coping Strategies





Head completed high school 0.280
(0.306)
No. hh members (<6) 0.405∗∗
(0.181)
No. hh members (6-15) -0.167
(0.130)
No. hh members (16-49) 0.059
(0.109)
No. hh members (50-69) -0.134
(0.187)




Main work in public sector 0.162
(0.575)
Main work in agriculture 0.262
(0.379)
Main work in trade or craftmenship -0.045
(0.495)
Main work in transport or construction -0.032
(0.517)




Village fixed effects Yes
Observations 306





Logit estimation. Standard errors clustered on village level in parentheses
Based on the sample of the 306 surveyed households in the 22 villages, including
a random sample of 14 households from Maramig.
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Table A.14: Actual Coping Strategy (all villages)
freq pct
Loan from informal group/moneylender 6 1.58
Loan from formal institution (bank, mfi) 5 1.32
Use of savings 6 1.58
Use benefits from insurance 43 11.32
Sale of assets 14 3.68
State assistance, assistance from community 14 3.68
Work more 4 1.05
Reduce food consumption 1 0.26
Nothing 40 10.53
Other specify 1 0.26
Loan from SSS, GSIS, Pag-ibig 3 0.79
Loan from association, coop 1 0.26
Monetary gift from relatives - within Barangay 57 15.00
Monetary gift from relatives - outside Barangay 105 27.63
Monetary gift from friends, neighbors - within Barangay 4 1.05
Monetary gift from friends - outside Barangay 7 1.84
Nonfinancial help by relatives - within barangay 35 9.21
Nonfinancial help by relatives - outside barangay 2 0.53
Nonfinancial help by friends, neighbors - within barangay 7 1.84
Nonfinancial help by friends - outside barangay 0 0.00
Loan from relatives - within Barangay - with interest 0 0.00
Loan from relatives - within Barangay - without interest 10 2.63
Loan from relatives - outside Barangay - with interest 1 0.26
Loan from relatives - outside Barangay - without interest 1 0.26
Loan from friends/neighbors - within Barangay - interest 3 0.79
Loan from friends/neighbors - within Barangay - no interest 7 1.84
Loan from friends - outside Barangay - interest 0 0.00
Loan from friends - outside Barangay - no interest 3 0.79
Total 380 100.00
Observations 380
Coping strategies listed in response to a health emergency in past 3 years.
Responses of the 148 households who experienced a health emergency.
Based on the sample of 306 surveyed households in the 22 villages, including a random
sample of 14 households from Maramig.
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Table A.15: Hypothetical Coping Strategy (all villages)
freq pct
Loan from informal group/moneylender 5 0.56
Loan from formal institution (bank, mfi) 26 2.91
Use of savings 9 1.01
Use benefits from insurance 97 10.84
Sale of assets 52 5.81
State assistance, assistance from community 61 6.82
Assistance by ngo 3 0.34
Work more 12 1.34
Nothing 42 4.69
Other specify 2 0.22
Loan from SSS, GSIS, Pag-ibig 27 3.02
Loan from association, coop 4 0.45
Monetary gift from relatives - within Barangay 148 16.54
Monetary gift from relatives - outside Barangay 220 24.58
Monetary gift from friends, neighbors - within Barangay 23 2.57
Monetary gift from friends - outside Barangay 11 1.23
Nonfinancial help by relatives - within barangay 58 6.48
Nonfinancial help by relatives - outside barangay 5 0.56
Nonfinancial help by friends, neighbors - within barangay 9 1.01
Nonfinancial help by friends - outside barangay 1 0.11
Loan from relatives - within Barangay - with interest 2 0.22
Loan from relatives - within Barangay - without interest 35 3.91
Loan from relatives - outside Barangay - with interest 2 0.22
Loan from relatives - outside Barangay - without interest 8 0.89
Loan from friends/neighbors - within Barangay - interest 2 0.22
Loan from friends/neighbors - within Barangay - no interest 21 2.35
Loan from friends - outside Barangay - interest 0 0.00
Loan from friends - outside Barangay - no interest 10 1.12
Total 895 100.00
Observations 895
Coping strategies listed in response to a hypothetical health emergency.
Based on the sample of 306 surveyed households in the 22 villages, including a random
sample of 14 households from Maramig.
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A.2.2 Dyadic Analysis - Full Tables
Table A.16: Likelihood of Support Link, full table
(1) (2)





% hh members (16-59) 0.104
(0.231)
No. of family hh within village 0.031∗∗
(0.013)
No. of family hh outside village -0.054∗
(0.030)
Age of head -0.013∗∗
(0.007)




Alter: Asset wealth 1.790∗∗∗
(0.685)
Alter: Household size 0.129∗∗
(0.062)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) 0.046
(0.334)
Alter: No. of family hh within village 0.000
(0.014)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village -0.056∗
(0.032)
Alter: Age of head -0.001
(0.009)
Alter: Head completed high school -0.093
(0.163)
Alter: Female head 0.058
(0.214)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth -1.501∗∗∗ -2.508∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.563)
AbsDiff in Household size 0.060 0.153∗∗
(0.049) (0.068)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) 0.181 0.011
(0.272) (0.354)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village -0.027∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh outside village 0.003 -0.062
(0.030) (0.039)
AbsDiff in Age of head -0.015∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
AbsDiff in Head completed high school 0.004 0.037
(0.158) (0.151)




Ego fixed effects No Yes
Alter fixed effects No Yes
Observations 4160 3357
log likelihood -859.128 -758.231
χ2 225.427 191.690
p 0.000 0.000
Logit Estimation on the directed network. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
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A.2.3 Neediness Score
Figure A.1: Distribution of Neediness Score in Maramig
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Table A.17: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement - Naïve Approach, full table
(1) (2)





% hh members (16-59) 0.107
(0.191)
No. of family hh within village 0.012
(0.009)
No. of family hh outside village -0.037
(0.023)
Age of head -0.011∗∗
(0.005)




Alter: Asset wealth 0.595∗
(0.330)
Alter: Household size 0.098∗∗∗
(0.038)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) 0.107
(0.191)
Alter: No. of family hh within village 0.012
(0.009)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village -0.037
(0.023)
Alter: Age of head -0.011∗∗
(0.005)
Alter: Head completed high school -0.279∗∗
(0.118)
Alter: Female head -0.073
(0.145)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth -0.523 -1.313∗∗
(0.511) (0.579)
AbsDiff in Household size 0.108∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.077)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) 0.090 -0.431
(0.309) (0.406)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village -0.018 -0.020
(0.017) (0.018)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh outside village -0.004 -0.059
(0.031) (0.045)
AbsDiff in Age of head -0.014∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
AbsDiff in Head completed high school -0.065 -0.093
(0.178) (0.167)




Ego fixed effects No Yes
Alter fixed effects No Yes
Observations 2080 1854
log likelihood -647.404 -568.690
χ2 69.712 151.925
p 0.000 0.030
Logit Estimation on the undirected network. ςij = 1 if sij = 1 or sji = 1.
Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.18: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement - Accounting for Reciprocation, full
table
(1) (2) (3)
P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3)
Asset wealth -0.847 1.858∗∗∗ 0.256
(0.604) (0.647) (1.044)
Household size 0.069 0.143∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.062) (0.055) (0.091)
% hh members (16-59) 0.077 -0.010 0.184
(0.267) (0.434) (0.552)
No. of family hh within village 0.025∗ -0.011 0.033∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019)
No. of family hh outside village -0.020 -0.030 -0.182∗
(0.030) (0.040) (0.097)
Age of head -0.020∗∗ -0.005 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
Head completed high school -0.483∗∗ -0.120 -0.001
(0.235) (0.262) (0.370)
Female head -0.188 0.067 0.084
(0.227) (0.197) (0.372)
Alter: Asset wealth 1.858∗∗∗ -0.847 0.256
(0.647) (0.604) (1.044)
Alter: Household size 0.143∗∗∗ 0.069 0.077
(0.055) (0.062) (0.091)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) -0.010 0.077 0.184
(0.434) (0.267) (0.552)
Alter: No. of family hh within village -0.011 0.025∗ 0.033∗
(0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village -0.030 -0.020 -0.182∗
(0.040) (0.030) (0.097)
Alter: Age of head -0.005 -0.020∗∗ 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
Alter: Head completed high school -0.120 -0.483∗∗ -0.001
(0.262) (0.235) (0.370)
Alter: Female head 0.067 -0.188 0.084
(0.197) (0.227) (0.372)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth -0.949∗ -0.949∗ -4.330∗∗∗
(0.525) (0.525) (1.200)
AbsDiff in Household size 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ -0.136
(0.045) (0.045) (0.158)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) -0.038 -0.038 0.746
(0.310) (0.310) (0.676)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village -0.014 -0.014 -0.060∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.035)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh outside village -0.013 -0.013 0.069
(0.042) (0.042) (0.134)
AbsDiff in Age of head -0.012 -0.012 -0.028∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
AbsDiff in Head completed high school -0.186 -0.186 0.455
(0.173) (0.173) (0.438)
AbsDiff in Female head 0.188 0.188 -0.197
(0.184) (0.184) (0.363)






Multinomial logit estimation. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.19: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement - Neediness Score, full table
Part (1) Part (2)
Mutual Support Mutual Support
P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3) P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3)
n̂eedy -0.285 0.287 -0.404 -0.456 0.767 1.506∗∗
(0.229) (0.452) (0.660) (0.504) (0.562) (0.590)
Age of head -0.027∗∗∗ 0.012 -0.014 -0.029∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.016
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Head compl. high school -0.646∗∗∗ 0.434 -0.863∗∗ -0.623∗∗ 0.479 -0.838∗∗
(0.250) (0.310) (0.381) (0.257) (0.324) (0.398)
Female head -0.626∗∗ -0.397 0.415 -0.646∗∗ -0.400 0.332
(0.277) (0.308) (0.531) (0.270) (0.316) (0.540)
Alter: n̂eedy 0.287 -0.285 -0.404 0.767 -0.456 1.506∗∗
(0.452) (0.229) (0.660) (0.562) (0.504) (0.590)
Alter: Age of head 0.004 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006 -0.025∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
Alter: Head compl. high school 0.755∗∗ -0.540∗∗ 0.568 0.815∗∗∗ -0.495∗ 0.704
(0.294) (0.265) (0.540) (0.303) (0.273) (0.531)
Alter: Female head 0.602∗∗∗ -0.279 -0.618 0.526∗∗∗ -0.327 -0.821∗
(0.190) (0.279) (0.474) (0.201) (0.282) (0.466)
AbsDiff in n̂eedy 0.728∗ 0.728∗ -1.366∗ 0.153 0.153 -1.238
(0.428) (0.428) (0.780) (0.651) (0.651) (1.206)
AbsDiff in Age of head -0.010 -0.023∗∗ -0.018 -0.011 -0.023∗∗ -0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
AbsDiff in Head compl. high school -0.133 -0.179 0.170 -0.164 -0.223 0.207
(0.233) (0.253) (0.463) (0.240) (0.256) (0.456)
AbsDiff in Female head 0.037 0.421 -0.569 0.087 0.480 -0.559
(0.177) (0.290) (0.480) (0.185) (0.292) (0.469)
commonfriend 1.052∗∗ 1.052∗∗ 3.990∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.419) (0.987)
n̂eedy ∗ commonfriend 0.273 -0.759 -3.006∗∗∗
(0.754) (0.617) (1.078)
(Alter: n̂eedy) ∗ commonfriend -0.759 0.273 -3.006∗∗∗
(0.617) (0.754) (1.078)
(Absdiff in n̂eedy)∗ commonfriend 0.660 0.660 0.320
(0.882) (0.882) (1.877)
Constant -1.980∗∗∗ -1.980∗∗∗ -2.450∗ -2.429∗∗∗ -2.429∗∗∗ -5.069∗∗∗
(0.655) (0.655) (1.419) (0.719) (0.719) (1.530)
Observations 2080 2080
log likelihood -839.892 -799.244
χ2 166.661 551.357
p 0.000 0.000
Multinomial logit estimation. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.20: Likelihood of Mutual Support Arrangement - incl. endogenous predictors
(1) (2) (3)
P (ς̇ij = 1) P (ς̇ij = 2) P (ς̇ij = 3)
Asset wealth 0.336 4.554∗∗ 2.043
(0.228) (3.408) (2.894)
Household size 1.015 1.142∗∗ 1.080
(0.068) (0.062) (0.116)
% hh members (16-59) 0.994 1.326 0.975
(0.302) (0.590) (0.528)
No. of family hh within village 1.038∗∗ 0.985 1.031
(0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
No. of family hh outside village 0.992 0.981 0.846∗
(0.034) (0.039) (0.079)
Health insurance 0.715 1.680∗∗ 0.971
(0.157) (0.376) (0.382)
Access to credit 1.618∗∗ 0.846 1.029
(0.338) (0.250) (0.369)
Receives remittances 0.732 1.041 0.572∗
(0.153) (0.249) (0.186)
Alter: Asset wealth 4.554∗∗ 0.336 2.043
(3.408) (0.228) (2.894)
Alter: Household size 1.142∗∗ 1.015 1.080
(0.062) (0.068) (0.116)
Alter: % hh members (16-59) 1.326 0.994 0.975
(0.590) (0.302) (0.528)
Alter: No. of family hh within village 0.985 1.038∗∗ 1.031
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Alter: No. of family hh outside village 0.981 0.992 0.846∗
(0.039) (0.034) (0.079)
Alter: Health insurance 1.680∗∗ 0.715 0.971
(0.376) (0.157) (0.382)
Alter: Access to credit 0.846 1.618∗∗ 1.029
(0.250) (0.338) (0.369)
Alter: Receives remittances 1.041 0.732 0.572∗
(0.249) (0.153) (0.186)
AbsDiff in Asset wealth 0.390∗ 0.390∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.215) (0.014)
AbsDiff in Household size 1.173∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗∗ 0.893
(0.058) (0.058) (0.143)
AbsDiff in % hh members (16-59) 0.965 0.965 2.088
(0.307) (0.307) (1.449)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh within village 0.986 0.986 0.935∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.035)
AbsDiff in No. of family hh outside village 0.983 0.983 1.054
(0.044) (0.044) (0.138)
AbsDiff in Health insurance 0.841 0.841 1.691
(0.139) (0.139) (0.608)
AbsDiff in Access to credit 0.885 0.885 0.701
(0.159) (0.159) (0.241)
AbsDiff in Receives remittances 0.866 0.866 0.781
(0.175) (0.175) (0.287)







Multinomial logit estimation. Dyadic robust standard errors in parentheses.
Control for the level of and absolute differences in Age of head, Education of head, Female head.
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Table A.21: Predicting Neediness
(1)
Female members between 0 and 5 1.503∗
(0.322)
Female members between 6 and 15 0.455∗∗∗
(0.125)
Female members between 16 and 49 0.556∗∗∗
(0.097)
Female members between 50 and 69 0.447∗
(0.185)
Female members above 69 0.864
(0.420)
Male members between 0 and 5 2.579∗∗∗
(0.753)
Male members between 6 and 15 0.956
(0.182)
Male members between 16 and 49 1.812∗∗
(0.445)
Male members between 50 and 69 1.606
(0.570)
Male members above 69 3.503∗∗
(1.809)




Age of head 0.979∗
(0.011)
No. of family hh outside village 0.974
(0.052)
Village fixed effects Yes
Observations 303
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.380
log likelihood -162.605
r2_p 0.192
Logit estimation; estimators reported as odds ratios; standard errors clustered on village level in parantheses.
Based on the sample of 306 surveyed households in the 22 villages, including a random
sample of 14 households from Maramig.
Table A.22: Neediness Score for Maramig
mean sd min max median
n̂eedy 0.34 0.26 0 1 .27
Observations 65
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Game Design
Outcome without insurance option [provider;recipient]
[16, 000; 16, 000] [16, 000− T ; 2, 000 + T ]
0.5 0.5
Outcome with insurance option [provider;recipient]
[16, 000; 10, 000]






Figure B.1: Outcome Tree of Transfer Game
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B.2 Instructions
B.2.1 Instruction for the ‘General Introduction’
[All 32 participants sit, at the front two RAs, the other RAs stand ready with their color sign
boards]
Thank you all for coming today. My name is XXX. Let me briefly introduce our team to
you. [Introduce each RA.] And this is Friederike who is a researcher at a university in Germany.
This workshop today has 2 games and 6 rounds in total. During the workshop you can earn a
considerable amount of money that you are permitted to keep and take home. In the six different
rounds you will have to make decisions that will influence your personal earning, but each of
you will be given a show-up fee of 4,000 Riel at the end for sure. [Show money.] The remaining
procedure, from now on, will last around three hours. Thank you in advance for your effort and
time.
You should understand that the money you can earn in this workshop is not Friederike’s own
money. It is money given to her by the German government to do a research study. Friederike is
working together with other researchers who are carrying out similar workshops all around the
world.
If at any time you find that this is something that you do not wish to participate in for any
reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started the game or not. If you already
feel uncomfortable, or you already know that you will not be able to stay for the three hours,
then you should tell us now.
It is very important that you understand each round. Therefore we will check your under-
standing by asking each of you test questions about the rules. If you do not understand the rules
you may ask the assistants to explain them. But if you cannot answer the test questions after
explaining them twice, we will have to exclude you from the workshop and you receive only the
show-up fee. But don’t worry: we will do our best to help you understand.
The workshop is structured as follows: we have one game with two rounds, then a break
during which you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire and then a second game with
four rounds. After this there will be the payout. It is very important for our research that you
answer all questions of the questionnaire seriously.
After knowing these rules, is there anybody who does not like to participate? [Wait some
moments.]
There will be six rounds that are slightly different from each other. At the beginning of each
round, each of you will be given 16,000 Riel as endowment. These 16,000 Riel are play money.
But they will be exchanged to real money at the end of the workshop. In each round you might
lose some of this money. How much you keep and eventually your final earnings of this workshop
depend on your decisions, decisions of others and luck. The show-up fee of 4,000 Riel is always
untouched. We will at no time inform you about the outcome of other participants.
Friederike administers the accounts for each participant. [Show template sheet with accounts
for each participant.] After each round, the amount each participant earned will be reported to
Friederike. We play 6 rounds. Each round is named after a fruit. We have Mango, Pineapple,
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Orange 1, Orange 2, Apple 1, Apple 2. But you might play them in a different order. Only one
of the 6 rounds determines the final payout for you. At the end of the workshop, we will draw
a ball to determine which of the 6 rounds will be paid out to you. [Show 6 balls with the fruit
names.] Just one of the 6 rounds is finally paid out. [Shows example sheet with accounts for each
participants.] This is an example for the account sheet. Each row specifies the outcome for a
specific participant in each round. [Show.] Let us assume we draw this ball. [Draw a ball, show
the name on it.] How much will be the payout of this participant? [Show participant number
on sheet.] And how much of this? [Show a different number.] Let us assume we draw this ball.
[Draw a ball, show the name on it.] How much will be the payout of this participant? [Show
participant number on sheet.] And how much of this? [Show a different number.] [Repeat until
understood.]
The outcomes in one round have absolutely no influence on the outcomes of another round
or another game. They are completely independent from each other. So, if you make your
decision in one round, don’t worry what happened in the rounds before or what will happen in
the following rounds. Just take each round seriously on its own, because it might be the one
that is paid out.
In the rounds you have to make decisions about small sums of money. Each decision you
make is good – there are no wrong decisions. Your decisions will be kept in private, so just
choose the option YOU like best!
After we finished the six rounds, one by one will come to Friederike, who will hand out the
earnings of the round drawn plus the show-up fee to you and you sign the receipt.
You all received a colour badge and a participant number. The participant number is your
personal number. You keep this number for all six rounds of the workshop and have to show it
at the end in order to get paid. So always remember to take the color badge with you.
There are some more rules for communication. During the rounds talking is strictly pro-
hibited. You cannot ask questions to the other participants or talk about the rules with other
participants while we are in the process of the round. If you have any questions, please raise your
hand and wait until someone comes to answer your question in private. If you do not follow the
rule you cannot participate in the workshop anymore and get no earnings from the workshop.
We will now start. Please go to the assistant that shows a signboard with your colour. This
is your group. For all 6 rounds of this workshop you will stay in this group.
[RAs collect the participants, go with them to the respective rooms.]
B.2.2 Instruction - Providers A1
Welcome again. I am YYY and this is ZZZ. We will assist you in this round. Let me reiterate
what XXX stated in the introduction: Talking is strictly prohibited. You must not ask questions
to the other participants or talk about the rules with other participants while the round is in
progress. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait until I or my colleague
comes to answer your question in private. If you do not follow the rule you cannot participate
in the workshop anymore and get no earnings from the workshop.
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Let me first hand out your endowment. [Hand out bags with money to each participant.] You
will find in the bag 16,000 Riel in play money. This is your endowment. Remember, while we
use play money now, this translates to real money later.
You are lucky; you can keep all your money. This was determined through a random draw
that allocated participants to their roles. People in the other rooms are less lucky. They also
receive 16,000 Riel in play money. But then each of them rolls the dice – like this [Show.]. If the
dice shows 4, 5 or 6, they can keep their 16,000 Riel. But if the dice shows 1, 2 or 3 they lose
14,000 Riel and can keep only 2,000 Riel.
Each of you will be matched randomly with one partner from the other rooms. You can
support your partner in the case that she loses 14,000 Riel. Thus, you can decide whether you
want to transfer part of your money to your partner if she rolls a 1, 2 or 3, and therefore suffers a
loss of 14,000 Riel. Please note that you will never be informed about the name of your partner.
Your partner does not know that she has a partner. She does not know that she might receive
support from someone in case of a loss. If you decide to transfer something in case you partner
loses, this amount will be added to her account. But she will never be informed about you and
your name.
There are two different groups [Show on illustration.] and your partner is in one of the two
groups:1
In the group ’khâ’ the participants have the possibility to purchase a guarantee before they
play the dice game. The guarantee costs 6,000 Riel. They receive a guarantee certificate. [Show
example.] If they purchase the guarantee, they have only 10,000 Riel left, but they will not lose
anything in the dice game. That is, nothing happens to them if the dice falls on 1, 2, or 3.
In the other group,’kâ’, participants do not have the possibility to buy a guarantee. They
just play the dice game and they will either lose money or not.
[Round 1: Test Questions Simulation Group ’khâ’ and Test Questions Simulation Group ’kâ’ ]
Each of you will be matched randomly with a partner in either the ’khâ’ group or in the
’kâ’ group. Before the partner matching is determined, you are therefore asked to make two
independent decisions: “Suppose you have your partner in group ’kâ’ and your partner loses
14,000 Riel in the dice game, thus she has only 2,000 Riel left. Will you transfer part of your
money to your partner? If so, how much?” You will note this down in private on a sheet. [Show
the sheet.]
And then: “Suppose on the other side, your partner is not in group ’kâ’, but in group ’khâ’.
Thus your partner had the option to purchase a guarantee. However, your partner decided not
to purchase the guarantee and loses 14,000 Riel in the dice game, thus she has only 2,000 Riel
left. Will you transfer part of your money to your partner? If so, how much?” You will note
this down in private on another sheet [Show sheet ]. You will then still have time to look through
both decisions.
For each of you we then determine in which group your partner is. You will receive an
envelope. You put the amount of money that you decided to transfer to your partner into the
1We used two Khmer letters to refer to the recipients without the insurance option and to those with the
insurance option, letter ’kâ’ for recipients of type B1 and C1 and letter ’khâ’ for recipients of type B2 and C2.
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envelope. The amount of money must be the exact same as noted on the decision sheet. The
amount will be double checked. In case there is any difference the amount you indicated on the
sheet will determine the transfer. After you put the amount in the envelope, we will collect the
envelopes. The money in the envelope will be transferred to your partner in case she loses part
of her endowment. If she does not lose anything, you will keep the money in the envelope. All
remaining money will determine your personal earnings for this game.
[Round 1 and Round 2: Test Questions Transfers]
Your decisions are anonymous in two ways: First, your name will never be revealed to your
partner and your partner’s name will never be revealed to you. Second, you will do your transfer
decision in private using this cardboard [Show cardboard.]. We will not look at the decision sheets
or on the envelopes. In fact, we will not even touch the sheets or envelopes. You will put them
in this basket [Show basket.] and we will bring the basket directly to Friederike. Hence your
transfer decisions will not be observed by the other participants and not by us.
Remember, that the transfer decision is yours and only yours – there are no wrong decisions.
You can transfer nothing or 1,000 Riel, 2,000 Riel, 3,000 Riel, etc. as you wish. Your transfers
will be kept in private, so just choose the amount YOU like best! And remember it’s real money!
Remember, you partner does not know that she has a partner. She is not expecting anything.
Let us start. [Hand out the decision sheet for each participant and pencils.] Please assume
your partner is in Group ’kâ’, thus your partner has no possibility to buy a guarantee. She rolls
the dice and loses 14,000 Riel. She has only 2,000 Riel left. Would you like to transfer part of
your 16,000 Riel? Please write in the box how much money you would like to transfer. If you do
not want to transfer anything you write 0. [Wait.] Please put the sheet next to you.
[Hand out the other decision sheet to each participant.] Now, please assume your partner is
in Group ’khâ’, your partner decided not to purchase the guarantee, she rolls the dice and loses
14,000 Riel. She only keeps 2,000 Riel. Would you like to transfer part of your 16,000 Riel?
Please write in the box how much money you would like to transfer. If you do not want to
transfer anything you write 0. [Wait.]
Now, please have a look at your two decisions. One of the two decisions will be enacted in
case your partner loses 14,000 Riel. Are you satisfied with your decisions? Then please fold the
sheets and lay them in front of you like this [Show with name on the top.]. [Collect pencils.]
I will now hand out the partner envelope. [Go from one participant to the other, each draws
one white envelope with the partner’s group name and a player id written on it.] Please look at
the envelope. It tells you in which group your partner is. Please now take your decision sheet
for this group [Collect the other decision sheet which is not relevant with a basket.], look at it
and add the money exactly according to your decision in the envelope. This amount will be
transferred to your partner if she loses. [Wait. Then ask each participant to put the envelope in
a basket and hand out brown envelopes with the player number of the player.] Now, here you put
your remaining money. This will be transferred to your account.
[Ask each participant to put the envelope in the other basket. Finish.]
138 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.2.3 Instruction - Providers A2
Welcome again. I am YYY and this is ZZZ. We will assist you in this round. Let me reiterate
what XXX stated in the introduction: Talking is strictly prohibited. You must not ask questions
to the other participants or talk about the rules with other participants while the round is in
progress. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait until I or my colleague
comes to answer your question in private. If you do not follow the rule you cannot participate
in the workshop anymore and get no earnings from the workshop.
Let me first hand out your endowment. [Hand out bags with money to each participant.] You
will find in the bag 16,000 Riel in play money. This is your endowment. Remember, while we
use play money now, this translates to real money later.
You are lucky; you can keep all your money. This was determined through a random draw
that allocated participants to their roles. People in the other rooms are less lucky. They also
receive 16,000 Riel in play money. But then each of them rolls the dice – like this [Show.]. If the
dice shows 4, 5 or 6, they can keep their 16,000 Riel. But if the dice shows 1, 2 or 3 they lose
14,000 Riel and can keep only 2,000 Riel.
Each of you will be matched randomly with one partner from the other rooms. You can
support your partner in the case that she loses 14,000 Riel. Thus, you can decide whether you
want to transfer part of your money to your partner if she rolls a 1, 2 or 3, and therefore suffers a
loss of 14,000 Riel. Please note that you will never be informed about the name of your partner.
Your partner knows that she might receive support from someone in this group in case of a
loss. They are asked how much they expect to receive. But they, too, will never be informed
about your name.
There are two different groups [Show on illustration.] and your partner is in one of the two
groups:
In the group ’khâ’ the participants have the possibility to purchase a guarantee before they
play the dice game. The guarantee costs 6,000 Riel. They receive a guarantee certificate. [Show
example.] If they purchase the guarantee, they have only 10,000 Riel left, but they will not lose
anything in the dice game. That is, nothing happens to them if the dice falls on 1, 2, or 3.
In the other group, ’kâ’, participants do not have the possibility to buy a guarantee. They
just play the dice game and they will either lose money or not.
[Round 1: Test Questions Simulation Group ’khâ’ and Test Questions Simulation Group ’kâ’ ]
Each of you will be matched randomly with a partner in either the ’khâ’ group or in the
’kâ’ group. Before the partner matching is determined, you are therefore asked to make two
independent decisions: “Suppose you have your partner in group ’kâ’ and your partner loses
14,000 Riel in the dice game, thus she has only 2.000 Riel left. Will you transfer part of your
money to your partner? If so, how much?” You will note this down in private on a sheet. [Show
the sheet.]
And then: “Suppose on the other side, your partner is not in group ’kâ’, but in group ’khâ’.
Thus your partner had the option to purchase a guarantee. However, your partner decided not
to purchase the guarantee and loses 14,000 Riel in the dice game, thus she has only 2,000 Riel
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left. Will you transfer part of your money to your partner? If so, how much?” You will note
this down in private on another sheet [Show sheet ]. You will then still have time to look through
both decisions.
For each of you we then determine in which group your partner is. You will receive an
envelope. You put the amount of money that you decided to transfer to your partner into the
envelope. The amount of money must be the exact same as noted on the decision sheet. The
amount will be double checked. In case there is any difference the amount you indicated on the
sheet will determine the transfer. After you put the amount in the envelope, we will collect the
envelopes. The money in the envelope will be transferred to your partner in case she loses part
of her endowment. If she does not lose anything, you will keep the money in the envelope. All
remaining money will determine your personal earnings for this game.
[Round 1 and Round 2: Test Questions Transfers]
Your decisions are anonymous in two ways: First, your name will never be revealed to your
partner and your partner’s name will never be revealed to you. Second, you will do your transfer
decision in private using this cardboard [Show cardboard.]. We will not look at the decision sheets
or on the envelopes. In fact, we will not even touch the sheets or envelopes. You will put them
in this basket [Show basket.] and we will bring the basket directly to Friederike. Hence your
transfer decisions will not be observed by the other participants and not by us.
Remember, that the transfer decision is yours and only yours – there are no wrong decisions.
You can transfer nothing or 1,000 Riel, 2,000 Riel, 3,000 Riel, etc. as you wish. Your transfers
will be kept in private, so just choose the amount YOU like best! And remember it’s real money!
Let us start. [Hand out the decision sheet for each participant and pencils.] Please assume
your partner is in Group ’kâ’, thus your partner has no possibility to buy a guarantee. She rolls
the dice and loses 14,000 Riel. She has only 2,000 Riel left. Would you like to transfer part of
your 16,000 Riel? Please write in the box how much money you would like to transfer. If you do
not want to transfer anything, you write 0. [Wait.] Please put the sheet next to you.
[Hand out the other decision sheet to each participant.] Now, please assume your partner is
in Group ’khâ’, your partner decided not to purchase the guarantee, she rolls the dice and loses
14,000 Riel. She only keeps 2,000 Riel. Would you like to transfer part of your 16,000 Riel?
Please write in the box how much money you would like to transfer. If you do not want to
transfer anything you write 0. [Wait.]
Now, please have a look at your two decisions. One of the two decisions will be enacted in
case your partner loses 14,000 Riel. Are you satisfied with your decisions? Then please fold the
sheets and lay them in front of you like this [Show with name on the top.]. [Collect pencils.]
I will now hand out the partner envelope. [Go from one participant to the other, each draws
one white envelope with the partner’s group name and a player id written on it.] Please look at
the envelope. It tells you in which group your partner is. Please now take your decision sheet
for this group [Collect the other decision sheet which is not relevant with a basket.], look at it
and add the money exactly according to your decision in the envelope. This amount will be
transferred to your partner if she loses. [Wait. Then ask each participant to put the envelope in
a basket and hand out brown envelopes with the player number of the A player.] Now, here you
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put your remaining money. This will be transferred to your account.
[Ask each participant to put the envelope in the other basket. Finish.]
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B.2.4 Illustrations
Figure B.2: Illustration for Provider A1 - Recipient B1
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Figure B.3: Illustration for Provider A1 - Recipient B2
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Figure B.4: Illustration for Provider A2 - Recipient C1
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Figure B.5: Illustration for Provider A2 - Recipient C2
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B.2.5 Decision Sheets
Figure B.6: Decision Sheet for Provider A1 - Recipient B1
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Figure B.7: Decision Sheet for Provider A1 - Recipient B2
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Figure B.8: Decision Sheet for Provider A2 - Recipient C1
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Figure B.9: Decision Sheet for Provider A2 - Recipient C2
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B.3 Descriptive Statistics
B.3.1 Characteristics of Experimental Participants
Table B.1 provides an overview of the socio-economic characteristics of the experimental partic-
ipants. The information is based on the data collected in the survey that was conducted two
weeks before the experiment. The participants are a homogenous group in terms of ethnicity
and religion, with all but a few being Khmer and Buddhists (not displayed in the table). 68%
of the participants are female. In all but two villages, the female participants outweigh the male
participants. The imbalance is largely due to the fact that men are more likely to work outside
the village (either abroad or within Cambodia); furthermore, at the time of the survey many
rice farmers were engaged in rice transplantation which is typically done by men. Participants
are between 18 and 77 years old with a mean age of 39 and a median age of 37. Most partic-
ipants (86%) are married and about half (45%) head their respective households. Two thirds
were born in the village where they are now living. The level of education is rather low. The
majority of the participants went less than three years to school; 30% never attended school.
Correspondigly, only 66% of the participants report to be able to read and write in Khmer. Most
of the participants (86%) are self-employed, the majority as rice farmers.
Table B.1: Characteristics of the Experiment Participants
mean sd min max median
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.68 0.47 0 1 1
Age 39.46 12.15 18 77 37
Married 0.86 0.34 0 1 1
Household Head 0.45 0.50 0 1 0
Born in this village 0.67 0.47 0 1 1
Literate 0.66 0.47 0 1 1
Schooling years 2.91 3.02 0 16 2
Self-employed 0.86 0.35 0 1 1
Household Characteristics
Household size 5.65 2.34 1 18 5
Monthly income (USD) 160.66 363.05 0 5,000 50
ID Poor status 0.21 0.41 0 1 0
Indebted 0.60 0.49 0 1 1
Borrowed from other households 0.44 0.50 0 1 0
Borrowed from financial institution 0.33 0.47 0 1 0
Bank account 0.05 0.21 0 1 0
Member in a saving group 0.20 0.40 0 1 0
Insurance 0.08 0.28 0 1 0
Migrant 0.57 0.49 0 1 1
Remittances 0.51 0.50 0 1 1
Landownership (ha) 2.67 2.26 .016 30 2
No electricity 0.71 0.45 0 1 1
Observations 672
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A household consists on average of six people. Many of the participants are poor. One in
two participants report a household income of 50 USD or less in the last month. 21% of the
participants come from a household that is officially classified as poor.2 There is a substantial
amount of formal and informal borrowing. 60% of the participants’ households have outstanding
loans. 44% report to have borrowed money from another household in the village in the last 2
years; 33% borrowed from a financial institution, typically a microfinance institution. Only a
small proportion (5%) have a bank account but one fifth participate in an informal savings group.
9% have a formal insurance (mostly, health insurance). The majority of participants (57%) live
in a household where at least one household member either worked abroad in the past 2 years or
is currently working abroad. 51% of the households receive remittances. The households of all
participants own land, with greatly varying land sizes. Average land size is 2.7 hectares. More
than two thirds of the participants live in a household without access to electricity.
2The so-called IDPoor program was established in Cambodia in 2006 and was meant to provide information
on the poor population to facilitate targeting of state programs and NGO assistance. The poverty status is
determined based on observable assets, familiy composition and exposure to shocks and is renewed every 3-4
years. Being identified as poor provides, in particular, free access to basic health services.
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Household Head 0.02 (0.66)
Born in this village 0.01 (0.91)
Literate -0.02 (0.64)
Schooling years -0.15 (0.64)
Self-employed -0.04 (0.33)
Household Characteristics
Household size -0.37 (0.17)
Monthly income (USD) -24.73 (0.55)
ID Poor status -0.05 (0.27)
Indebted -0.04 (0.44)
Borrowed from other households -0.05 (0.33)
Borrowed from financial institution -0.01 (0.91)
Bank account 0.05∗∗ (0.03)




Landownership (ha) -0.08 (0.77)
No electricity -0.01 (0.81)
Observations 336
p-values in parentheses
Provider types are based on the roles subjects played in Round 1
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B.4 Treatment Effect Analysis
B.4.1 Tobit Estimation
Table B.3: Treatment Effect Analysis - Tobit Random Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer Transfer
Inf (β) 0.022 0.023 0.035 0.037 0.118 0.114
(0.090) (0.089) (0.099) (0.106) (0.103) (0.072)
Opt (γ) -0.751∗∗∗ -0.751∗∗∗ -0.747∗∗∗ -0.830∗∗∗ -0.878∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.091) (0.101) (0.108) (0.106) (0.074)
InfOpt (η) 0.024 0.026 -0.060 -0.006 -0.005 -0.016
(0.130) (0.128) (0.142) (0.152) (0.149) (0.104)
Constant (θ) 2.102∗∗∗ 2.237∗∗∗ 2.272∗∗∗ 2.324∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗ 2.086∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.098) (0.109) (0.118) (0.128) (0.084)
sigma_u
Constant (θ) 1.247∗∗∗ 1.250∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.277∗∗∗ 1.208∗∗∗ 1.125∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.074) (0.082) (0.053)
sigma_e
Constant (θ) 1.160∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ 1.117∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.023)
Round effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1344 1344 1168 908 596 1320
log likelihood -2253.435 -2244.583 -1977.033 -1499.709 -882.897 -1992.970
ρ 0.536 0.542 0.546 0.567 0.652 0.599
Tobit Random effect estimator; bounded at 0. Standard errors in parentheses.
(1)-(2) for all subjects; (3) excluding subjects who needed support in writing;
(4) excluding subjects who made at least two mistake at test questions;
(5) excluding subjects who made at least one mistake at test questions;
(6) excluding subjects who made at least one transfer above 7,000 Riel.
Transfers in terms of 1,000 Riel
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B.4.2 Round Effects
In Section 3.4.1, we noticed that there are round effects in our experiment but these round effects
did not seem to influence our coefficients of interest. To provide further evidence, we here split
our sample by rounds and run the OLS estimation of specification (3.2) separately for Round 1
(Column 1) and Round 2 (Column 2). Table B.4 reports the results.
Table B.4: Treatment Effect Analysis, by Round
(1) (2) (1) - (2)
Transfer - Round 1 Transfer - Round2 Effect Comparison
Inf (β) -0.268 0.274 -0.542
(0.277) (0.282) (0.395)
Opt (γ) -0.565∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ 0.066
(0.123) (0.166) (0.206)
InfOpt (η) -0.048 0.083 -0.131
(0.164) (0.222) (0.276)





Pooled OLS; standard errors (wild cluster bootstrap) in parentheses; clustered on village level.
(1) Participants who played Round 1
(2) Participants who played Round 2
Transfers in 1,000 Riel
There is a substantial round effect in the baseline transfer (i.e. θ). Providers with an
uninformed recipient without the insurance option send on average 500 Riel less in Round 2
than in Round 1. Yet, there is no significant difference in the transfer sent to informed recipients
without the insurance option (i.e. θ + β) between Round 1 and Round 2. Most importantly
for our analysis, the coefficients of interest, γ and η, do not change significantly across rounds.
Thus, a within-subject analysis combining the two rounds is unproblematic.
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B.4.3 Determinants of Insurance Uptake
Table B.5: Determinants of Insurance Decision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uninformed Uninformed Informed Informed
Age 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Female 0.069 -0.051 0.033 0.017
(0.063) (0.081) (0.088) (0.080)
Schooling years 0.002 -0.015 0.001 0.006
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Born in this village 0.137∗ 0.155∗ -0.044 -0.110
(0.080) (0.083) (0.078) (0.088)
Insurance -0.259 -0.167 0.209∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗
(0.168) (0.137) (0.069) (0.103)
Asset Index 0.009 -0.015 -0.581∗∗ -0.498
(0.316) (0.329) (0.234) (0.293)
Remittances -0.111 -0.024 0.034 0.096
(0.068) (0.068) (0.077) (0.086)
Personal Shock -0.011 -0.015 0.000 0.019
(0.083) (0.071) (0.050) (0.061)
Agriculture Shock 0.038 0.056 -0.006 0.013
(0.069) (0.061) (0.085) (0.101)
Trust in Village 0.005 -0.007 0.013 0.020
(0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.026)
Risk Preference -0.005 -0.006 -0.016 -0.021∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
No. of known participants 0.004 0.012 -0.002 0.005
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
No. of related participants -0.001 -0.003 -0.007∗ -0.007∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
Village fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 168 168 168 168
r2a -0.010 0.130 0.032 0.106
Mean of dependent variable 0.786 0.786 0.714 0.714
Pooled OLS estimator; standard errors in parantheses, clustered on village level.
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C.1 Descriptives
C.1.1 Summary Statistics
Table C.1: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Respondents
mean sd min max median count
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.71 0.45 0 1 1 1270
Age 43.31 13.61 18 79 43 1270
Native 0.67 0.47 0 1 1 1270
Household head 0.47 0.50 0 1 0 1270
School years 2.36 2.97 0 16 1 1270
Working 0.74 0.44 0 1 1 1270
Working outside village 0.14 0.34 0 1 0 936
Selfemployed 0.86 0.35 0 1 1 936
Household Characteristics
Household size 5.64 2.28 1 18 5 1270
Female headed household 0.28 0.45 0 1 0 1270
Total household income (USD) 164.74 354.69 0 5,000 55 1133
Asset wealth 0.37 0.15 0 1 .37 1270
No electricity 0.71 0.45 0 1 1 1270
Household grows rice 0.91 0.29 0 1 1 1270
Farming as income source 0.77 0.42 0 1 1 1270
Cultivated land (ha) 2.98 3.04 0 50 2.2 1270
Loan at MFI 0.34 0.47 0 1 0 1270
Bank account 0.04 0.19 0 1 0 1270
Savings at fin. institution 0.02 0.15 0 1 0 1270
Insurance 0.08 0.27 0 1 0 1270
Observations 1270
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Table C.2: Variables used in Main Analysis
mean sd min max p50 count
P (T I < TNI) 0.44 0.50 0 1 0 333
T I−TNI
TNI
-0.23 0.62 -1 5 0 311
Exchange network 6.47 4.44 0 26 6 333
Credit exchange 1.25 1.48 0 8 1 333
Food exchange 3.08 1.58 0 8 3 333
Labor exchange 2.14 2.81 0 19 1 333
Exchange network within family 4.19 3.92 0 21 3 333
Exchange network outside family 2.28 2.79 0 15 1 333
Friendship network 3.63 1.89 0 12 3 333
Advice network 1.17 0.93 0 5 1 333
Workshop network 16.14 9.01 0 31 16 333
Female 0.68 0.47 0 1 1 333
Native 0.71 0.45 0 1 1 333
Age 39.04 12.02 18 77 36 333
Age2 1,667.75 1,002.28 324 5,929 1,296 333
School years 2.94 3.06 0 14 2 333
Household head 0.46 0.50 0 1 0 333
Asset wealth 0.38 0.15 0 .92 .37 333
Selfemployed 0.73 0.45 0 1 1 333
Cultivated land (ha) 2.95 2.54 0 30 2.5 333
Household grows rice 0.93 0.25 0 1 1 333
Observations 333
For all provider subjects, excluding replaced participants.
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C.1.2 Informal Exchange
Table C.3: Determinants for Network Size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Friendship Advice Credit Food Labor(*) Any exchange
Female 0.016 0.087 0.189∗∗ 0.020 0.096 0.081
(0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05)
Native 0.021 0.151∗∗∗ 0.022 0.111∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.05)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.016 -0.001 -0.009 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
School years 0.014∗ 0.005 0.020∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Selfemployed 0.030 -0.018 0.024 0.022 0.096 0.064∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
Cultivated land (ha) 0.012∗∗ 0.004 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 -0.001 0.014∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female household head -0.136∗∗∗ -0.055 -0.301∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.119 -0.178∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05)
Household size -0.001 -0.026∗∗ -0.007 -0.003 0.003 -0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1270 1270 1270 1270 1152 1270
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. variable 3.408 1.159 1.311 2.926 2.171 6.206
r2p 0.036 0.021 0.050 0.032 0.171 0.105
χ2 577.905 256.591 285.991 594.052 580.910 1049.653
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Estimated by Poisson. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. (*) For households growing rice.
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Figure depicts for each village the proportion of surveyed households engaged in a specific type of exchange.
Proportion engaged in exchange (by village)
Figure C.1: Exchange Networks across Villages
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C.2 Regression Analysis
C.2.1 Full Tables
Table C.4: Likelihood of Transfer Reduction and Engagement in Exchange, full table
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P (T I < TNI) P (T I < TNI) P (T I < TNI) P (T I < TNI)
Exchange network 0.048∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.066∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Friendship network -0.087 -0.090 -0.082
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Advice network 0.100 0.103 0.071
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Workshop network -0.009 -0.011 -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Female -0.072 -0.055 0.104
(0.32) (0.30) (0.42)
Native 0.055 0.058 -0.144
(0.21) (0.23) (0.27)
Age 0.088 0.094 0.079
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
School years -0.020 -0.018 0.002
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Household head 0.040 0.027 0.323
(0.36) (0.35) (0.42)




Cultivated land (ha) 0.027 0.038
(0.06) (0.10)
Household grows rice 0.247 0.134
(0.58) (0.71)
Observations 333 333 333 333
Village fixed effects No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.441 0.441 0.441 0.441
r2p 0.008 0.020 0.022 0.022
χ2 3.405 12.932 20.359 11.855
p 0.065 0.228 0.119 0.618
Estimated by logit. Standard errors in parentheses.
In Columns 1-3: standard errors clustered on village level; in Column 4: bootstrap standard errors.
Constant included but not reported.
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Table C.5: Change in Transfers and Engagement in Exchange, full table









Exchange network -0.023∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Friendship network 0.054∗ 0.056∗ 0.053∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Advice network -0.036 -0.046 -0.010
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Workshop network 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female 0.084 0.090 0.019
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Native 0.070 0.074 0.129∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Age -0.024 -0.029∗ -0.030∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age2 0.000 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
School years 0.021 0.016 0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Household head 0.059 0.091 0.037
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)




Cultivated land (ha) 0.000 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01)
Household grows rice -0.171 0.004
(0.16) (0.22)
Observations 311 311 311 311
Village fixed effects No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable -0.232 -0.232 -0.232 -0.232
r2a 0.025 0.064 0.066 0.040
F 7.662 2.698 2.420 2.613
p 0.012 0.028 0.035 0.025
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on village level.
Constant included but not reported.
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C.2.2 Extended Analysis
Table C.6: Change in Transfers and Credit, Food and Labor Exchange













Credit exchange -0.070∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Food exchange -0.048∗∗ -0.023 -0.045∗ -0.047∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Labor exchange -0.023∗ -0.010 -0.021∗ -0.010
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Friendship network 0.059∗ 0.058∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Advice network -0.039 0.001
(0.04) (0.03)










Household head 0.089 0.041
(0.09) (0.09)
School years 0.017 0.014
(0.02) (0.02)




Cultivated land (ha) -0.002 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01)
Household grows rice -0.174 0.012
(0.16) (0.21)
Observations 311 311 311 311 311 311
Control Variables No No No No Yes Yes
Village fixed effects No No No No No Yes
r2a 0.025 0.012 0.008 0.025 0.066 0.044
F 10.590 5.857 3.068 3.616 2.579 6.074
p 0.004 0.025 0.095 0.031 0.024 0.000
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on village level.
Control Variables: Friendship network, Advice network, Workshop network, Female, Native, Age, Age2,
Household head, School years, Asset wealth, Selfemployed, Cultivated land (ha), Household grows rice.
Constant included but not reported.
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Table C.7: Absolute Transfers and Engagement in Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
TNI TNI TNI TNI T I T I T I T I
Credit exchange -0.068 -0.057 -0.067 0.000 -0.138∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.092
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Food exchange 0.111∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.153∗∗ 0.061 0.049 0.049 0.043
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Labor exchange -0.058 -0.055 -0.061 -0.069∗ -0.018 -0.035 -0.039 -0.033
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Friendship network -0.047 -0.054 -0.058 0.036 0.035 0.021
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Advice network -0.004 0.033 0.021 -0.056 -0.053 -0.006
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Workshop network 0.015 0.017 0.015 0.032∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female -0.327∗ -0.371∗ -0.378∗ -0.083 -0.058 -0.195
(0.18) (0.21) (0.21) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
Native -0.156 -0.171 -0.167 -0.221 -0.240 -0.149
(0.25) (0.26) (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.30)
Age 0.048 0.034 0.025 -0.015 -0.037 -0.033
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
School years 0.065∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.033 0.074∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.041
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Household head 0.114 -0.020 0.077 0.026 0.027 -0.055
(0.24) (0.22) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Asset wealth -0.307 0.756 0.856 1.150∗
(0.87) (0.68) (0.56) (0.62)
Selfemployed 0.527∗∗ 0.561∗∗ 0.262 0.198
(0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.19)
Cultivated land (ha) -0.016 -0.035 -0.017 -0.046
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Household grows rice -0.331 -0.675 -0.234 -0.289
(0.57) (0.71) (0.37) (0.46)
Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333 333 333
Village fixed effects No No No Yes No No No Yes
Mean of dep. variable 2.150 2.150 2.150 2.150 1.556 1.556 1.556 1.556
r2a 0.006 0.019 0.022 0.031 0.009 0.052 0.053 0.034
F 4.038 6.707 19.261 8.482 5.552 6.380 25.536 21.825
p 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses clustered on village level. Constant included but not reported.
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Table C.8: Change in Transfers and Engagement in Exchange, excluding Outliers(*)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







Exchange network 0.035 0.047 0.040 -0.024∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Friendship network -0.074 -0.073 0.058∗ 0.058∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Advice network 0.165 0.137 -0.057 -0.020
(0.13) (0.14) (0.05) (0.04)
Workshop network -0.010 -0.005 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.053 0.047 0.084 0.018
(0.30) (0.31) (0.07) (0.08)
Native 0.007 -0.151 0.076 0.127∗∗
(0.21) (0.29) (0.07) (0.05)
Age 0.098 0.090 -0.030∗ -0.032∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02)
Age2 -0.001 -0.001 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
School years -0.016 0.006 0.014 0.010
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Household head 0.086 0.361 0.078 0.024
(0.33) (0.38) (0.10) (0.09)
Asset wealth -0.121 0.744 0.406 0.180
(0.88) (0.92) (0.32) (0.21)
Selfemployed -0.053 -0.019 -0.041 -0.060
(0.32) (0.37) (0.09) (0.09)
Cultivated land (ha) 0.013 0.012 0.001 -0.003
(0.05) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Household grows rice 0.307 0.221 -0.171 0.014
(0.58) (0.77) (0.16) (0.22)
Observations 319 319 319 298 298 298
Village fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Mean of dep. variable 0.433 0.433 0.433 -0.219 -0.219 -0.219
r2p 0.003 0.018 0.022
r2a 0.016 0.055 0.037
χ2 1.457 22.751 33.145
F 5.533 2.393 2.028
p 0.227 0.064 0.003 0.029 0.037 0.072
(*)Subjects reporting 16 or more exchange arrangements are excluded.
Columns 1-3 estimated by logit; columns 4-6 estimated by OLS.
Standard errors clustered on village level.
Column 6 bootstrap standard errors. Constant included but not reported.
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